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>The main reason is there are alternative paths where neither were required. Japan was already fishing around for diplomatic end to the war with the major stick

by opo 8d ago

>The main reason is there are alternative paths where neither were required. Japan was already fishing around for diplomatic end to the war with the major sticking point being conditional vs unconditional surrender and their main condition iirc was protection for the Emperor ... This is not true. While there were peace feelers put out by the civilian members of the Big 6, the military hardliners blocked each of them. (Most accounts also state that part of their conditions would be to be given the islands in the South Pacific that the allies had just conquered.) Even AFTER an atomic bomb had been dropped, the military had unacceptable demands: >...Three members held out for three additional terms: Army Minister General Korechika Anami and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, General Yoshijiro Umezu, and Navy, Admiral Soemu Toyoda. These additional terms included: 1) Japan would disarm her own forces; 2) Japan would conduct any “so-called” war crimes trials of her own nationals; and 3) there would be no occupation of Japan. This last term would assure the continuance of the Imperial system and Hirohito’s seat on the throne. These positions would be referred to as the “one condition” and the “four condition” Japanese peace terms. Under the Japanese governing system, however, the Big Six could only act when unanimous. With a three to three split, they were deadlocked. It was at this point that Hirohito intervened: >...At the end of the theatrical demonstration of the deadlock, the emperor spoke. He stated he had given serious consideration to the situation at home and aboard. He then announced his support of the “one condition” offer. He and Japan must “bear the unbearable.” The Big Six and later the full cabinet made Hirohito’s decision official government policy. The American and Allied reply accepted the Japanese surrender offer, except that it stated clearly that the emperor would be subordinate to the occupation commander. This produced another dispute as to whether Japan could accept these terms. The emperor intervened again to announce he was satisfied with the American cable. https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/japans-surrender-military-coup-1945 https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/japans-surren... Even after all this, hardline military officers attempted a violent military coup to destroy the Emperor's recorded surrender broadcast and keep the war going.

rtkwe 8d ago
I talk in more (somewhat ramble-y) detail here [0], but I think I can put a more succinct version of the anti argument here, the main argument is that to morally justify the extreme act dropping atomic bombs on those cities requires an extreme set of justifications to the level of "it was the only option short of a bloody millions dead between both sides home island invasion" that history doesn't necessarily support. The core thrust that undermines the this or that between bombs and traditional invasion justification for dropping the bombs is that a) the Emperor was already exploring possible peace deals and b) ultimately the Emperor was able to override the extreme militarists in the war council and accept the peace after the bombs. A lot of the pro-moral-bomb argument presupposes that the shock and awe of the atomic bombs were a prerequisite for the change in stance and that anything short of a full invasion of the home islands would not achieve shift large enough to get to a peace deal. (and that to achieve that impact required them to be used on a city) Ultimately I think (and I know this is extremely hard to prove ahistorically) a naval blockade and shelling/arial campaign that devastated what little military might Japan had left would have lead to the same shift as the bombs and that the casualties from that would be lower or at least less morally weighted as the intentional atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When that shift would happen and how to weigh the deaths morally are going to vary a lot from person to person though and I accept that. > Even after all this, hardline military officers attempted a violent military coup to destroy the Emperor's recorded surrender broadcast and keep the war going. A coup that ultimately fails though. I don't think anyone really argues that there weren't fanatical elements remaining even after the bombs were dropped. Their existence doesn't mean peace required the bombs however, the big question is what were the conditions that would reduce their power to the point the peace could be accepted. We have one example in the bombing but that doesn't mean that was the only option. [0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49757977 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49757977
- hylaride 8d ago
  I personally subscribe to the theory that nuking Japan (at least once) probably stopped the need for an invasion. Almost all of the archives that were sifted through pretty much answers the fact that the Japanese were never going to negotiate a peace that removed its militant aspects otherwise. There would likely have been another war and Japan wouldn't have become democratic. The 2nd bomb? I can be convinced either way. Japan needed to know they had more than one, but it probably didn't have to be a city. That being said, this is a lot of presentism (looking at the past with modern ethics). World War Two was a brutal, total war and the long term effects of nuclear weapons were not fully understood. Remember that there was carpet bombing with incendiary bombs happening against Japan's wooden cities for the year leading up to this. A non-nuclear end the the war would almost certainly have involved a land invasion and many, many more deaths on all sides. Japan (as a country) was also not innocent in all this. They started the war - both with China and the USA. The Japanese military IN COLD BLOOD slaughtered more civilians than the Allies did in all their strategic bombings, let alone just nuclear. Even the nuclear bombs had military targets in mind...
  - FireHorseAutumn 8d ago
    It's complicated because Japan, then and now: 1) is a place where symbolic and actual authority are two very different things. 2) is a place where outward consensus is prioritized. Heavily. After the fall of Tojo in the middle of 1944, the cabinet which regained a modest degree of civilian control was split between those who wanted to surrender with one condition (the kokutai gets preserved in some form-this is what Truman eventually agreed to) and those who wanted to surrender, but with several conditions-they handle their own war crimes trials, all kinds of unrealistic stuff. The thing is: the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, the atomic bombings, the potential social unrest, it all happened within the space of a week. It's frankly a bit bizarre to suggest that one and only one of these played a role in the Japanese decision to surrender, especially given the structure of their government. It probably all combined together at once. And even this led to the Kyujo incident. >The Japanese military IN COLD BLOOD slaughtered more civilians than the Allies did in all their strategic bombings, let alone just nuclear. Even the nuclear bombs had military targets in mind... Operation Meetinghouse killed more than the atomic bombs did. And the Soviets-quite literally-raped, murdered, and looted their way through Manchuria to the point where anti-Soviet demonstrations in multiple Chinese cities became very difficult for the KMT regime to control. The Americans would pardon Shiro Ishii, the Soviets would put several Unit 731 goons to work on their own human experimentation program at Sverdlovsk. And these were the relative good guys. So, yeah: it was a dark time in human history. Ultimately, the decision to use the atomic bombs can't be separated from the decision to press for unconditional surrender of some kind. You could genuinely make the argument that Roosevelt was careless in applying something meant for Germany and its history to a completely different country with different pathologies, and it is certainly true that a "placated" Stalin, a strong pro-US nationalist China, a demilitarized irrelevant Japan, and a decolonized Asia were four goals that were never going to be compatible. But it didn't really matter for Truman, one of the few American Presidents who knew what war actually was-WWI as well as being descended from the losers in the Civil War-and someone who barely had the legitimacy needed to agree to keeping the kokutai after the atomic bombings. I think their usage was inevitable by 1945. Those incandescent with rage from 80 years later miss the forest for the trees.

by opo 8d ago

rtkwe 8d ago

I talk in more (somewhat ramble-y) detail here [0], but I think I can put a more succinct version of the anti argument here, the main argument is that to morally justify the extreme act dropping atomic bombs on those cities requires an extreme set of justifications to the level of "it was the only option short of a bloody millions dead between both sides home island invasion" that history doesn't necessarily support. The core thrust that undermines the this or that between bombs and traditional invasion justification for dropping the bombs is that a) the Emperor was already exploring possible peace deals and b) ultimately the Emperor was able to override the extreme militarists in the war council and accept the peace after the bombs. A lot of the pro-moral-bomb argument presupposes that the shock and awe of the atomic bombs were a prerequisite for the change in stance and that anything short of a full invasion of the home islands would not achieve shift large enough to get to a peace deal. (and that to achieve that impact required them to be used on a city) Ultimately I think (and I know this is extremely hard to prove ahistorically) a naval blockade and shelling/arial campaign that devastated what little military might Japan had left would have lead to the same shift as the bombs and that the casualties from that would be lower or at least less morally weighted as the intentional atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When that shift would happen and how to weigh the deaths morally are going to vary a lot from person to person though and I accept that. > Even after all this, hardline military officers attempted a violent military coup to destroy the Emperor's recorded surrender broadcast and keep the war going. A coup that ultimately fails though. I don't think anyone really argues that there weren't fanatical elements remaining even after the bombs were dropped. Their existence doesn't mean peace required the bombs however, the big question is what were the conditions that would reduce their power to the point the peace could be accepted. We have one example in the bombing but that doesn't mean that was the only option. [0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49757977 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49757977

hylaride 8d ago
I personally subscribe to the theory that nuking Japan (at least once) probably stopped the need for an invasion. Almost all of the archives that were sifted through pretty much answers the fact that the Japanese were never going to negotiate a peace that removed its militant aspects otherwise. There would likely have been another war and Japan wouldn't have become democratic. The 2nd bomb? I can be convinced either way. Japan needed to know they had more than one, but it probably didn't have to be a city. That being said, this is a lot of presentism (looking at the past with modern ethics). World War Two was a brutal, total war and the long term effects of nuclear weapons were not fully understood. Remember that there was carpet bombing with incendiary bombs happening against Japan's wooden cities for the year leading up to this. A non-nuclear end the the war would almost certainly have involved a land invasion and many, many more deaths on all sides. Japan (as a country) was also not innocent in all this. They started the war - both with China and the USA. The Japanese military IN COLD BLOOD slaughtered more civilians than the Allies did in all their strategic bombings, let alone just nuclear. Even the nuclear bombs had military targets in mind...
- FireHorseAutumn 8d ago
  It's complicated because Japan, then and now: 1) is a place where symbolic and actual authority are two very different things. 2) is a place where outward consensus is prioritized. Heavily. After the fall of Tojo in the middle of 1944, the cabinet which regained a modest degree of civilian control was split between those who wanted to surrender with one condition (the kokutai gets preserved in some form-this is what Truman eventually agreed to) and those who wanted to surrender, but with several conditions-they handle their own war crimes trials, all kinds of unrealistic stuff. The thing is: the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, the atomic bombings, the potential social unrest, it all happened within the space of a week. It's frankly a bit bizarre to suggest that one and only one of these played a role in the Japanese decision to surrender, especially given the structure of their government. It probably all combined together at once. And even this led to the Kyujo incident. >The Japanese military IN COLD BLOOD slaughtered more civilians than the Allies did in all their strategic bombings, let alone just nuclear. Even the nuclear bombs had military targets in mind... Operation Meetinghouse killed more than the atomic bombs did. And the Soviets-quite literally-raped, murdered, and looted their way through Manchuria to the point where anti-Soviet demonstrations in multiple Chinese cities became very difficult for the KMT regime to control. The Americans would pardon Shiro Ishii, the Soviets would put several Unit 731 goons to work on their own human experimentation program at Sverdlovsk. And these were the relative good guys. So, yeah: it was a dark time in human history. Ultimately, the decision to use the atomic bombs can't be separated from the decision to press for unconditional surrender of some kind. You could genuinely make the argument that Roosevelt was careless in applying something meant for Germany and its history to a completely different country with different pathologies, and it is certainly true that a "placated" Stalin, a strong pro-US nationalist China, a demilitarized irrelevant Japan, and a decolonized Asia were four goals that were never going to be compatible. But it didn't really matter for Truman, one of the few American Presidents who knew what war actually was-WWI as well as being descended from the losers in the Civil War-and someone who barely had the legitimacy needed to agree to keeping the kokutai after the atomic bombings. I think their usage was inevitable by 1945. Those incandescent with rage from 80 years later miss the forest for the trees.