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I really think the right way to look at this is as a matter of degree ('what is it conscious of) rather than whether it is conscious or not. The crux: if the ca
by _alternator_ 15d ago
I really think the right way to look at this is as a matter of degree ('what is it conscious of) rather than whether it is conscious or not. The crux: if the capacity exists in all material but "something else" makes it conscious, then consciousness is outside of the material, right?
The argument that consciousness suddenly arises due to a particular configuration of atoms is also suspect; all forms of consciousness we routinely accept are fairly robust to many configuration changes. It seems to me that consciousness hinges on the discussion of degree or content, not on the material form. A soup of atoms certainly could be aware, but not aware of in the same way that "I" am aware.
- someguynamedq 15d agoThe forms of consciousness we accept are, in the grand scheme of things, profoundly sensitive to disruption of their configuration. E.g. anything that physically reconfigures the brain sufficiently, including just a reduction in oxygen flow to its cells, completely destroys all evidence of consciousness in the brained-individual. It comes down to which axioms you take. If you assume materialism is true, then your consciousness is evidence that a soup of atoms can be aware precisely the way you are. The only question becomes how that is the case. It is only when you assume that your consciousness cannot fit within materialism that you must start looking for the alternative.
- mysecretaccount 15d ago> The argument that consciousness suddenly arises due to a particular configuration of atoms is also suspect; all forms of consciousness we routinely accept are fairly robust to many configuration changes. Not true at all - consciousness appears to rely on an extremely limited set of configurations, relative to all possible.