Not only am I not a lawyer, but I'm especially not a constitutional lawyer. It seems that you're right that the general concern is about Americans who communic

Not only am I not a lawyer, but I'm especially not a constitutional lawyer. It seems that you're right that the general concern is about Americans who communicate with targets abroad, not purely domestic communications. However, I recall discussion in the office about chilling effects re: international communications that would harm US academics' abilities to collaborate abroad, which is the only example I remember at this distance. The original article: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pa... My interpretation of the EFF is that while intent matters, and the intent of existing programs is to primarily target internationally, without oversight, there's no distinction between international and domestic wiretapping. We have little sense of what wiretapping does go on because it's all overseen by secret FISA courts. Here's the '09 report on domestic overcollection: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html?pagewanted=all http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/16nsa.html?pagewanted=a... I think the EFF's point is: what protections does a US citizen have against being caught up in these wiretaps, considering the known flaws of the program and its operators? That's where the Fourth Amendment comes into play and questions over probably cause and warrants.