> Seems doubtful! I expect the forgers used a real signature from another card instead, so it has the right key but the wrong data. Reverse engineering the proc

> Seems doubtful! I expect the forgers used a real signature from another card instead, so it has the right key but the wrong data. Reverse engineering the process as the author did and making up their own key wouldn't be of any value to the forgers. This was just bad wording. I meant to say "someone else's key" in the context that it was a key generated by the forgers rather than the state DMV, will update to make it more clear! > This is not wrong, but should come with a little warning. A real verifier needs to additionally check the encoded data matches the human-readable data on the front of the card. Correct, but simply checking that it matches the front is likely not enough to deter fraud. You could extract the barcode data from a real ID and put it on a physically different (fake) ID with a different photo and it would still return as valid. To detect this you generally would need a higher end solution (IDScan.net/VeriScan's ID authentication solution (yes... the one that just leaked everyone's data), TokenWorks' IdentiFake, IDScience, amongst others) that does the same high resolution UV/IR checks TSA does. But the forgers are good enough now to be able to sometimes pass those scanners too.