3 ms·
Important to note that the system(s) it infected were non-trivially air-gapped, so it had to do the entirety of it's infectious work without command and control
by BLKNSLVR 1mo ago
Important to note that the system(s) it infected were non-trivially air-gapped, so it had to do the entirety of it's infectious work without command and control servers or receiving any additional input. It had to be an entirely autonomous process from infection to propagation to execution.
Pretty amazing to have been pulled off seemingly so successfully.
- stingraycharles 1mo agoWasn’t it actually not as successful as it could have been? I recall something about it spreading to more machines than it should have, which caused it to be detected earlier than it should have.
- deleted 1mo ago[deleted]
- BLKNSLVR 1mo agoPlaying with definitions of success in this reply, but, yes, I think the industrial control system detection wasn't quite narrow enough. Very successful in doing what was intended. Less successful in limiting collateral damage; the collateral damage of which was earlier than intended discovery (or discovery at all). What lessons have they learned, though, so what's out there now, with 10 years more learning, and now AI assistance? Scary thought. We're all pwnt.
- theturtletalks 1mo agoYes they actually flooded the market with USB drives with Stuxnet. But it was actually too good and started infecting non-target computers. That’s what got a malware researcher to dig in and he saw multiple zero days being used and deduced it was a Mossad and US operation.
- Tangurena2 1mo agoSome of the code needed to be digitally signed to execute on target hardware, so being able to get the actual digital certs meant that Stuxnet could not be a hacker group and could only be some national agency or "Bond villain."
- shuwix 1mo ago[dead]