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Scott Aaronson mentions Penrose's "The Emperor's New Mind", but I feel "Shadows of the Mind" is putting forward a much clearer view of Penrose's thesis. At the

by _hao 1mo ago

Scott Aaronson mentions Penrose's "The Emperor's New Mind", but I feel "Shadows of the Mind" is putting forward a much clearer view of Penrose's thesis. At the current stage of my life I'm quite comfortably in Camp C. "Intelligence" and "consciousness" are not algorithmic.[1] A lot of materialists are in Camp A. For some even today, LLM's are AGI. Unfortunately, the terminology is quite clearly not adequate. There's many a people that have very different ideas and feelings on what's what. The question on whether you can have "intelligence" without "consciousness" or "self-reference" are just on top of those. How can we define if a machine is "conscious" if we can't agree on what consciousness is? Panpsychists solve that problem by going the other way and saying that everything is conscious. Overall these are very interesting topics that we can all ponder. The realities at the current time are, however, that LLM's are indeed useful. And the harnessing tooling that is being employed those days solve a lot of actual usage problems. Whether they solve other fundamental issues remains to be seem IMO. [1]. I realize a lot of people probably haven't read the book, but you can ask your garden variety LLM to give you a quick rundown on the four camps that Sir Roger is using :)

yeellow 1mo ago
Do you treat LLM as algorithmic? I mean, the process of computing tokens is algorithmic, also the process of training, but does it mean that LLM itself follows an algorithm, in a practical sense? If yes, how is it different to a biological system constrained by physics?
- t_von_doom 1mo ago
  I would be interested in the answer to this question too. The visual cortex is certainly algorithmic in that light data enters, various cells and synapses react and fire and that information is ingested into something 'conscious'. Where does this then exist, and would it even be able to exist if we removed the biological algorithms at play?
- _hao 1mo ago
  A short disclaimer before answering. Right now I'm doing a Mathematics & Physics undergrad degree and have interest in philosophy. I'm not a specialist in any of those fields. I have plans to tackle the actual math around LLM's a bit further, but I'm not there yet. To question 1 based on my current understanding (and let's say "beliefs") is that - yes, LLM's are following a probabilistic algorithm to give me the output. The same prompt won't yield the same result, but the same prompt will yield results that are quite adjacent to each other in meaning because of the training. There's randomness in the sense that you can't say which next token will be put with certainty, BUT you can be certain it will be a token that exists in the pool of tokens available. Hopefully that makes sense? For question 2. Both us and LLMs are constrained by physics. The main difference for me is the fact that at every point of our existence we're constantly changing. Our internal state and bodies are changing based on all the sensory input we get from our environment and the processes that lie underneath. Another commenter in this thread talked about qualia. That's certainly part of it as well (but again we have a definition problem). That's not to say that I think that a hypothetical future machine cannot be devised to handle a lot of these, but the level of sophistication in the biological world is such that I don't think that's realistic. Let's say that even then, that happens, would that really prove that humans work the same way as the machine?
  - yeellow 1mo ago
    LLM algorithm does not need to be probabilistic, we add probability to make it more interesting, but in principle it should return the same tokens for the same input (which is often desired, and we had temperature=0 for that, even if for practical reasons it was not always working that way). But it is not the point. My point is that LLM inference follows an easy algorithm, but what we get is something different, because weights are part of the algorithm and they are not easily interpretable. So if I ask LLM to write me an essay on a given subject I know what it is technically doing, but writing it as an algorithm different than "convert this text to tokens and than perform billions of simple operations on them to get the next token and repeat" seems hopeless. Because the black box of weights is what matters. In this meaning it is not an algorithm we can find in a book on algorithms. Of course it's a computational process, but the question is, if it is qualitatively different to the one in our heads.
iainmerrick 1mo ago
Do you distinguish between Penrose's argument and the older one by Lucas, invoking Gödel's proof that certain facts are non-computable? I always felt it's basically the same argument, and Lucas's was never really convincing; Hofstadter rebutted it very convincingly in GEB long before Penrose's books came out. To me, camp C's claim is possible but I don't buy the argument that says it's necessary. So I guess I'm camp A. (D is religion and B seems to me incoherent.)
- _hao 1mo ago
  I haven't read GEB (yet), but I'd say I do feel there's a difference between the original formulation of Lucas and the extensions that Penrose provide. At this stage I can't say whether I'd agree with Hofstadter or not on the rebuttal though. As for the camps, I agree with you that B doesn't really make sense (at least to me). I can put myself in position to argue for A, C and D, but as mentioned in my original post so far I agree with C the most.

by _hao 1mo ago

yeellow 1mo ago

Do you treat LLM as algorithmic? I mean, the process of computing tokens is algorithmic, also the process of training, but does it mean that LLM itself follows an algorithm, in a practical sense? If yes, how is it different to a biological system constrained by physics?

t_von_doom 1mo ago
I would be interested in the answer to this question too. The visual cortex is certainly algorithmic in that light data enters, various cells and synapses react and fire and that information is ingested into something 'conscious'. Where does this then exist, and would it even be able to exist if we removed the biological algorithms at play?
_hao 1mo ago
A short disclaimer before answering. Right now I'm doing a Mathematics & Physics undergrad degree and have interest in philosophy. I'm not a specialist in any of those fields. I have plans to tackle the actual math around LLM's a bit further, but I'm not there yet. To question 1 based on my current understanding (and let's say "beliefs") is that - yes, LLM's are following a probabilistic algorithm to give me the output. The same prompt won't yield the same result, but the same prompt will yield results that are quite adjacent to each other in meaning because of the training. There's randomness in the sense that you can't say which next token will be put with certainty, BUT you can be certain it will be a token that exists in the pool of tokens available. Hopefully that makes sense? For question 2. Both us and LLMs are constrained by physics. The main difference for me is the fact that at every point of our existence we're constantly changing. Our internal state and bodies are changing based on all the sensory input we get from our environment and the processes that lie underneath. Another commenter in this thread talked about qualia. That's certainly part of it as well (but again we have a definition problem). That's not to say that I think that a hypothetical future machine cannot be devised to handle a lot of these, but the level of sophistication in the biological world is such that I don't think that's realistic. Let's say that even then, that happens, would that really prove that humans work the same way as the machine?
- yeellow 1mo ago
  LLM algorithm does not need to be probabilistic, we add probability to make it more interesting, but in principle it should return the same tokens for the same input (which is often desired, and we had temperature=0 for that, even if for practical reasons it was not always working that way). But it is not the point. My point is that LLM inference follows an easy algorithm, but what we get is something different, because weights are part of the algorithm and they are not easily interpretable. So if I ask LLM to write me an essay on a given subject I know what it is technically doing, but writing it as an algorithm different than "convert this text to tokens and than perform billions of simple operations on them to get the next token and repeat" seems hopeless. Because the black box of weights is what matters. In this meaning it is not an algorithm we can find in a book on algorithms. Of course it's a computational process, but the question is, if it is qualitatively different to the one in our heads.

iainmerrick 1mo ago

Do you distinguish between Penrose's argument and the older one by Lucas, invoking Gödel's proof that certain facts are non-computable? I always felt it's basically the same argument, and Lucas's was never really convincing; Hofstadter rebutted it very convincingly in GEB long before Penrose's books came out. To me, camp C's claim is possible but I don't buy the argument that says it's necessary. So I guess I'm camp A. (D is religion and B seems to me incoherent.)

_hao 1mo ago
I haven't read GEB (yet), but I'd say I do feel there's a difference between the original formulation of Lucas and the extensions that Penrose provide. At this stage I can't say whether I'd agree with Hofstadter or not on the rebuttal though. As for the camps, I agree with you that B doesn't really make sense (at least to me). I can put myself in position to argue for A, C and D, but as mentioned in my original post so far I agree with C the most.