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I think there is an important distinction here that you are missing. The principle that a simulation is not the thing being simulated is true in general, but it

I think there is an important distinction here that you are missing. The principle that a simulation is not the thing being simulated is true in general, but it cannot be used to justify the claim that there can be no equivalences between a simulation and the thing being simulated. Indeed, if this were the case, then the word 'simulation' would have no meaning, as it is precisely the existence of some equivalences that justify calling X a simulation of Y. Furthermore, there is an important class of simulations that are important generally and very relevant here, and it is those where the equivalence is in the generation and transformation of information. When X simulates Y in this regard, and what matters (in whatever it is that makes Y interesting or important to us) is the information generated and/or transformed by it, then we can indeed substitute X for Y. So, in the Enigma machine example, would you argue that the output of a physical Enigma machine when it encodes a given text is not the same as the output from an equivalently set-up Enigma machine simulation encoding the same message? As the text of the two outputs would be identical, I will assume you will allow that in this case, the simulation is performing the same function as the physical machine. Now suppose someone comes along and says "That can't be right! You can use the physical machine as a footrest, but not the simulation, so the Enigma simulation cannot substitute for the physical machine as a communications-security device." Would you be persuaded that this argument is sound when applied in this case? If you think it is, then I do not think we can discuss this issue any further, but if not, then would you be any more persuaded by this argument: "That can't be right! A simulated rainstorm will not get you wet, so the Enigma simulation cannot substitute for the physical machine as a communications-security device?" If you think the latter is sound while the latter is not, then I would be really interested in understanding why you would think that. If you think the latter is unsound, then you are in complete agreement with the whole point of my original post in this thread: arguments like "simulated rain does not get you wet" are useless against the simulation argument. This does not establish that a sufficiently-accurate simulation of a brain could have a mind, of course, and while I think it would, I do not claim to know it would, and it would take more than the absence of conclusive proof in this matter to persuade me that it is implausible. In particular, I am familiar with all the widely-made arguments in that direction, and not only do I think they are defeasible, I think that the philosophical approach of "going metaphysical" is unlikely to succeed; if nothing else, we have been doing this for centuries, if not millennia, and nothing like a broad consensus has emerged from it (just look at the SEP Qualia entry [1], for example) - but that discussion goes far beyond what can be usefully debated in a website comments section. [1] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/

slopinthebag 1mo ago
Ok I was implicitly including the mind as part of the brain. Absent a mind, I think we're just talking past each other. I don't see a reason why a brain absent a mind could not be simulated. And of course I have nothing really novel to add to the arguments against a mind arising from a simulation, and I'm sure you're familiar with all the common ones. However this is more interesting " ‘…a bit pattern in computer memory [only] means “pain” because of how a program and its users interpret or employ it.’ This is somewhat begging the question, in that it tacitly presupposes that the system itself is incapable of interpreting it, but if the formation of this bit-pattern has certain consequences, such as the system saying it is in pain, redirecting its attention to finding any means to eliminate it while avoiding anything tending to exacerbate it, and forming memories which will have the consequence that the system will, from now on, try to avoid circumstances likely to cause its recurrence, then on what basis would you reject its own claims of being in pain?" Are you claiming that the specific bit formations here indicate the presence of a mind?
- mannykannot 1mo ago
  Just to be clear, my objection to the "simulated rain won't get you wet" argument is not predicated on any assumptions about brains, minds, or the relationship between the two, and in my presentation of that objection in the chronologically first of my posts yesterday, I did not mention either and did not make any assumptions about their relationship. In reply to your statement that you don't see a reason why a brain absent a mind could not be simulated, let's consider whether we could have a simulation of an Enigma machine that does not encrypt and decrypt messages. It is possible in a trivial sense, of course: you could have a sort of cargo-cult simulation where the plug-board can be connected in various ways, the rotors turn when a key is pressed and one of the lights come on, but it lacks the causal relationships to produce output it could decrypt. This, however, is just an incomplete simulation, and the one that matters is this: could you completely digitally simulate the physics of an Enigma machine in a way that is incapable of being used to perform encrypted communication? If not, then there is something very wrong with what seems to be well-established physics. Now let's suppose that we could do a complete-physics simulation of a person's brain. It will be missing many of the features of a brain (it will not consume material nutrients and produce waste products, for example), but how would you go about testing for whether it has a mind? How would an absence of a mind manifest itself? If you think the answer lies in the simulation not being part of a body, then let's suppose we simulate the person's whole body. ------ With regard to your concluding question, "Are you claiming that the specific bit formations here indicate the presence of a mind?", the short answer is no. I feel that with this question you are reverting to an earlier issue that we have already gone over: a digital simulation of anything is not just a pattern of bits, it is a physical process (i.e. a sequence of events.)

slopinthebag 1mo ago

Ok I was implicitly including the mind as part of the brain. Absent a mind, I think we're just talking past each other. I don't see a reason why a brain absent a mind could not be simulated. And of course I have nothing really novel to add to the arguments against a mind arising from a simulation, and I'm sure you're familiar with all the common ones. However this is more interesting " ‘…a bit pattern in computer memory [only] means “pain” because of how a program and its users interpret or employ it.’ This is somewhat begging the question, in that it tacitly presupposes that the system itself is incapable of interpreting it, but if the formation of this bit-pattern has certain consequences, such as the system saying it is in pain, redirecting its attention to finding any means to eliminate it while avoiding anything tending to exacerbate it, and forming memories which will have the consequence that the system will, from now on, try to avoid circumstances likely to cause its recurrence, then on what basis would you reject its own claims of being in pain?" Are you claiming that the specific bit formations here indicate the presence of a mind?

mannykannot 1mo ago
Just to be clear, my objection to the "simulated rain won't get you wet" argument is not predicated on any assumptions about brains, minds, or the relationship between the two, and in my presentation of that objection in the chronologically first of my posts yesterday, I did not mention either and did not make any assumptions about their relationship. In reply to your statement that you don't see a reason why a brain absent a mind could not be simulated, let's consider whether we could have a simulation of an Enigma machine that does not encrypt and decrypt messages. It is possible in a trivial sense, of course: you could have a sort of cargo-cult simulation where the plug-board can be connected in various ways, the rotors turn when a key is pressed and one of the lights come on, but it lacks the causal relationships to produce output it could decrypt. This, however, is just an incomplete simulation, and the one that matters is this: could you completely digitally simulate the physics of an Enigma machine in a way that is incapable of being used to perform encrypted communication? If not, then there is something very wrong with what seems to be well-established physics. Now let's suppose that we could do a complete-physics simulation of a person's brain. It will be missing many of the features of a brain (it will not consume material nutrients and produce waste products, for example), but how would you go about testing for whether it has a mind? How would an absence of a mind manifest itself? If you think the answer lies in the simulation not being part of a body, then let's suppose we simulate the person's whole body. ------ With regard to your concluding question, "Are you claiming that the specific bit formations here indicate the presence of a mind?", the short answer is no. I feel that with this question you are reverting to an earlier issue that we have already gone over: a digital simulation of anything is not just a pattern of bits, it is a physical process (i.e. a sequence of events.)