4 ms·

So you decrypt -any- password on a system with malware, and malware gets -all- the passwords. Makes life super easy for an attacker. All they would need to do

by lrvick 1mo ago

So you decrypt -any- password on a system with malware, and malware gets -all- the passwords. Makes life super easy for an attacker. All they would need to do is install a wrapper for sesame that waits for the next database unlock and exfiltrates all passwords in plain text to a pastebin somewhere. To prevent this, you need to encrypt each password to a key held in a yubikey, nitrokey, or similar with a touch policy. Now as an attacker if I want to get the users whole database of 100 passwords I must trick them to tapping a blinking smartcard or touchid 100 times. Presumably the user would notice something is wrong, and stop. Damage control. This is how I have been doing password management for over a decade with password store, the standard unix password manager. That tiny shell script is the -minimum- security any password manager must have. I get that most major password managers like 1password and lastpass also get this wrong. I submit with a straight face that they have never let any capable security engineers near their products. They have a negligent design end to end and must not be replicated.

Aachen 1mo ago
Isn't this a fundamental issue with all popular password managers? Your setup where each decrypt requires a physical action is superior of course (even if an attacker is still likely to get 2-3 of the most important secrets before you start to investigate why a login isn't working), I just mean that most people don't have this and it's not a particular flaw with OP's implementation right?
- lrvick 1mo ago
  It is a negligent and blatant design flaw in all popular implementations, yes. Mooltipass and Password Store are the only two password managers to do the bare minimum. That is ridiculous. Anyone who corrects this, with a good UX solution, will win the password manager wars. It is so so so easy to do, so it is unthinkable only the CLI password manager written in bash bothers to do it. Ask an LLM to implement it for you if you must, but no one has any excuse to skip the most basic security function of a password manager: do anything at all to protect it from malware. The bar for password managers is in hell.
  - antonvs 1mo ago
    > Anyone who corrects this, with a good UX solution, will win the password manager wars. In some technical sense, not necessarily in popularity.
  - what 1mo ago
    You can’t have a good UX with this setup, which is why none of the major password mangers do it.
    - lrvick 1mo ago
      Of course you can. Random non technical executive goes to a login page, and a popup happens on an external device like a phone or keychain dongle, watch, or any secondary display that asks "Allow aws.amazon.com root access to open browser tab on laptop xyz?" and if the page you are on right now says "doordash.com" and you did not ask to decrypt aws root credentials, then you say "nope, that does not seem right" and the attack is stopped cold. The first mistake was letting non technical executive have aws root access in the first place, but the password manager only releasing a single credential at a time with a physical button press on a trusted screen can still be a last line of defense for our most sensitive credentials. Being user friendly and being able to have any defense at all against malware are not mutually exclusive.
      - what 1mo ago
        What? This has nothing to do with encrypting each secret separately and requiring presence for decryption. Which I think is a good idea, it just has terrible UX.
        lrvick 1mo ago
        This is me talking about the UX of decrypting one password at a time with explicit consent.
xoa 1mo ago
It's hard to give a big enough :rolleyes: for this nihilistic bullshit being spouted in 2026. In fact I'm going to go further: I accuse you lrvick of active maliciousness and trying to aid illicit access and discourage people from improving their security, because you have no excuse not to know better. >All they would need to do is install a wrapper for sesame that waits for the next database unlock and exfiltrates all passwords in plain text to a pastebin somewhere. """All""" they need is to get root? Most people access all key stuff on their own devices, and for the vast ultra super majority of the population and vital sites if their personal trusted device is rooted it's over regardless. Your "Now as an attacker if I want to get the users whole database of 100 passwords I must trick them to tapping a blinking smartcard or touchid 100 times" is total fucking make believe, completely ignoring normal things like RECOVERY FLOWS. If you have root on someone's computer and phone you have access to their email and probably messaging as well, and that will suffice to get into nearly everything including the majority of financial institutions (which even now have massive ones that don't even support HSMs at all, let alone leave no recovery route! looking at you Charles Schwab, with total client assets in excess of $12.5 trillion at the start of this year [0]). There isn't any need for "100 times" because most people don't have 100 different critical accounts, rather single digits or even just one actual one that has things like money or comms. >This is how I have been doing password management for over a decade with password store, the standard unix password manager. That tiny shell script is the -minimum- security any password manager must have. Literally laughing out loud here. If it's not easy enough for my friends in their 70s to use and like it's WORTHLESS to most security. Including on some level mine or yours, because security has key social/network effects beyond just individuals, stolen money, information, and access is used to fuel further security threats. Job #1 is to make something people like and works with most of what already exists. Otherwise it's yet another case of "ROTATE PASSWORDS EVERY 2 MONTHS NO USE X NUMBERS OH ALSO Y SPECIAL CHARACTERS NO NOT LIKE THAT" which results in everyone just leaving stuff on sticky notes on their screens and doing the bare minimum to fool the system and using the same thing or minor variants everywhere. Theorycrafted garbage made for robots not humans. >I submit with a straight face that they have never let any capable security engineers near their products. They have a negligent design end to end and must not be replicated. I submit with a straight face you are either literally working for a hostile agency to spread disinformation or you have serious neurodivergence or you are seriously and dangerously bubbled with an (un)healthy splash of Dunning-Kruger mixed in. ---- 0: https://pressroom.aboutschwab.com/press-releases/press-release/2026/Schwab-Reports-Monthly-Activity-Highlights/default.aspx https://pressroom.aboutschwab.com/press-releases/press-relea...
Marsymars 1mo ago
> That tiny shell script is the -minimum- security any password manager must have. So any device without touchid or a yubikey can't use a password manager without typing out your full master password every time you want to access any password?
- lrvick 1mo ago
  Every modern device under the sun ships with a hardware security module of some kind which could, if nothing else, rate limit decryptions and ensure decryptions can only happen on that machine. There are so so many hardware anchors free for the taking. The same hardware Microsoft, Google, and Apple use to verify you are running a "genuine" OS these days can also do general purpose encryption and decryption with rate limits and touch policies. Pick literally any of them. TPM, Passkeys, PIV, touchid, yubikeys, nitrokeys, the keycard to your last hotel room being touched on the hidden NFC reader most people do not know about under Dell touchpads. Use whichever one is the least shitty but not having a hardware anchor in a password manager is shipping a car without airbags.
  - what 1mo ago
    Apples SE doesn’t let you load a key, so you have to reencrypt your secrets for every Apple device you want them on… requiring hundreds of touches. The UX just sucks, which is why it’s not a thing.
    - lrvick 1mo ago
      An optional remotely attestable secure enclave all secrets are encrypted to on first entry can however bulk encrypt secrets to a public key of each device bypassing the touch policy when adding new devices but still requiring a manual tap for each secret on each device if consent challenges on all involved devices and optional time delay policies are met.
      - what 1mo ago
        I’m really not sure what you’re trying to say? You have some magic device that can tell when you want you reencrypt everything for new devices versus just accessing your passwords? This doesn’t exist.

by lrvick 1mo ago

Aachen 1mo ago

Isn't this a fundamental issue with all popular password managers? Your setup where each decrypt requires a physical action is superior of course (even if an attacker is still likely to get 2-3 of the most important secrets before you start to investigate why a login isn't working), I just mean that most people don't have this and it's not a particular flaw with OP's implementation right?

lrvick 1mo ago
It is a negligent and blatant design flaw in all popular implementations, yes. Mooltipass and Password Store are the only two password managers to do the bare minimum. That is ridiculous. Anyone who corrects this, with a good UX solution, will win the password manager wars. It is so so so easy to do, so it is unthinkable only the CLI password manager written in bash bothers to do it. Ask an LLM to implement it for you if you must, but no one has any excuse to skip the most basic security function of a password manager: do anything at all to protect it from malware. The bar for password managers is in hell.
- antonvs 1mo ago
  > Anyone who corrects this, with a good UX solution, will win the password manager wars. In some technical sense, not necessarily in popularity.
- what 1mo ago
  You can’t have a good UX with this setup, which is why none of the major password mangers do it.
  - lrvick 1mo ago
    Of course you can. Random non technical executive goes to a login page, and a popup happens on an external device like a phone or keychain dongle, watch, or any secondary display that asks "Allow aws.amazon.com root access to open browser tab on laptop xyz?" and if the page you are on right now says "doordash.com" and you did not ask to decrypt aws root credentials, then you say "nope, that does not seem right" and the attack is stopped cold. The first mistake was letting non technical executive have aws root access in the first place, but the password manager only releasing a single credential at a time with a physical button press on a trusted screen can still be a last line of defense for our most sensitive credentials. Being user friendly and being able to have any defense at all against malware are not mutually exclusive.
    - what 1mo ago
      What? This has nothing to do with encrypting each secret separately and requiring presence for decryption. Which I think is a good idea, it just has terrible UX.
      - lrvick 1mo ago
        This is me talking about the UX of decrypting one password at a time with explicit consent.

xoa 1mo ago

It's hard to give a big enough :rolleyes: for this nihilistic bullshit being spouted in 2026. In fact I'm going to go further: I accuse you lrvick of active maliciousness and trying to aid illicit access and discourage people from improving their security, because you have no excuse not to know better. >All they would need to do is install a wrapper for sesame that waits for the next database unlock and exfiltrates all passwords in plain text to a pastebin somewhere. """All""" they need is to get root? Most people access all key stuff on their own devices, and for the vast ultra super majority of the population and vital sites if their personal trusted device is rooted it's over regardless. Your "Now as an attacker if I want to get the users whole database of 100 passwords I must trick them to tapping a blinking smartcard or touchid 100 times" is total fucking make believe, completely ignoring normal things like RECOVERY FLOWS. If you have root on someone's computer and phone you have access to their email and probably messaging as well, and that will suffice to get into nearly everything including the majority of financial institutions (which even now have massive ones that don't even support HSMs at all, let alone leave no recovery route! looking at you Charles Schwab, with total client assets in excess of $12.5 trillion at the start of this year [0]). There isn't any need for "100 times" because most people don't have 100 different critical accounts, rather single digits or even just one actual one that has things like money or comms. >This is how I have been doing password management for over a decade with password store, the standard unix password manager. That tiny shell script is the -minimum- security any password manager must have. Literally laughing out loud here. If it's not easy enough for my friends in their 70s to use and like it's WORTHLESS to most security. Including on some level mine or yours, because security has key social/network effects beyond just individuals, stolen money, information, and access is used to fuel further security threats. Job #1 is to make something people like and works with most of what already exists. Otherwise it's yet another case of "ROTATE PASSWORDS EVERY 2 MONTHS NO USE X NUMBERS OH ALSO Y SPECIAL CHARACTERS NO NOT LIKE THAT" which results in everyone just leaving stuff on sticky notes on their screens and doing the bare minimum to fool the system and using the same thing or minor variants everywhere. Theorycrafted garbage made for robots not humans. >I submit with a straight face that they have never let any capable security engineers near their products. They have a negligent design end to end and must not be replicated. I submit with a straight face you are either literally working for a hostile agency to spread disinformation or you have serious neurodivergence or you are seriously and dangerously bubbled with an (un)healthy splash of Dunning-Kruger mixed in. ---- 0: https://pressroom.aboutschwab.com/press-releases/press-release/2026/Schwab-Reports-Monthly-Activity-Highlights/default.aspx https://pressroom.aboutschwab.com/press-releases/press-relea...

Marsymars 1mo ago

> That tiny shell script is the -minimum- security any password manager must have. So any device without touchid or a yubikey can't use a password manager without typing out your full master password every time you want to access any password?

lrvick 1mo ago
Every modern device under the sun ships with a hardware security module of some kind which could, if nothing else, rate limit decryptions and ensure decryptions can only happen on that machine. There are so so many hardware anchors free for the taking. The same hardware Microsoft, Google, and Apple use to verify you are running a "genuine" OS these days can also do general purpose encryption and decryption with rate limits and touch policies. Pick literally any of them. TPM, Passkeys, PIV, touchid, yubikeys, nitrokeys, the keycard to your last hotel room being touched on the hidden NFC reader most people do not know about under Dell touchpads. Use whichever one is the least shitty but not having a hardware anchor in a password manager is shipping a car without airbags.
- what 1mo ago
  Apples SE doesn’t let you load a key, so you have to reencrypt your secrets for every Apple device you want them on… requiring hundreds of touches. The UX just sucks, which is why it’s not a thing.
  - lrvick 1mo ago
    An optional remotely attestable secure enclave all secrets are encrypted to on first entry can however bulk encrypt secrets to a public key of each device bypassing the touch policy when adding new devices but still requiring a manual tap for each secret on each device if consent challenges on all involved devices and optional time delay policies are met.
    - what 1mo ago
      I’m really not sure what you’re trying to say? You have some magic device that can tell when you want you reencrypt everything for new devices versus just accessing your passwords? This doesn’t exist.