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This is a decent summary of functionalism but it doesn't provide any concrete justification for it. We both agree that the brain processes information. The ques

This is a decent summary of functionalism but it doesn't provide any concrete justification for it. We both agree that the brain processes information. The question is if a sufficiently abstract description of that processing captures everything physically constitutive of consciousness. How would you support your position that it does?

hackinthebochs 2mo ago
It's really the only live option once the issues are properly understood. Causal closure: a physical event is explanatorily exhausted by prior physical events. Causal exclusion: if physical properties fully cause/explain everything we say and do about consciousness, i.e. our behavior purported to be about consciousness, then consciousness cannot be distinct from the physical behavior and also be a cause of that behavior. For example, for our speech acts to be about consciousness, consciousness must be causally involved in their generation. Hence, consciousness is a second-order physical property of the same category as the information carried by the speech acts about consciousness. That is, consciousness is an abstract property of physical organization.
- slopinthebag 2mo ago
  It's a massive leap to go from consciousness must be causally integrated with physical brain activity to consciousness is exhausted by an abstract functional description of that activity. At best you could establish that consciousness cannot be an additional, independent cause outside the physical causal order.
  - hackinthebochs 2mo ago
    Causal integration + causal closure is a wrap for non-abstract theories. The so-called biological theories of consciousness are just wishful thinking.
    - slopinthebag 2mo ago
      How so?
      - hackinthebochs 2mo ago
        A corollary of causal exclusion is that two causally identical systems have identical explanations for identical physical events. If you posit some property of a substrate purported to be relevant for consciousness, it will either have a causal influence or non-causal influence. Given causal closure, any causal influence is explained by prior physical events, thus bypassing any relevance of this special property (or this special property is just identical to some physical event). If the influence of this special property is non-causal, then due to causal exclusion it can't have any explanatory relevance to causally downstream behavior. E.g. it is causally excluded from relevance to speech acts about consciousness. You're left with some kind of non-physical, non-causal influence. In other words, wishful thinking. Two further points. Modern physics has been described as "topic neutral"[1] in the sense that it doesn't posit the intrinsic nature of the substrate being described, only describes its behavior. Thus physics properly understood is itself multiply realizable: the behavior of physics can be "implemented" in dissimilar substrates with a range of intrinsic properties. But, according to the argument just outlined, these intrinsic properties can't play any explanatory role in the unfolding of physical dynamics (outside of bare implementation). The other point is that this argument is fully general in the sense that any closed explanatory regime causally excludes phenomena not captured by entities defined within the explanatory regime. The explanatory regime of abstract semantic information is another such closed regime. Thus, for our speech acts, i.e. abstract semantic information, to be about consciousness, consciousness must be captured within the explanatory regime of abstract semantic information. [1] https://chomsky.info/201401__/ https://chomsky.info/201401__/
        slopinthebag 2mo ago
        You said “Given causal closure, any causal influence is explained by prior physical events, thus bypassing any relevance of this special property.” That does not follow. A property being physically caused does not make it causally irrelevant. For example, a wire’s conductivity is produced by its physical microstructure. Its conductivity helps explain why current flows through it. The fact that the conductivity itself has a physical explanation does not “bypass” its relevance. Likewise, suppose some biochemical property of neurons is essential to consciousness. That property could be entirely physical, caused or constituted by prior physical conditions, causally relevant to later neural activity, and omitted by some abstract computational description. “Causally identical” already assumes much of the conclusion, and causal relevance is not the same as constitutive relevance. You also conflate “caused by physical events” with “identical to a physical event”. Properties are not usually identical to events. Events possess or instantiate properties. More importantly, this still would not establish functionalism.
  - deleted 2mo ago
    [deleted]
grantcas 2mo ago
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hackinthebochs 2mo ago

It's really the only live option once the issues are properly understood. Causal closure: a physical event is explanatorily exhausted by prior physical events. Causal exclusion: if physical properties fully cause/explain everything we say and do about consciousness, i.e. our behavior purported to be about consciousness, then consciousness cannot be distinct from the physical behavior and also be a cause of that behavior. For example, for our speech acts to be about consciousness, consciousness must be causally involved in their generation. Hence, consciousness is a second-order physical property of the same category as the information carried by the speech acts about consciousness. That is, consciousness is an abstract property of physical organization.

slopinthebag 2mo ago
It's a massive leap to go from consciousness must be causally integrated with physical brain activity to consciousness is exhausted by an abstract functional description of that activity. At best you could establish that consciousness cannot be an additional, independent cause outside the physical causal order.
- hackinthebochs 2mo ago
  Causal integration + causal closure is a wrap for non-abstract theories. The so-called biological theories of consciousness are just wishful thinking.
  - slopinthebag 2mo ago
    How so?
    - hackinthebochs 2mo ago
      A corollary of causal exclusion is that two causally identical systems have identical explanations for identical physical events. If you posit some property of a substrate purported to be relevant for consciousness, it will either have a causal influence or non-causal influence. Given causal closure, any causal influence is explained by prior physical events, thus bypassing any relevance of this special property (or this special property is just identical to some physical event). If the influence of this special property is non-causal, then due to causal exclusion it can't have any explanatory relevance to causally downstream behavior. E.g. it is causally excluded from relevance to speech acts about consciousness. You're left with some kind of non-physical, non-causal influence. In other words, wishful thinking. Two further points. Modern physics has been described as "topic neutral"[1] in the sense that it doesn't posit the intrinsic nature of the substrate being described, only describes its behavior. Thus physics properly understood is itself multiply realizable: the behavior of physics can be "implemented" in dissimilar substrates with a range of intrinsic properties. But, according to the argument just outlined, these intrinsic properties can't play any explanatory role in the unfolding of physical dynamics (outside of bare implementation). The other point is that this argument is fully general in the sense that any closed explanatory regime causally excludes phenomena not captured by entities defined within the explanatory regime. The explanatory regime of abstract semantic information is another such closed regime. Thus, for our speech acts, i.e. abstract semantic information, to be about consciousness, consciousness must be captured within the explanatory regime of abstract semantic information. [1] https://chomsky.info/201401__/ https://chomsky.info/201401__/
      - slopinthebag 2mo ago
        You said “Given causal closure, any causal influence is explained by prior physical events, thus bypassing any relevance of this special property.” That does not follow. A property being physically caused does not make it causally irrelevant. For example, a wire’s conductivity is produced by its physical microstructure. Its conductivity helps explain why current flows through it. The fact that the conductivity itself has a physical explanation does not “bypass” its relevance. Likewise, suppose some biochemical property of neurons is essential to consciousness. That property could be entirely physical, caused or constituted by prior physical conditions, causally relevant to later neural activity, and omitted by some abstract computational description. “Causally identical” already assumes much of the conclusion, and causal relevance is not the same as constitutive relevance. You also conflate “caused by physical events” with “identical to a physical event”. Properties are not usually identical to events. Events possess or instantiate properties. More importantly, this still would not establish functionalism.
- deleted 2mo ago
  [deleted]

grantcas 2mo ago

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