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>So why would it be different for the brain? If nuclear energy can’t arise from abstract relationships, why would consciousness or anything else? Because consc

>So why would it be different for the brain? If nuclear energy can’t arise from abstract relationships, why would consciousness or anything else? Because consciousness isn't something the brain produces like a hormone or an excited particle. Consciousness isn't an output of the brain that is somehow separate from it, it is the manner in which the brain processes sensory information and makes decisions to produce output. The causal context in which brain dynamics occurs is orthogonal to the relevant properties regarding consciousness. Consciousness is a state characterized by certain kinds of information processing, namely that which carries relevant semantics of the organism encoded in a way that maximizes effective control by the executive center. Consciousness is the rich semantic space in which the executive center engages to affect highly competent control of the organism. It is substrate independent information processing.

slopinthebag 1mo ago
This is a decent summary of functionalism but it doesn't provide any concrete justification for it. We both agree that the brain processes information. The question is if a sufficiently abstract description of that processing captures everything physically constitutive of consciousness. How would you support your position that it does?
- hackinthebochs 1mo ago
  It's really the only live option once the issues are properly understood. Causal closure: a physical event is explanatorily exhausted by prior physical events. Causal exclusion: if physical properties fully cause/explain everything we say and do about consciousness, i.e. our behavior purported to be about consciousness, then consciousness cannot be distinct from the physical behavior and also be a cause of that behavior. For example, for our speech acts to be about consciousness, consciousness must be causally involved in their generation. Hence, consciousness is a second-order physical property of the same category as the information carried by the speech acts about consciousness. That is, consciousness is an abstract property of physical organization.
  - slopinthebag 1mo ago
    It's a massive leap to go from consciousness must be causally integrated with physical brain activity to consciousness is exhausted by an abstract functional description of that activity. At best you could establish that consciousness cannot be an additional, independent cause outside the physical causal order.
    - hackinthebochs 1mo ago
      Causal integration + causal closure is a wrap for non-abstract theories. The so-called biological theories of consciousness are just wishful thinking.
      - slopinthebag 1mo ago
        How so?
        hackinthebochs 1mo ago
        A corollary of causal exclusion is that two causally identical systems have identical explanations for identical physical events. If you posit some property of a substrate purported to be relevant for consciousness, it will either have a causal influence or non-causal influence. Given causal closure, any causal influence is explained by prior physical events, thus bypassing any relevance of this special property (or this special property is just identical to some physical event). If the influence of this special property is non-causal, then due to causal exclusion it can't have any explanatory relevance to causally downstream behavior. E.g. it is causally excluded from relevance to speech acts about consciousness. You're left with some kind of non-physical, non-causal influence. In other words, wishful thinking. Two further points. Modern physics has been described as "topic neutral"[1] in the sense that it doesn't posit the intrinsic nature of the substrate being described, only describes its behavior. Thus physics properly understood is itself multiply realizable: the behavior of physics can be "implemented" in dissimilar substrates with a range of intrinsic properties. But, according to the argument just outlined, these intrinsic properties can't play any explanatory role in the unfolding of physical dynamics (outside of bare implementation). The other point is that this argument is fully general in the sense that any closed explanatory regime causally excludes phenomena not captured by entities defined within the explanatory regime. The explanatory regime of abstract semantic information is another such closed regime. Thus, for our speech acts, i.e. abstract semantic information, to be about consciousness, consciousness must be captured within the explanatory regime of abstract semantic information. [1] https://chomsky.info/201401__/ https://chomsky.info/201401__/
- grantcas 1mo ago
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hackernud3s 1mo ago
You have this backwards. Thoughts and decisions precede consciousness, the sense of authorship is mostly constructed after the fact. See studies on readiness potentials in motor cortex.
- hackinthebochs 1mo ago
  If you're referring to the Libet experiments, they have been wildly overinterpreted. The conceptual problem with the common interpretation is that detecting a readiness potential prior to a report of a conscious intention to act does not entail the readiness potential is distinct from that conscious intention. The readiness potential may in part constitute one's conscious experience and so cannot be separated from it.
  - hackernud3s 1mo ago
    Even if overinterpreted were true, it's silly to claim that consciousness is driving. You don't "decide" to think thoughts. They come to you. They are driving.
    - hackinthebochs 1mo ago
      One's subconscious drives much of your thoughts, yes. But important decisions are conscious mediated if only because consciousness has veto power. A lack of veto is a tacit endorsement of the action. That is control.
      - hackernud3s 1mo ago
        Either that or consciousness pops out afterwards as a by-product of the physical process. A less fun to believe idea I know, but the data supports it.
- grantcas 1mo ago
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slopinthebag 1mo ago

This is a decent summary of functionalism but it doesn't provide any concrete justification for it. We both agree that the brain processes information. The question is if a sufficiently abstract description of that processing captures everything physically constitutive of consciousness. How would you support your position that it does?

hackinthebochs 1mo ago
It's really the only live option once the issues are properly understood. Causal closure: a physical event is explanatorily exhausted by prior physical events. Causal exclusion: if physical properties fully cause/explain everything we say and do about consciousness, i.e. our behavior purported to be about consciousness, then consciousness cannot be distinct from the physical behavior and also be a cause of that behavior. For example, for our speech acts to be about consciousness, consciousness must be causally involved in their generation. Hence, consciousness is a second-order physical property of the same category as the information carried by the speech acts about consciousness. That is, consciousness is an abstract property of physical organization.
- slopinthebag 1mo ago
  It's a massive leap to go from consciousness must be causally integrated with physical brain activity to consciousness is exhausted by an abstract functional description of that activity. At best you could establish that consciousness cannot be an additional, independent cause outside the physical causal order.
  - hackinthebochs 1mo ago
    Causal integration + causal closure is a wrap for non-abstract theories. The so-called biological theories of consciousness are just wishful thinking.
    - slopinthebag 1mo ago
      How so?
      - hackinthebochs 1mo ago
        A corollary of causal exclusion is that two causally identical systems have identical explanations for identical physical events. If you posit some property of a substrate purported to be relevant for consciousness, it will either have a causal influence or non-causal influence. Given causal closure, any causal influence is explained by prior physical events, thus bypassing any relevance of this special property (or this special property is just identical to some physical event). If the influence of this special property is non-causal, then due to causal exclusion it can't have any explanatory relevance to causally downstream behavior. E.g. it is causally excluded from relevance to speech acts about consciousness. You're left with some kind of non-physical, non-causal influence. In other words, wishful thinking. Two further points. Modern physics has been described as "topic neutral"[1] in the sense that it doesn't posit the intrinsic nature of the substrate being described, only describes its behavior. Thus physics properly understood is itself multiply realizable: the behavior of physics can be "implemented" in dissimilar substrates with a range of intrinsic properties. But, according to the argument just outlined, these intrinsic properties can't play any explanatory role in the unfolding of physical dynamics (outside of bare implementation). The other point is that this argument is fully general in the sense that any closed explanatory regime causally excludes phenomena not captured by entities defined within the explanatory regime. The explanatory regime of abstract semantic information is another such closed regime. Thus, for our speech acts, i.e. abstract semantic information, to be about consciousness, consciousness must be captured within the explanatory regime of abstract semantic information. [1] https://chomsky.info/201401__/ https://chomsky.info/201401__/
grantcas 1mo ago
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hackernud3s 1mo ago

You have this backwards. Thoughts and decisions precede consciousness, the sense of authorship is mostly constructed after the fact. See studies on readiness potentials in motor cortex.

hackinthebochs 1mo ago
If you're referring to the Libet experiments, they have been wildly overinterpreted. The conceptual problem with the common interpretation is that detecting a readiness potential prior to a report of a conscious intention to act does not entail the readiness potential is distinct from that conscious intention. The readiness potential may in part constitute one's conscious experience and so cannot be separated from it.
- hackernud3s 1mo ago
  Even if overinterpreted were true, it's silly to claim that consciousness is driving. You don't "decide" to think thoughts. They come to you. They are driving.
  - hackinthebochs 1mo ago
    One's subconscious drives much of your thoughts, yes. But important decisions are conscious mediated if only because consciousness has veto power. A lack of veto is a tacit endorsement of the action. That is control.
    - hackernud3s 1mo ago
      Either that or consciousness pops out afterwards as a by-product of the physical process. A less fun to believe idea I know, but the data supports it.
grantcas 1mo ago
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