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If someone digitally modelled a nuclear reactor, would any energy be produced? No, because the simulation is actually missing an important aspect, namely the c

If someone digitally modelled a nuclear reactor, would any energy be produced? No, because the simulation is actually missing an important aspect, namely the causal part that exists with the physical material but not in the simulation. It’s actually that it’s missing these components that makes it a simulation and not the real thing. But for that you need the physical material. So why would it be different for the brain? If nuclear energy can’t arise from abstract relationships, why would consciousness or anything else?

hackinthebochs 2mo ago
>So why would it be different for the brain? If nuclear energy can’t arise from abstract relationships, why would consciousness or anything else? Because consciousness isn't something the brain produces like a hormone or an excited particle. Consciousness isn't an output of the brain that is somehow separate from it, it is the manner in which the brain processes sensory information and makes decisions to produce output. The causal context in which brain dynamics occurs is orthogonal to the relevant properties regarding consciousness. Consciousness is a state characterized by certain kinds of information processing, namely that which carries relevant semantics of the organism encoded in a way that maximizes effective control by the executive center. Consciousness is the rich semantic space in which the executive center engages to affect highly competent control of the organism. It is substrate independent information processing.
- slopinthebag 2mo ago
  This is a decent summary of functionalism but it doesn't provide any concrete justification for it. We both agree that the brain processes information. The question is if a sufficiently abstract description of that processing captures everything physically constitutive of consciousness. How would you support your position that it does?
  - hackinthebochs 2mo ago
    It's really the only live option once the issues are properly understood. Causal closure: a physical event is explanatorily exhausted by prior physical events. Causal exclusion: if physical properties fully cause/explain everything we say and do about consciousness, i.e. our behavior purported to be about consciousness, then consciousness cannot be distinct from the physical behavior and also be a cause of that behavior. For example, for our speech acts to be about consciousness, consciousness must be causally involved in their generation. Hence, consciousness is a second-order physical property of the same category as the information carried by the speech acts about consciousness. That is, consciousness is an abstract property of physical organization.
    - slopinthebag 2mo ago
      It's a massive leap to go from consciousness must be causally integrated with physical brain activity to consciousness is exhausted by an abstract functional description of that activity. At best you could establish that consciousness cannot be an additional, independent cause outside the physical causal order.
      - hackinthebochs 2mo ago
        Causal integration + causal closure is a wrap for non-abstract theories. The so-called biological theories of consciousness are just wishful thinking.
        slopinthebag 2mo ago
        How so?
        hackinthebochs 2mo ago
        A corollary of causal exclusion is that two causally identical systems have identical explanations for identical physical events. If you posit some property of a substrate purported to be relevant for consciousness, it will either have a causal influence or non-causal influence. Given causal closure, any causal influence is explained by prior physical events, thus bypassing any relevance of this special property (or this special property is just identical to some physical event). If the influence of this special property is non-causal, then due to causal exclusion it can't have any explanatory relevance to causally downstream behavior. E.g. it is causally excluded from relevance to speech acts about consciousness. You're left with some kind of non-physical, non-causal influence. In other words, wishful thinking. Two further points. Modern physics has been described as "topic neutral"[1] in the sense that it doesn't posit the intrinsic nature of the substrate being described, only describes its behavior. Thus physics properly understood is itself multiply realizable: the behavior of physics can be "implemented" in dissimilar substrates with a range of intrinsic properties. But, according to the argument just outlined, these intrinsic properties can't play any explanatory role in the unfolding of physical dynamics (outside of bare implementation). The other point is that this argument is fully general in the sense that any closed explanatory regime causally excludes phenomena not captured by entities defined within the explanatory regime. The explanatory regime of abstract semantic information is another such closed regime. Thus, for our speech acts, i.e. abstract semantic information, to be about consciousness, consciousness must be captured within the explanatory regime of abstract semantic information. [1] https://chomsky.info/201401__/ https://chomsky.info/201401__/
  - grantcas 2mo ago
    [dead]
- hackernud3s 2mo ago
  You have this backwards. Thoughts and decisions precede consciousness, the sense of authorship is mostly constructed after the fact. See studies on readiness potentials in motor cortex.
  - hackinthebochs 2mo ago
    If you're referring to the Libet experiments, they have been wildly overinterpreted. The conceptual problem with the common interpretation is that detecting a readiness potential prior to a report of a conscious intention to act does not entail the readiness potential is distinct from that conscious intention. The readiness potential may in part constitute one's conscious experience and so cannot be separated from it.
    - hackernud3s 2mo ago
      Even if overinterpreted were true, it's silly to claim that consciousness is driving. You don't "decide" to think thoughts. They come to you. They are driving.
      - hackinthebochs 2mo ago
        One's subconscious drives much of your thoughts, yes. But important decisions are conscious mediated if only because consciousness has veto power. A lack of veto is a tacit endorsement of the action. That is control.
        hackernud3s 2mo ago
        Either that or consciousness pops out afterwards as a by-product of the physical process. A less fun to believe idea I know, but the data supports it.
  - grantcas 2mo ago
    [dead]
mannykannot 2mo ago
A digital simulation of an Enigma machine is not just abstract relationships. Its program is, but the program is not the simulation; the simulation is the program running on suitable hardware, which provides the causal element. Note that the hardware on which the program runs is very different from an Enigma machine's hardware, and the latter would be unable to run the simulation program. This is what is meant by substrate independence, a concept poorly understood by many philosophers-of-mind. There are many differences between Enigma-machine simulation and nuclear-reactor simulation, but the one that is relevant here is that the former's inputs and outputs are abstract information, and we have very good reason to think that a brain's biological purpose (in the sense of what the organism needs it to do) is, like the Enigma machine's, abstract information processing in the broad sense.
- slopinthebag 2mo ago
  We obviously will never agree since functionalism and my form of somewhat-physicalism are at complete odds. But I do want to understand your position more. You say that the physical hardware your enigma simulation runs on provides the causal element. But the simulation of the nuclear reactor also runs on physical hardware. Yet it obviously doesn't provide the causal element, and neither does the enigma machine simulation's hardware. There are no spinning gears for example. Hence why you and I both call it a simulation, I think we're in agreement here. I think you could argue that while the actual simulation of the enigma machine is not an actual enigma machine, the essence of the enigma machine is not grounded in physical reality, it's the abstract relationships we're talking about. And I could also agree. The essence of the enigma machine are it's abstract inputs and outputs. But now about the brain. You said > When you have digitally modeled a brain such that the model responds to its inputs as a brain does, then you have built a brain The issue is that you have not built a brain, you have built a simulation of the abstract relationships of how a brain works. The brain is obviously more than that, considering it exists in physical reality. And thus the claim is that the essence of the brain is the abstract relationships, correct? The problem I see is that consciousness is a physical phenomenon. In fact it seems like it's the magnum opus of phenomenon, in that all our experience comes from our consciousness. And you have to then bridge the gap between the simulation and physical reality. At most you can say you "simulated" consciousness, but questions about qualia remain. Anyways I'm not trying to attack you or your views, I'd love to hear where I go wrong in your mind on this.
ratelimitsteve 2mo ago
>If nuclear energy can’t arise from abstract relationships, why would consciousness or anything else? because consciousness is a function of intangible relationships and energy is not.

hackinthebochs 2mo ago

>So why would it be different for the brain? If nuclear energy can’t arise from abstract relationships, why would consciousness or anything else? Because consciousness isn't something the brain produces like a hormone or an excited particle. Consciousness isn't an output of the brain that is somehow separate from it, it is the manner in which the brain processes sensory information and makes decisions to produce output. The causal context in which brain dynamics occurs is orthogonal to the relevant properties regarding consciousness. Consciousness is a state characterized by certain kinds of information processing, namely that which carries relevant semantics of the organism encoded in a way that maximizes effective control by the executive center. Consciousness is the rich semantic space in which the executive center engages to affect highly competent control of the organism. It is substrate independent information processing.

slopinthebag 2mo ago
This is a decent summary of functionalism but it doesn't provide any concrete justification for it. We both agree that the brain processes information. The question is if a sufficiently abstract description of that processing captures everything physically constitutive of consciousness. How would you support your position that it does?
- hackinthebochs 2mo ago
  It's really the only live option once the issues are properly understood. Causal closure: a physical event is explanatorily exhausted by prior physical events. Causal exclusion: if physical properties fully cause/explain everything we say and do about consciousness, i.e. our behavior purported to be about consciousness, then consciousness cannot be distinct from the physical behavior and also be a cause of that behavior. For example, for our speech acts to be about consciousness, consciousness must be causally involved in their generation. Hence, consciousness is a second-order physical property of the same category as the information carried by the speech acts about consciousness. That is, consciousness is an abstract property of physical organization.
  - slopinthebag 2mo ago
    It's a massive leap to go from consciousness must be causally integrated with physical brain activity to consciousness is exhausted by an abstract functional description of that activity. At best you could establish that consciousness cannot be an additional, independent cause outside the physical causal order.
    - hackinthebochs 2mo ago
      Causal integration + causal closure is a wrap for non-abstract theories. The so-called biological theories of consciousness are just wishful thinking.
      - slopinthebag 2mo ago
        How so?
        hackinthebochs 2mo ago
        A corollary of causal exclusion is that two causally identical systems have identical explanations for identical physical events. If you posit some property of a substrate purported to be relevant for consciousness, it will either have a causal influence or non-causal influence. Given causal closure, any causal influence is explained by prior physical events, thus bypassing any relevance of this special property (or this special property is just identical to some physical event). If the influence of this special property is non-causal, then due to causal exclusion it can't have any explanatory relevance to causally downstream behavior. E.g. it is causally excluded from relevance to speech acts about consciousness. You're left with some kind of non-physical, non-causal influence. In other words, wishful thinking. Two further points. Modern physics has been described as "topic neutral"[1] in the sense that it doesn't posit the intrinsic nature of the substrate being described, only describes its behavior. Thus physics properly understood is itself multiply realizable: the behavior of physics can be "implemented" in dissimilar substrates with a range of intrinsic properties. But, according to the argument just outlined, these intrinsic properties can't play any explanatory role in the unfolding of physical dynamics (outside of bare implementation). The other point is that this argument is fully general in the sense that any closed explanatory regime causally excludes phenomena not captured by entities defined within the explanatory regime. The explanatory regime of abstract semantic information is another such closed regime. Thus, for our speech acts, i.e. abstract semantic information, to be about consciousness, consciousness must be captured within the explanatory regime of abstract semantic information. [1] https://chomsky.info/201401__/ https://chomsky.info/201401__/
- grantcas 2mo ago
  [dead]
hackernud3s 2mo ago
You have this backwards. Thoughts and decisions precede consciousness, the sense of authorship is mostly constructed after the fact. See studies on readiness potentials in motor cortex.
- hackinthebochs 2mo ago
  If you're referring to the Libet experiments, they have been wildly overinterpreted. The conceptual problem with the common interpretation is that detecting a readiness potential prior to a report of a conscious intention to act does not entail the readiness potential is distinct from that conscious intention. The readiness potential may in part constitute one's conscious experience and so cannot be separated from it.
  - hackernud3s 2mo ago
    Even if overinterpreted were true, it's silly to claim that consciousness is driving. You don't "decide" to think thoughts. They come to you. They are driving.
    - hackinthebochs 2mo ago
      One's subconscious drives much of your thoughts, yes. But important decisions are conscious mediated if only because consciousness has veto power. A lack of veto is a tacit endorsement of the action. That is control.
      - hackernud3s 2mo ago
        Either that or consciousness pops out afterwards as a by-product of the physical process. A less fun to believe idea I know, but the data supports it.
- grantcas 2mo ago
  [dead]

mannykannot 2mo ago

A digital simulation of an Enigma machine is not just abstract relationships. Its program is, but the program is not the simulation; the simulation is the program running on suitable hardware, which provides the causal element. Note that the hardware on which the program runs is very different from an Enigma machine's hardware, and the latter would be unable to run the simulation program. This is what is meant by substrate independence, a concept poorly understood by many philosophers-of-mind. There are many differences between Enigma-machine simulation and nuclear-reactor simulation, but the one that is relevant here is that the former's inputs and outputs are abstract information, and we have very good reason to think that a brain's biological purpose (in the sense of what the organism needs it to do) is, like the Enigma machine's, abstract information processing in the broad sense.

slopinthebag 2mo ago
We obviously will never agree since functionalism and my form of somewhat-physicalism are at complete odds. But I do want to understand your position more. You say that the physical hardware your enigma simulation runs on provides the causal element. But the simulation of the nuclear reactor also runs on physical hardware. Yet it obviously doesn't provide the causal element, and neither does the enigma machine simulation's hardware. There are no spinning gears for example. Hence why you and I both call it a simulation, I think we're in agreement here. I think you could argue that while the actual simulation of the enigma machine is not an actual enigma machine, the essence of the enigma machine is not grounded in physical reality, it's the abstract relationships we're talking about. And I could also agree. The essence of the enigma machine are it's abstract inputs and outputs. But now about the brain. You said > When you have digitally modeled a brain such that the model responds to its inputs as a brain does, then you have built a brain The issue is that you have not built a brain, you have built a simulation of the abstract relationships of how a brain works. The brain is obviously more than that, considering it exists in physical reality. And thus the claim is that the essence of the brain is the abstract relationships, correct? The problem I see is that consciousness is a physical phenomenon. In fact it seems like it's the magnum opus of phenomenon, in that all our experience comes from our consciousness. And you have to then bridge the gap between the simulation and physical reality. At most you can say you "simulated" consciousness, but questions about qualia remain. Anyways I'm not trying to attack you or your views, I'd love to hear where I go wrong in your mind on this.

ratelimitsteve 2mo ago

>If nuclear energy can’t arise from abstract relationships, why would consciousness or anything else? because consciousness is a function of intangible relationships and energy is not.