4 ms·
I think you've really hit the mark on how the harness should be structured: 1. Guardrails - deterministic, social intelligence, team alignment & accountability
by rush86999 1mo ago
I think you've really hit the mark on how the harness should be structured:
1. Guardrails - deterministic, social intelligence, team alignment & accountability
2. Learn by doing
3. make it stupid easy for the agent to research and access data
4. DRY
Research supports this.
Try picking up some ideas from my harness: https://github.com/rush86999/atom https://github.com/rush86999/atom
- polotics 1mo agoHi. This is very interesting, could you link to the research? There is a dearth of proper research studies that A/B test what approach is best in terms of harness structure based on repeatable benchmark data with relevant sample uses-cases.
- rush86999 1mo agoReasoning / self-consistency (voter in core/llm/self_consistency_voter.py): - Wang et al. Self-Consistency Improves Chain-of-Thought — ICLR 2023, Google Brain, 4k+ cites — https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.11171 https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.11171 — N-sample majority vote we use verbatim - Chen et al. Universal Self-Consistency — ICML 2024 — https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.17311 https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.17311 — judge fallback when no hash collides - Soft Self-Consistency — ACL 2024 — https://aclanthology.org/2024.acl-short.28.pdf https://aclanthology.org/2024.acl-short.28.pdf - Too Consistent to Detect — EMNLP 2025 — https://aclanthology.org/2025.emnlp-main.238/ https://aclanthology.org/2025.emnlp-main.238/ — why SC doesn't fix systematic bias - Self-Consistency Falls Short — TACL — https://direct.mit.org/tacl/article/doi/10.1162/TACL.a.625/ https://direct.mit.org/tacl/article/doi/10.1162/TACL.a.625/ — position-bias failure mode Multi-agent / org (core/agent_radio/, core/fleet_orchestration/): - Stanford Virtual Biotech — bioRxiv 2026.02.23.707551, Zou Lab — https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.02.23.707551v1 https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.02.23.707551v1 — 37k agents, CSO->scientists->reviewer->re-delegation, Merck external validation of B7-H3 design. Basis for VFS + hierarchy. - Debate or Vote (Choi & Li) — NeurIPS 2025 — https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.17536 https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.17536 — MAD gains = majority vote, not debate (why we didn't build debate) Sandbox / eval: - DABstep — arXiv:2506.23719 — https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.23719 https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.23719 — 450 real Adyen tasks, justifies code-interpreter + sandbox isolation - Spotlighting — Microsoft Research — https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.14720 https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.14720 — provenance delimiters cut injection ASR 50% -> <2% Governance: - OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026 — globally peer-reviewed by 100+ experts, Dec 2025 — https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/ https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-ap... — HIGH. Atom maps 1:1 (Goal Hijack -> match-confidence + oracle, Tool Misuse -> sandbox whitelist/caps, Privilege Abuse -> capability bindings, Memory Poisoning -> verified-episode graduation, etc.) docs/marketing/RESEARCH_NOTES.md:130 - NIST AI Agent Standards Initiative — Feb 17 2026, NIST CAISI — https://www.nist.gov/artificial-intelligence/ai-agent-standards-initiative https://www.nist.gov/artificial-intelligence/ai-agent-standa... + RFI summary May 2026 https://www.nist.gov/publications/summary-analysis-responses-request-information-regarding-security-considerations-ai https://www.nist.gov/publications/summary-analysis-responses... — HIGH (US gov standard). Defines the 4 enterprise minimums Atom implements: identification, authorization, access delegation, logging. - Stanford Virtual Biotech — bioRxiv 2026.02.23.707551 — https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.02.23.707551v1 https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.64898/2026.02.23.707551v1 — CSO -> 4 divisions -> 8 scientists -> reviewer -> re-delegation, no debate, no SFT — HIGH (Stanford Zou lab + Merck external validation). Basis for Atom's fleet hierarchy core/agent_radio/ and why maturity is routing not security. - Spotlighting — Microsoft Research — https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.14720 https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.14720 — HIGH — provenance delimiters <provenance type="tool_output"> cut indirect injection ASR 50% -> <2%, used in core/provenance.py:10 - IntentGuard — https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.00966 https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.00966 + OpenReview — HIGH — intent tracing ASR 100% -> 8.5% on AgentDojo/Mind2Web, basis for sandbox egress allowlist + core/sandbox_tripwire.py
- stasomatic 1mo ago[flagged]