As they say, ignorance of the law is [generally] no excuse; "knowingly" and "intentionally" here are about knowing what you're doing and meaning to do it, rathe

As they say, ignorance of the law is [generally] no excuse; "knowingly" and "intentionally" here are about knowing what you're doing and meaning to do it, rather than whether you know it's illegal. This section of the USC is about false ID offenses, but it discusses culpable states of mind generally. I think the context helps illustrate it though. https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-1510-culpable-states-mind-18-usc-1028 https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual... ---- > A knowing state of mind with respect to an element of the offense is (1) an awareness of the nature of one's conduct, and (2) an awareness of or a firm belief in the existence of a relevant circumstance, such as the "stolen," the "produced without lawful authority," or "false" nature of the identification document. The knowing state of mind requirement may be satisfied by proof that the actor was aware of a high probability of the existence of the circumstance (e.g., stolen or false nature of the document), although a defense should succeed if it is proven that the actor actually believed that the circumstance did not exist after taking reasonable steps to ensure that such belief was warranted. > As we pointed out in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978), a person who causes a particular result is said to act purposefully if `he consciously desires that result, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct,' while he is said to act knowingly if he is aware `that the result is practically certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result. ---- This Congressional Research Service Report discusses mens rea further, including a brief mention of the CFAA. The whole thing is worth a read if you're interested in the topic. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R46836 https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R46836 ---- > The approach largely reflected in the MPC and some federal precedent is to distinguish between "intention" or purpose on the one hand as being limited to a conscious object or desire, and "knowledge" on the other hand as capturing a requirement of awareness of a high probability or to a practical certainty. > The Supreme Court in Bailey referenced this distinction approvingly and suggested that intention or purpose "corresponds loosely with the common-law concept of specific intent, while 'knowledge' corresponds loosely with the concept of general intent." Some federal courts utilize a definition of "knowing" that approximates the MPC approach, instructing that to act knowingly a defendant must have "realized what he was doing and [be] aware of the nature of his conduct" rather than acting "through ignorance, mistake or accident." > Congress has also signaled an intent to distinguish between the two mens rea terms in this way in particular statutes. For instance, prior to 1986, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) proscribed "knowingly" accessing a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized access in certain circumstances. In its 1986 amendments, however, Congress changed the standard from "knowingly" to "intentionally," and the Senate report emphasized that the change was meant to require "more than that one voluntarily engaged in conduct . . . . Such conduct . . . must have been the person's conscious objective." ---- (Note, for reference, what requires a "knowing" vs. "intentional" state of mind in the CFAA: <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1030 https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1030>) The Justice Manual also has some relevant detail (the rest of this page is also worth a look, as it addresses the practical (and nominal) matter of what is and isn't likely to be prosecuted (IANAL though, and I should stress that I'm not speaking to whatever might be the true realities of how the CFAA is applied): https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-48000-computer-fraud https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-48000-computer-fraud ---- > In either a "without authorization" case or an "exceeds authorized access" case, the attorney for the government must be prepared to prove that the defendant knowingly accessed a computer or area of a computer to which he was not allowed access in order to obtain or alter information stored there, and not merely that the defendant subsequently misused information or services that he was authorized to obtain from the computer at the time he obtained it. > As part of proving that the defendant acted knowingly or intentionally, the attorney for the government must be prepared to prove that the defendant was aware of the facts that made the defendant’s access unauthorized at the time of the defendant’s conduct. Such an awareness could potentially be proven through various means, including the presence of technology intended (however unsuccessfully) to limit unauthorized access; written or oral communications sent to the defendant that unambiguously informed him that he is not authorized to access a protected computer or particular areas of it; or the defendant’s own statements or behaviors reflecting knowledge that his actions were unauthorized. > Experience has demonstrated that in the large majority of "exceeds authorized access" cases brought by the Department, the operator of the computer system made some technological effort to protect the information at issue, thereby signaling the importance or sensitivity of that information. It is not necessary that this technological effort erect an impenetrable "technological barrier" or that the technology succeed in its intended purpose of preventing access. To the contrary, when the CFAA is violated, the technology all too often "permits" the defendant’s illegal access, often despite network defenders’ unsuccessful technological attempts to prevent it. ----