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I don’t agree. On an encrypted volume all space unallocated by the filesystem should have random data in it and should be indistinguishable from the portion rep

I don’t agree. On an encrypted volume all space unallocated by the filesystem should have random data in it and should be indistinguishable from the portion representing in-use filesystem data. Deleting data securely involves overwriting all the previously allocated filesystem blocks with random data. No one should be able to discern that now-empty space had data in it as of some specific recent datetime. There may be more OS design decisions you have to make to cleanly wipe all references to particular app or process names but to me it all seems doable.

tripzilch 1mo ago
> Deleting data securely involves overwriting all the previously allocated filesystem blocks with random data. No one should be able to discern that now-empty space had data in it as of some specific recent datetime. If it was like a HDD maybe that could work, but most modern solid state storage doesn't work like that any more. You can't reliably overwrite any data, because the default is to write any new data in an empty sector (sort of, it has to do with how flash storage works, because of "wear leveling"), which is managed at the hardware level of the storage itself, so you also can't really tell the OS to do something else.