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Exploits can be shipped in any type of dependency. Remember the compression exploit that affected even SSH? The problem is your solution depends on the honor-s
by hnlmorg 2mo ago
Exploits can be shipped in any type of dependency. Remember the compression exploit that affected even SSH?
The problem is your solution depends on the honor-system. Ie “trust me, because I’m just a YAML mashaller. Why would I want to inject a crypto miner?”
That’s why package databases exist. They are meant to be centralised databases of peer reviewed and CVE checked resources. But Gos approach pushes all that responsibility onto each and every developer.
One thing it does get right, in my opinion, is removing the value of name squatting.
- leecommamichael 2mo agoIt's interesting how this plays out with C/C++. There's not really a package manager, and so the host system has to have vetted packages. It moves the burden on to the system maintainer.
- hnlmorg 2mo agoYup. It’s a system that worked when it was relatively safe to assume a chain of trust. But it’s not scaling to the era of AI agents writing patches, nor the increasingly number of attacks against existing foundational packages. We really do need to rethink the security model behind open source.