RFCs are used by developers as strict guidelines for implementation. The mere publishing of an RFC has customarily been treated by developers as a stamp of app

RFCs are used by developers as strict guidelines for implementation. The mere publishing of an RFC has customarily been treated by developers as a stamp of approval from the IETF. The NSA, contractors and their fans argue that simply adding a "RECOMMENDED=N" in an obscure section of this draft will somehow prevent said implementations in deployments. However, as an example, Canada's NSA equivalent specifically requested the draft to be published so that they can use it to support their poor choice in deployment of solo ML-KEM nation-wide. While ML-KEM may be sound, significant bugs in implementations in the wild continue to be published. To be clear, CRQCs do not exist today. ECC is battle tested, proven, and is used today. It makes no sense to delete working cryptography and replace it with potentially buggy, non-battle tested implementations of new cryptography for a threat that does not yet exist today. Instead, you fight HNDL [1] with hybrid which preserves the safety of today, and hopefully also, tomorrow. No serious security person should be recommending otherwise which is, perhaps, why some may question the motives of those that are pushing for solo ML-KEM. [1] Harvest now decrypt later