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I suspect it only goes the other way mainly in such minor, insignificant cases to build up the stats to satisfy the bilateral agreements, which go back for a lo

by Create 14y ago

I suspect it only goes the other way mainly in such minor, insignificant cases to build up the stats to satisfy the bilateral agreements, which go back for a long time. This is what Churchill meant by "special relationship" and the agreement which Tony Benn oversaw when he was in office. The price set for the Polaris was Her Majesty's subjects' data. All of it. My brother answered no because whilst he was arrested he was never charged or convicted -> http://craphound.com/littlebrother/ http://craphound.com/littlebrother/ http://techtv.mit.edu/videos/21783-the-government-is-profiling-you http://techtv.mit.edu/videos/21783-the-government-is-profili...

standingstone 14y ago
Tony Blair I'd say. Not Tony Benn's sort of thing at all!
- Create 14y ago
  Like most politicians, Tony Benn changed with time. Although in the unlikely way: the other way around. Tony Blair wasn't around Nassau (Trident, the successor to Polaris, was signed off by Thatcher, and it also precedes Blair). youtu.be/rokTiJfL4WY
  - standingstone 14y ago
    Sorry, I was about as wrong as is possible!
    - Create 14y ago
      no problem, History isn't simple (for many reasons) Certainly, the presence of nuclear weapons on their territory involves, for Europeans, multiple risks. Many of them are similar to the risks and dangers faced by the citizens of any of the countries possessing an atomic arsenal. The usefulness and desirability of which may be subject to debate. Including whether the risks are worth to be taken in the service of a politico-military strategy of national defence (or, conversely, must be rejected in view of universal peace and total disarmament). It is up to each and everyone to take a stance according to their beliefs, their world views, their perception and ranking of hazards, et cetera. For us here, all this is irrelevant. Because in this case, the question does not even arise. Thanks to another dimension of NATO nuclear "sharing", which is highly reflective of transatlantic relations. Whereas in the nuclear power countries the debate can focus on the articulation of the nuclear force with an overall strategy (importance attributed, or not, to the concept of deterrence), here, to the contrary, the (U.S.) nuclear force, and the myth of the protective umbrella that accompanies it, is a pretext used to justify the lack of (European) strategy. As well as providing a comfortable smokescreen that allows the governments of the old continent to stay, ultimately, flawlessly aligned on the United States – even if this means to become accomplices of a nuclear strategy in the development and implementation of which they cannot even dream of having a little bit of say. Alas, they already feel happy when they are, more or less correctly and more or less timely, informed on the subject.

by Create 14y ago

standingstone 14y ago

Tony Blair I'd say. Not Tony Benn's sort of thing at all!

Create 14y ago
Like most politicians, Tony Benn changed with time. Although in the unlikely way: the other way around. Tony Blair wasn't around Nassau (Trident, the successor to Polaris, was signed off by Thatcher, and it also precedes Blair). youtu.be/rokTiJfL4WY
- standingstone 14y ago
  Sorry, I was about as wrong as is possible!
  - Create 14y ago
    no problem, History isn't simple (for many reasons) Certainly, the presence of nuclear weapons on their territory involves, for Europeans, multiple risks. Many of them are similar to the risks and dangers faced by the citizens of any of the countries possessing an atomic arsenal. The usefulness and desirability of which may be subject to debate. Including whether the risks are worth to be taken in the service of a politico-military strategy of national defence (or, conversely, must be rejected in view of universal peace and total disarmament). It is up to each and everyone to take a stance according to their beliefs, their world views, their perception and ranking of hazards, et cetera. For us here, all this is irrelevant. Because in this case, the question does not even arise. Thanks to another dimension of NATO nuclear "sharing", which is highly reflective of transatlantic relations. Whereas in the nuclear power countries the debate can focus on the articulation of the nuclear force with an overall strategy (importance attributed, or not, to the concept of deterrence), here, to the contrary, the (U.S.) nuclear force, and the myth of the protective umbrella that accompanies it, is a pretext used to justify the lack of (European) strategy. As well as providing a comfortable smokescreen that allows the governments of the old continent to stay, ultimately, flawlessly aligned on the United States – even if this means to become accomplices of a nuclear strategy in the development and implementation of which they cannot even dream of having a little bit of say. Alas, they already feel happy when they are, more or less correctly and more or less timely, informed on the subject.