4 ms·

The provider has the hidden text anyway; this isn’t customer managed encryption.

• yubblegum 2mo ago
  Sure, but if each session has a unique key then these need to be managed and stored and unauthorized access to these leaves tracks. So all that had to be 'compromised' is a single universally applicable key. Again, the question stands: session based encryption can be scalable and efficient. Why aren't they using it?
  • paxys 2mo ago
    The exploit here isn’t a leaked encryption key. It’s pretty likely that they are already using a unique key per conversation. The raw CoT eventually reaches the model, and you can convince the model to share it with you.
    • theapadayo 2mo ago
      Yeah encryption isn't the issue. The only way I see to fix this is if you stop the user from switching models mid-session, or strip out the thoughts when switching models. Either way you're degrading the user experience.
    • yubblegum 2mo ago
      If a different model is using encyrpted blocks of another model, then by definition it is no longer a session scoped bit of information. Since you can give it to any other session and another model, clearly it doesn't even have to be the same user. Therefore, there is only one (set) of universally available key(s) used by all models across all sessions.