To be accurate, the elementary school was: - Built as part of an IRGCN base (that base was closed in 2013) - Within 100 yards of the perimeter of an acti

To be accurate, the elementary school was: - Built as part of an IRGCN base (that base was closed in 2013) - Within 100 yards of the perimeter of an active IRGCN base at the time of the strike - Targeted as a result of extensive use of Palantir's Maven Smart System and Claude by the US military to pre-identify targets Wikipedia has an extensively cited entry: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Minab_school_attack https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Minab_school_attack Given all of that, I think the most accurate takeaway would be that the US military is deficient in their target approval process. (Arguably grossly so, though that's an international law legal question) There's been less investigation into the background behind the Lamerd sports hall attack, but it's fairly certainly an intended US strike, likely for the same reason that the Azadi stadium was hit: assumption that it would be used as a muster point for an Iranian military response. My takeaway from the atrocities is that there need to be substantial updates to international laws of war around (a) automated target approval (even worse excesses by the Israelis in the initial Gaza strikes) and ultimate human responsibility and (b) more strongly defining what constitutes due diligence in intelligence and classification of military targets. Currently, both are far too nebulous and will likely lead to both incidents being classified as war as usual. Whereas there was a plausible route to both being removed as targets with even non-manual open source intelligence scraping (substantial patterns of school activity over years and the volleyball game schedule, respectively).