7 ms·
TBF the specific backdoor isn’t the point of the article. It’s a cautionary tale. The point is that practically all systems above the MCU level, and even some o
by K0balt 2mo ago
TBF the specific backdoor isn’t the point of the article. It’s a cautionary tale. The point is that practically all systems above the MCU level, and even some of those, have lower level systems that are often undocumented or not intended for use by the hardware designers, much less the end users. Those systems often have extremely low level access to system resources.
For example, I am building a device that records motion data, video, audio, and lidar imaging. Inside the 6 dollar IMU and the 12 dollar lidar sensor are powerful processors that load binary blobs provided by the manufacturer. The lidar could potentially gain access to any of the system data stored on the SPI bus, which includes the bulk storage and secondary RAM for the system. It could exfiltrate that data using its laser to anyone within a few hundred meters in the laser fov. It could also receive remote c&c over its optical sensor. The only thing that prevents that from being the case is that I trust the blob does not include the code to do those things, but it would be trivial to replace the blob with one that does.
Millions of devices are made that include basic wifi functionality. often, this comes in the form of a dedicated WiFi module. Those almost entirely consist of a powerful processor running a proprietary binary blobs, connected to some internal bus of the system that may give it access to some or all of the functions of the device, or at the very least could cause the device to malfunction. These WiFi phy modules are sub$1, pervasive, and often built in to devices that do not have any advertised connectivity features. A threat actor that has knowledge of an attack surface for that opaque blob can probably cause >50% of the connected devices built with that product to malfunction, in some cases in serious and dangerous ways, and sometimes to exfiltrate data that might be compromising or valuable.
That’s what this article is really about.
- hnuser123456 2mo agoI recently got an air purifier. The touch button controls for adjusting the fan speed didn't seem to be working, so I emailed support. They had me download their app, link the air purifier, and give them its MAC address. Then they asked me to try pressing each of the buttons a few times and email them back. I did so, and they responded that they re-calibrated the buttons using my touch samples. It worked.
- gavinsyancey 2mo agoI am amazed that by emailing support you were able to actually get in contact with someone technical who understood the product well enough to fix the problem.
- evilduck 2mo agoThat’s insane. I actively avoid buying things that are pointlessly internet connected nowadays. An air purifier’s buttons should be simple electromechanical switches.
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- SoftTalker 2mo agoBy "touch buttons" possibly he means that they are "buttons" on a touch screen. What's crazy to me is that this is now cheaper to put in a product than electromechanical switches.
- hnuser123456 2mo agoIt's a Mila, they're capacitive touch buttons but not a touchscreen. There's just a fan down, fan up, and mode button. Even still, I don't know how they got the calibration wrong enough at the factory that it can't detect a full-pressure thumb press.
- 05 2mo agoFeels like having touch calibration procedure built into firmware and documented in the manual (remember those?) would also work.