4 ms·

I agree with the need for an empirical reality check, but have grown really skeptical about these kinds of cohort-level well-being measures. I wouldn't say the

by derbOac 2mo ago

I agree with the need for an empirical reality check, but have grown really skeptical about these kinds of cohort-level well-being measures. I wouldn't say they're meaningless, but there's a lot of studies suggesting they don't really change much over time, and my sense is they don't change in tandem with events that should change well-being, except in extremes like widespread genocidal war. There's even researchers who have kind of taken them seriously to suggest that people have social cognitive biases about the past, and societal changes. I respect them and think what they're suggesting is reasonable (in the sense that they're taking the measures seriously) but the other way of looking at it is to flip it around and raise the possibility that the aggregation-level measurement isn't tracking what we want it to. I admit I don't have an alternative, and don't think they're worthless per se, I just feel like (as someone who does vaguely related research) like they're tracking something more akin to perceptual sets or world schemas than psychosocial functioning. I guess at some level I always have the "everything is fine" dog meme in the back of my mind when I see these kinds of well-being or mood analyses.

paytonjjones 2mo ago
As someone who does _very_ related research, I'd push back on your skepticism. I recommend Gilbert's "Stumbling on Happiness". It very accessibly addresses almost every point you raised. In particular, people have very bad intuitions about trauma and loss. Humans are shockingly adaptable and bounce back to full functioning and happiness almost all of the time. Provided you don't have a biased sample (such as people seeking care) this is equally apparent when talking to victims of trauma as when doing empirical research.
- derbOac 2mo ago
  I'm aware of the research on trauma and posttraumatic growth (and have worked with such patients). What I'm referring to are correlations between group-level variables at the level of nations or states. There's a kind of disconnect in that on the one hand, you end up with these models of why disruptive political change happens — because people are deeply dissatisfied and having trouble making ends meet and so forth (cf the price of eggs etc) — but then on the other, end up concluding that well-being is inelastic to external events. So which is it? Maybe it has nothing to do with aggregate level measurement? Even the trauma example is sort of telling: someone can end up being deeply impacted and their reported well-being remains the same (or even increases), but that story is very oversimplified at some level. Sometimes I feel as if this line of reasoning leads to absurdities, like there's nothing wrong with traumatic harm or abuse because people are resilient and it doesn't matter to their well-being. I'm being provocative on purpose to make a point — I don't think anyone really thinks that — but at some point you have to wrestle with the implications of what is being said, and at that point it kind of starts to become internally inconsistent.
  - paytonjjones 2mo ago
    > there's nothing wrong with traumatic harm or abuse because people are resilient and it doesn't matter to their well-being I know it's just a throwaway example, but this statement isn't internally inconsistent. Traumatic harm hurts people now, it doesn't need to permanently harm them to be considered immoral. A very similar knee-jerk often occurs when people learn that parenting has very, very little effect on long-term psychological outcomes for children compared to genetics. But "parenting doesn't matter" is illogical for the same reason. "We may not hold their tomorrows in our hands but we surely hold their todays" - Judith Rich Harris > correlations between group-level variables at the level of nations or states Ecological mismatches in trauma harms is what I study, so I'll take the opportunity to shamelessly plug some of my and others' research, maybe you'll find it interesting. [0] https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2027-56641-002 https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2027-56641-002 (open at https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/9dpqu https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/9dpqu) [1] https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/44FD260C9AC21868E34F6FC3968421E2/S0007125000245145a.pdf/div-class-title-a-vulnerability-paradox-in-the-cross-national-prevalence-of-post-traumatic-stress-disorder-div.pdf https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/c... [2] https://psycnet.apa.org/manuscript/2022-20702-001.pdf https://psycnet.apa.org/manuscript/2022-20702-001.pdf [3] https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstreams/e3528534-da4d-4402-a8b5-26bd17046a71/download https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstreams/e3528534-da4d-4402-a8b5-...

by derbOac 2mo ago

paytonjjones 2mo ago

As someone who does _very_ related research, I'd push back on your skepticism. I recommend Gilbert's "Stumbling on Happiness". It very accessibly addresses almost every point you raised. In particular, people have very bad intuitions about trauma and loss. Humans are shockingly adaptable and bounce back to full functioning and happiness almost all of the time. Provided you don't have a biased sample (such as people seeking care) this is equally apparent when talking to victims of trauma as when doing empirical research.

derbOac 2mo ago
I'm aware of the research on trauma and posttraumatic growth (and have worked with such patients). What I'm referring to are correlations between group-level variables at the level of nations or states. There's a kind of disconnect in that on the one hand, you end up with these models of why disruptive political change happens — because people are deeply dissatisfied and having trouble making ends meet and so forth (cf the price of eggs etc) — but then on the other, end up concluding that well-being is inelastic to external events. So which is it? Maybe it has nothing to do with aggregate level measurement? Even the trauma example is sort of telling: someone can end up being deeply impacted and their reported well-being remains the same (or even increases), but that story is very oversimplified at some level. Sometimes I feel as if this line of reasoning leads to absurdities, like there's nothing wrong with traumatic harm or abuse because people are resilient and it doesn't matter to their well-being. I'm being provocative on purpose to make a point — I don't think anyone really thinks that — but at some point you have to wrestle with the implications of what is being said, and at that point it kind of starts to become internally inconsistent.
- paytonjjones 2mo ago
  > there's nothing wrong with traumatic harm or abuse because people are resilient and it doesn't matter to their well-being I know it's just a throwaway example, but this statement isn't internally inconsistent. Traumatic harm hurts people now, it doesn't need to permanently harm them to be considered immoral. A very similar knee-jerk often occurs when people learn that parenting has very, very little effect on long-term psychological outcomes for children compared to genetics. But "parenting doesn't matter" is illogical for the same reason. "We may not hold their tomorrows in our hands but we surely hold their todays" - Judith Rich Harris > correlations between group-level variables at the level of nations or states Ecological mismatches in trauma harms is what I study, so I'll take the opportunity to shamelessly plug some of my and others' research, maybe you'll find it interesting. [0] https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2027-56641-002 https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2027-56641-002 (open at https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/9dpqu https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/9dpqu) [1] https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/44FD260C9AC21868E34F6FC3968421E2/S0007125000245145a.pdf/div-class-title-a-vulnerability-paradox-in-the-cross-national-prevalence-of-post-traumatic-stress-disorder-div.pdf https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/c... [2] https://psycnet.apa.org/manuscript/2022-20702-001.pdf https://psycnet.apa.org/manuscript/2022-20702-001.pdf [3] https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstreams/e3528534-da4d-4402-a8b5-26bd17046a71/download https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstreams/e3528534-da4d-4402-a8b5-...