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>I recognize that Russia is making this change for MitM spying Nope, they do it primarily out of necessity, because of the mounting pressure on the previously
by fuoqi 2mo ago
>I recognize that Russia is making this change for MitM spying
Nope, they do it primarily out of necessity, because of the mounting pressure on the previously used CAs. The MitM capability is just a nice side bonus.
>So I empathize with the sarcasm, but best not to offer MitM proponents (whether in Russia or the U.S. or elsewhere!) an argument that could be used against your viewpoint.
If browsers truly cared about user security they would've provided reasonable conditions for supporting national CAs:
- Limit its authority only to respective national domain zones.
- Mandate use of Certificate Transparency handled by an independent third party to prevent MitM.
But this debacle only shows that western-controlled (especially financial) systems can be and will be used as a pressure tool, so any large sovereign nation will not trust them as they would in the past. And the taken actions only contribute to further fragmentation of the Internet across national and block borders.
- altairprime 2mo agoI’d be totally onboard with TLD-locking them to legal jurisdictions they’re comfortable being bound to, except that this would underserve a great deal of the Internet. Don’t really have a great solution yet, either. Perhaps as each TLD operates DNSSEC they could sign authorized issuers by publishing TLD CAA records, which would create some legal zone accountability that’s lacking today (and give the EU a lever by which to cut off U.S. registrars from their zones). But I have no idea how to effect any of that change, and Let’s Encrypt is truly screwed in this model as a worldwide entity. The endgame might actually be “to operate a domain registrar you must be a PKI”, which would ravage the segment and probably permanently kill off Namecheap (one can dream). So, yeah, I agree: I think instead we absolutely will see fragmentation, at both software (PKI) and, eventually, hardline levels, rather than see domain registrars and PKI issuers be forcibly merged by policy.
- inigyou 2mo agoWe should let each country specify trusted CAs the way they specify their DNS signing keys. Or we should just implement DANE already and then the same key serves both purposes and we can delete WebPKI from the world.
- drysine 2mo ago>Nope, they do it primarily out of necessity, because of the mounting pressure on the previously used CAs. The MitM capability is just a nice side bonus. So the West essentially helps Kremlin to control Russian citizens. Why is that? Incompetence or something else?
- inigyou 2mo agoAllowing Russia to have a TLD is also helping the Kremlin control Russian citizens. Do you recommend that IANA should delete the .ru domain?
- drysine 2mo agoHow so?
- inigyou 2mo agoit lets them have websites, where they can impose controls via the internet, obviously. Should we delete .ru?
- drysine 2mo agoYou are not making sense. What controls? They can only ban your domain name and if they do that, you already have a bigger problem. It's not a surprise for you, you used you passport when registering the domain name and if you planned to do something Kremlin wouldn't like you could've registered it via a foreign registrar and used foreign hosting. Contrarily, when you have to install Kremlin's root certificate to access your bank, you are unwittingly allowing Kremlin to quietly MitM any connection you make (without them specifically targeting you) and to avoid that you need: - to be aware of the problem, - to install those certs in a separate browser or on a separate device which you'd use only to visit your bank and state services
- wartywhoa23 2mo agoJust some Nanay Boys wrestling. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ztstTo3dVp4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ztstTo3dVp4