It actually is wrong, in that its summary on Microsoft Research's site shows it advocates for a permutation of a counter (e.g. LFSR) as a solution to glitch att

It actually is wrong, in that its summary on Microsoft Research's site shows it advocates for a permutation of a counter (e.g. LFSR) as a solution to glitch attacks against CTR mode. That's completely ineffective. The paper by Jaffe shows how to perform DPA (passive, not active attack) against various counter modes of AES, despite the permutation in use for the counter. http://www.iacr.org/workshops/ches/ches2007/presentations/S1T1-Jaffe.pdf http://www.iacr.org/workshops/ches/ches2007/presentations/S1... However, in order for me to remove the first reference and add the second one, I'd have to undertake a war of participation on Wikipedia. The outcome would not be determined by anyone I respect in cryptography, but by people who happen to be dedicated to a particular a message board. You have your own experience with such people: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:StankDawg http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:StankDawg Wikipedia is a cesspool, and I'm very sad to see "worse but free" winning out yet again.