7 ms·

I don't deny that there's an innate attribute to physical property rights - the lion gets mad when you take his kill. It's undeniable this is what a lot of what

I don't deny that there's an innate attribute to physical property rights - the lion gets mad when you take his kill. It's undeniable this is what a lot of what the early state was designed to enforce - land rights in post-tribal societies to use Fukuyama's model. However, corporations, bankruptcy, patents, etc. are all not state-of-nature constructs being reinforced formally. They are state innovations to encourage positive growth - do you deny this? To your closing point, it sounds like you're saying that "business models don't have to be approved by the government based on this metric", however this would deny that the myriad taxes, laws, etc. make money itself the imprecise metric by which we judge this social value. In an impossible situation, money would account for all positive and negative externalities, and getting rich would really mean that you truly helped society a great deal - unlike today where it could just mean that you played the system, etc. Thoughts?

Gormo 14y ago
> However, corporations, bankruptcy, patents, etc. are all not state-of-nature constructs being reinforced formally. They are state innovations to encourage positive growth - do you deny this? To some extent. I'd certainly regard bankruptcy and patents as creatures of positive law, but these legal tools aren't property rights: patents are grants of monopoly over mere concepts - to the extent of allowing the confiscation of the physical property of third parties simply because they used it to implement an idea similar to yours - and bankruptcy is effectively a license for people to renege on their promises and nullify the property rights of their creditors. Whether or not these are beneficial or useful policies is a separate question, but its clear that they contradict rather than protect property. Corporations, on the other hand, most certainly are natural constructs - people engaging in organized collaboration is a viable definition of society itself - and they certainly would exist with or without recognition in positive law, given any context in which property rights were indeed protected in a consistent and stable manner. > To your closing point, it sounds like you're saying that "business models don't have to be approved by the government based on this metric", however this would deny that the myriad taxes, laws, etc. make money itself the imprecise metric by which we judge this social value. Well, my entire comment was an elaboration of a single point: that property rights aren't contingent on the state's approval, but rather that the state's existence - as a state and not a mere cipher for the strongest inhabitants of what remains a raw state of nature - is contingent upon its protection of property rights. But we don't get to judge the 'social value' of people's activities as individuals, reducing things to simple rationalizations evaluated against subjective criteria. Money isn't an "imprecise metric by which we judge this social value", it's just an inert token used as a convenience to facilitate exchange, and the those taxes, laws, etc. aren't there to approve or disapprove of anyone's business model, but are rather (ostensibly) there to ensure that no one's rights are being violated within the undertaking of that business. Society itself - people in aggregate - judges the value of an endeavor by supplying that endeavor with the very rewards that you'd make subject to the approval of only an excessively formalized subset of that society. If the state intervenes to defend people against deceit or violence as they engage in commerce, then it's fulfilling its mission; if it intervenes to make that commerce itself contingent upon the whims of third parties, then it's subverting its mission. > In an impossible situation, money would account for all positive and negative externalities But your statement wasn't that there ought to be some means for assigning responsibility for negative externalities to those who created them; your statement implied that you believe that people ought to be obligated to produce positive macro-level externalites, else forfeit protection of their rights. Without intending any personal insult, I'd regard the latter as an unconscionable position. > unlike today where it could just mean that you played the system, etc. The same holds true of acquiring political power, and regardless of the institutional models and logical constructs we employ, society remains composed of the same set of people; so if you acknowledge the existence of malintent out in the world, how can you advocate admitting subjective discretion in the protection of rights?
- nickpinkston 14y ago
  I think the overall difference in our thinking is based on a few base principles: - You believe that rights exist outside the state (i.e. there are property rights without a state), and I think they only meaningfully exist within a state, however primitive (tribal chief + social norms, etc.). - You believe that natural law (however divined) is a fully correct basis for statutory law, whereas I see statutory as something that should reference a natural human tendency, but not be beholden to it. Am I understanding your view correctly? If so, we can go point by point, but until then we're arguing over the falling action and not the premise.

Gormo 14y ago

> However, corporations, bankruptcy, patents, etc. are all not state-of-nature constructs being reinforced formally. They are state innovations to encourage positive growth - do you deny this? To some extent. I'd certainly regard bankruptcy and patents as creatures of positive law, but these legal tools aren't property rights: patents are grants of monopoly over mere concepts - to the extent of allowing the confiscation of the physical property of third parties simply because they used it to implement an idea similar to yours - and bankruptcy is effectively a license for people to renege on their promises and nullify the property rights of their creditors. Whether or not these are beneficial or useful policies is a separate question, but its clear that they contradict rather than protect property. Corporations, on the other hand, most certainly are natural constructs - people engaging in organized collaboration is a viable definition of society itself - and they certainly would exist with or without recognition in positive law, given any context in which property rights were indeed protected in a consistent and stable manner. > To your closing point, it sounds like you're saying that "business models don't have to be approved by the government based on this metric", however this would deny that the myriad taxes, laws, etc. make money itself the imprecise metric by which we judge this social value. Well, my entire comment was an elaboration of a single point: that property rights aren't contingent on the state's approval, but rather that the state's existence - as a state and not a mere cipher for the strongest inhabitants of what remains a raw state of nature - is contingent upon its protection of property rights. But we don't get to judge the 'social value' of people's activities as individuals, reducing things to simple rationalizations evaluated against subjective criteria. Money isn't an "imprecise metric by which we judge this social value", it's just an inert token used as a convenience to facilitate exchange, and the those taxes, laws, etc. aren't there to approve or disapprove of anyone's business model, but are rather (ostensibly) there to ensure that no one's rights are being violated within the undertaking of that business. Society itself - people in aggregate - judges the value of an endeavor by supplying that endeavor with the very rewards that you'd make subject to the approval of only an excessively formalized subset of that society. If the state intervenes to defend people against deceit or violence as they engage in commerce, then it's fulfilling its mission; if it intervenes to make that commerce itself contingent upon the whims of third parties, then it's subverting its mission. > In an impossible situation, money would account for all positive and negative externalities But your statement wasn't that there ought to be some means for assigning responsibility for negative externalities to those who created them; your statement implied that you believe that people ought to be obligated to produce positive macro-level externalites, else forfeit protection of their rights. Without intending any personal insult, I'd regard the latter as an unconscionable position. > unlike today where it could just mean that you played the system, etc. The same holds true of acquiring political power, and regardless of the institutional models and logical constructs we employ, society remains composed of the same set of people; so if you acknowledge the existence of malintent out in the world, how can you advocate admitting subjective discretion in the protection of rights?

nickpinkston 14y ago
I think the overall difference in our thinking is based on a few base principles: - You believe that rights exist outside the state (i.e. there are property rights without a state), and I think they only meaningfully exist within a state, however primitive (tribal chief + social norms, etc.). - You believe that natural law (however divined) is a fully correct basis for statutory law, whereas I see statutory as something that should reference a natural human tendency, but not be beholden to it. Am I understanding your view correctly? If so, we can go point by point, but until then we're arguing over the falling action and not the premise.