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That doesn't sound right in this absolutenes (it is of course not wrong). For example, given a rng that is attackable when being allowed to get multiple random
by onli 14y ago
That doesn't sound right in this absolutenes (it is of course not wrong). For example, given a rng that is attackable when being allowed to get multiple random values from it after the rng was seeded, i still see no attack on rsa in a scenario such as this, when the rng is only used to create the key (see [1]). You wouldn't get the necessary samples for the attack.
I already agreed that sure, if you can guess the prime-numbers because of a flaw in a rng, that is a serious issue. But I don't see how it follows that if you use javascript for the key-creation it is guaranteed you will use a rng with predictable outcome, especially not if you use user-input like described in the screenshot.
[1] http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/03/surviving-bad-rng.html http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/03/surviving-ba...
- gizmo686 14y agoThe problem is that a cryptographicly secure rng generates all numbers with equal probability. Non-cryptographic rng s have no such guarantee, so even given a truly random seed and a single value taken from the rng, one might still know something about the distribution of the rng's output that will allow them to know what values are more likely to have been produced, therefore allowing them to launch a brute force attack using the most likely values first, reducing the number of attempts they can expect to need in order to find the correct key. That is not to say that one cannot use javascript for secure key generation, however one must make sure that the algorithm used to convert the truly random entropy into a useful random number is secure.