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I find the whistle-blowing aspect interesting (Chunghwa didn't get penalized because they blew the whistle). Did Chunghwa participate in the price fixing? Did
by SoftwareMaven 14y ago
I find the whistle-blowing aspect interesting (Chunghwa didn't get penalized because they blew the whistle).
Did Chunghwa participate in the price fixing? Did they get the benefits, and then throw their competitors under the bus? It would be an interesting way to disadvantage your competition if so.
- phogster 14y agoPrisoner's Dilemma anyone?
- oconnore 14y agoThe Prisoner's Dilemma is different, since (here) there is no punishment if there is no betrayal, and betrayal is basically atomic.
- flyinRyan 14y agoNo, it's the same. If no one talks, nothing bad happens. If one person talks they get to keep all the money and everyone else eats a big fine.
- oconnore 14y agoLook at the matrix in [1]. The matrix here is +-----------+ | A,A | C,B | +-----------+ | B,C | n/a | +-----------+ With (A=B) > C [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma#Generalized_form http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma#Generalize...
- pathy 14y agoIf memory serves, it is common that the whistle-blower gets a lower penalty/gets of entirely in antitrust cases, simply because if no one blows the whistle it is unlikely that there would be an investigation in the first place.
- josephlord 14y agoIt should be a deterent to enter the illegal trust knowing that every member has an incentive to blow the whistle. That needs massive amounts of faith in competitors. When I worked at Sony the only annual mandatory traing sessions were competition law training for everyone near marketing and the potential penalties were drummed in (upto 10% of global group turnover).