A few thoughts: 1. It is always perilous for a startup to put all its eggs in one BigCorp basket. In most cases, even when success ensues, the startup will get

A few thoughts: 1. It is always perilous for a startup to put all its eggs in one BigCorp basket. In most cases, even when success ensues, the startup will get squeezed on things like pricing and they will continually face the risk of termination of the arrangement, leaving them vulnerable if the company's survival is tied to that deal. What is unusual here - and what so seriously increased the risk to this startup even much more than the norm - is the unusually blatant way in which Best Buy connived to steal the trade secrets. It is blatant in what was done because even by the low standards of much of corporate America it is pretty depraved to knowingly scheme to trick a young company into giving over its valuable company jewels while planning along to steal them. It is also blatant in how it was done because only really small-minded executives lack the good sense to refrain from implementing a plan to use contract assurances as a ruse by which to "take a peek under the hood" of the startup's technology, to promise to put up a "brick wall" between the team evaluating the technology and others simultaneously working on a comparable internal development effort only to wind up sending the trade secret information "across the wall" within a week of receiving it, to make a record of acknowledging an extremely high risk of litigation after doing a crude termination of the relationship, and then to use the trade secret information wholesale while simply deleting the name of the startup from it. 2. The founders may or may not have come out OK but they certainly did better given that the VCs stepped up to take the added risk of pursuing the suit than they would have otherwise. Without the VC action, the best they would have had a right to get would have been their pro rata share of whatever might have been left after the likely scant proceeds raised from a distress sale of the company's assets were applied to satisfy the VC's liquidation preferences (in other words, very likely zero). With the VC action, however, after the company sold its assets, its capitalization structure would have remained intact and the $27M from the lawsuit would go to pay remaining liquidation preferences, likely leaving a decent sum to be paid out pro rata to all shareholders, including founders (or, if the liquidation preferences were non-participating and the value of the VC's participation interest exceeded the value of any liquidation preference, then all of the $27M would be distributed pro rata to the shareholders, meaning that the founders would have gotten even more). The only question here is how the litigation funding was handled. If the VC's inserted some unfair mechanism by which the litigation funding was done so as to severely dilute the interests of the founders (akin to a down round), then the founders might have gotten a bad result. From all appearances, however, this did not happen and the founders should therefore be pretty happy with the result. It is a rare case where investors go out and hire Kirkland & Ellis and take the risk of paying them "hundreds of thousands of dollars," all for the purpose of trying to salvage a terrible situation. I would say 99% of VCs I know would have simply walked away from this and that it truly did take guts to take the hard path. 3. I was struck by the comment that, slow and plodding as the U.S. court system is, it generally works well when it plays out as it should. This is very true and is for me borne out by over three decades of experience with the courts. Litigation is frustrating beyond belief and one has to be almost insane to step gratuitously into it: it is costly, slow, unpredictable, and it is guaranteed only of one thing, to rob you of your peace of mind as you endure the process. Yet the adversarial process, when handled skillfully, tends to ferret out the truth and judges and juries do normally want to try to do right. This means that a wanton malefactor such as Best Buy here had better watch out if it meets a determined adversary who is willing to play out the fight and expose its wrongs. I call this "slamming it to them" and it works more often than not if the process plays out in full. It is only sad that the overwhelming number of litigants cannot afford to take the huge risks needed to be incurred to bring it to that state. In this sense, the system is robust and excellent but only for the relatively few who can manage its pitfalls. 4. The Latin-derived word "insidious" best captures the spirit of the wrongs committed here. This derives from a word meaning "to sit" and connotes "lying in wait" to harm the innocent. We can all succumb to temptations to do wrong on this or that occasion but it takes someone really loathsome to do what Best Buy's executives did here. And not just the wrongs but the utter failures to acknowledge them once caught red-handed. This can only mean that Best Buy was animated by a "might makes right" approach to this whole episode. Yes, large corporations do get away with this sort of thing all too often but it remains morally repulsive and it is inordinately refreshing when the day of comeuppance does arrive as it did here. Something to cheer about indeed.