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1.) Citizens can't afford a Narus device, let alone what they're offering now (more service oriented, less local hardware) 2.) Narus doesn't sell to citizens.

1.) Citizens can't afford a Narus device, let alone what they're offering now (more service oriented, less local hardware) 2.) Narus doesn't sell to citizens. Citizens aren't allowed to have information on what kind of monitoring Narus does because it's national security classified. >The exact use of this data is not fully documented, as the public is not authorized to see what types of activities and ideas are being monitored. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narus_%28company%29 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narus_%28company%29

jessaustin 14y ago
Yeah it probably isn't cheap. If motivated enough, however, somebody like EFF or WikiLeaks could co-opt enough officials in a third-party nation (Ecuador, perhaps?) to purchase the service. "National security classified" has never stopped Boeing from selling cut-rate, not-latest-generation tech to other nations before. After all, their pals who want to work for them upon "retirement" from the military decide what's classified. Probably the service wouldn't come with a complete ruleset, but it would come with consulting, from the same people who helped develop the initial USA ruleset. Also, the system is probably optimized for the use of its largest customer. Failing that, you might be able to enlist the help of some of the APT folks who've been downloading all the F-35 plans. Why would we expect Boeing's network to be more secure than Lockheed's? If one were really patient and as immoral as the NSA, one could start moving around a lot of fabricated-but-plausible evidence against USA citizens for national security-type crimes, and then paying special attention to federal prosecution notices. If you noticed which manufactured "evidence" turned up most often, you'd be able to run a kind of oracle attack by fine-tuning for what got prosecuted the most. In addition, many of these framed citizens would be so obviously innocent that even our debased court system would acquit. This would undermine the perceived accuracy of this fancy expensive system. After federal prosecutors look foolish a couple of times when relying on super-secret we-can't-tell-you-where-we-got-this surveillance data, word will get around. However it's done, if someone figured out how to characterize which packets get saved (I still refuse to believe they're saving every packet sent in the USA), one could generate many such packets, which could be obviously bogus upon inspection but enough to fool the initial analyzer. That's a DOS right there. Just throwing out some ideas. I'm sure you smart guys have already thought of all this.
- IheartApplesDix 14y ago
  The problem with all your proposed solutions is it doesn't allow the market to escape from the ever more technologically advanced supply of data because the development time is constrained by how fast you can fail. By the time you've found a vulnerability in their monitoring system, they've already written exception handlers for it and set up team dedicated to finding solutions for exceptions to those exceptions.

jessaustin 14y ago

Yeah it probably isn't cheap. If motivated enough, however, somebody like EFF or WikiLeaks could co-opt enough officials in a third-party nation (Ecuador, perhaps?) to purchase the service. "National security classified" has never stopped Boeing from selling cut-rate, not-latest-generation tech to other nations before. After all, their pals who want to work for them upon "retirement" from the military decide what's classified. Probably the service wouldn't come with a complete ruleset, but it would come with consulting, from the same people who helped develop the initial USA ruleset. Also, the system is probably optimized for the use of its largest customer. Failing that, you might be able to enlist the help of some of the APT folks who've been downloading all the F-35 plans. Why would we expect Boeing's network to be more secure than Lockheed's? If one were really patient and as immoral as the NSA, one could start moving around a lot of fabricated-but-plausible evidence against USA citizens for national security-type crimes, and then paying special attention to federal prosecution notices. If you noticed which manufactured "evidence" turned up most often, you'd be able to run a kind of oracle attack by fine-tuning for what got prosecuted the most. In addition, many of these framed citizens would be so obviously innocent that even our debased court system would acquit. This would undermine the perceived accuracy of this fancy expensive system. After federal prosecutors look foolish a couple of times when relying on super-secret we-can't-tell-you-where-we-got-this surveillance data, word will get around. However it's done, if someone figured out how to characterize which packets get saved (I still refuse to believe they're saving every packet sent in the USA), one could generate many such packets, which could be obviously bogus upon inspection but enough to fool the initial analyzer. That's a DOS right there. Just throwing out some ideas. I'm sure you smart guys have already thought of all this.

IheartApplesDix 14y ago
The problem with all your proposed solutions is it doesn't allow the market to escape from the ever more technologically advanced supply of data because the development time is constrained by how fast you can fail. By the time you've found a vulnerability in their monitoring system, they've already written exception handlers for it and set up team dedicated to finding solutions for exceptions to those exceptions.