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ITU Approves Deep Packet Inspection Recommendation
- jug6ernaut 14y agoIf this were some form of physical information transit it would have never passed. While ill be the first to admit I do not know what will come from this, or really even the basic understanding of DPI, this can not be good for those who value there privacy. I imagine that forcing encryption over all connections would be a counter measure to this? Going about getting all websites to offer encryption might be another story...
- gergles 14y agoAnd of course you can't even read what they approved, because this extra-governmental body inexplicably restricts the text of their decisions to a nebulous list of "TIES users". Fucking awful.
- mtgx 14y agoThe technical PDF is here (I shortened it because it was a long Google link): http://bit.ly/Yx0Sya http://bit.ly/Yx0Sya
- josh2600 14y agoI note that they're not applying DPI to encrypted traffic per the spec, but they do note that unencrypted portions of encrypted packets will still be inspected. The example they give is that if a PDU is encrypted, but all of the other sections of the packet are not, then only the PDU won't be inspected. Still, DPI is scary as all hell.
- lwat 14y agohttp://www.google.co.il/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&cad=rja&ved=0CFYQFjAH&url=http://committee.tta.or.kr/include/Download.jsp%3Ffilename%3Dchoan%252F%255B2012-1357%255DY.2770.pdf&ei=jju8UMDqMIXltQbB7IFw&usg=AFQjCNHBc9MUFhm95SGxzaDjVcckqK5exw&sig2=paw-5xFX0FDxqlq6Y1VnIQ http://www.google.co.il/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s...
- Sniffnoy 14y agoNon-Google version: http://committee.tta.or.kr/include/Download.jsp?filename=choan%2F%5B2012-1357%5DY.2770.pdf http://committee.tta.or.kr/include/Download.jsp?filename=cho...
- pera 14y agoFor some reason the download is not working here, but I was able to obtain it using Google's Quick View (and then Google Drive).. so here is a mirror: http://peramides.files.wordpress.com/2012/12/2012-1357y-2770.pdf http://peramides.files.wordpress.com/2012/12/2012-1357y-2770...
- nitrogen 14y agoA useful feature of HN is that it will elide links if they get too long.
- mtgx 14y agoMore info here (there's also a PDF for DPI in one of the links): http://broabandtrafficmanagement.blogspot.com/2012/12/itu-approves-dpi-recommendation-t2770.html http://broabandtrafficmanagement.blogspot.com/2012/12/itu-ap...
- mullingitover 14y agoI recently approved my own proposal to encrypt all my packets via VPN. Inspect away.
- Jabbles 14y agoSection 6.8 of the PDF deals with those pesky encrypted packets.
- jrabone 14y agoOnly insofar as it talks about 1) partially encrypted traffic, 2) using local copies of the keys for decryption, or 3) flow identification of IPSEC. Properly done I don't see an IPSEC/L2TP VPN being vulnerable to DPI - although you will want a constant stream of "filler" packets going back and forward to thwart traffic analysis. Otherwise, the whole thing is a disgrace and the engineers responsible for working on it need to take a long look at themselves. Dressing it up with examples of "Detection of Malware" is disingenuous, it's abundantly clear what the use case is here.
- spindritf 14y agoIf this gets widespread enough, they'll just inspect traffic when it leaves your VPN gateway/server. VPN is fine for public wifi, or connections between predetermined networks but you can't stretch it much past that.
- josh2600 14y agoThe hardest thing for me to understand is how every telco can complain of congestion, but they're perfectly willing to introduce unnecessary overhead for DPI. This is not a good day, not a good day at all.
- MichaelGG 14y agoHow is DPI related to needing more bandwidth needed per base station or residential area?
- kcbanner 14y agoI think he is referring to the fact that significant CPU resources are required for DPI and if the DPI can't keep up, things will slow down.
- Jach 14y agoI think you're underestimating the limit to how fast DPI is or can get. The computations aren't complicated and like many kinds of algorithms you can trade space with time.
- jessaustin 14y agoThis statement might be correct (although I've never seen any evidence to support it), but it's still misleading because "forward the packet" is always going to require fewer resources than "read the packet, parse it using this set of algos, use the parse results to search your DB of shit you want to fuck with, optionally fuck with the packet, optionally forward the packet". An exception to this would be if you have big iron on the edge that protects resource-poor interior nodes. This situation is unavoidable sometimes (DDOS), but it's not what anyone should aim for.
- gknoy 14y agoThey don't necessarily need to do anything with the packet then -- they could always pass a copy to cold storage, and then crunch the bits at their leisure in a massive data center.
- jstr 14y agoCan someone explain what this means from a practical point of view for telecommunications end users? Does it mean that NGN traffic will all undergo deep packet inspection in transit? What exactly are NGNs?
- revelation 14y agoGood luck with that. What they have just "approved" is the IP-equivalent of opening every single piece of mail. That is, wiretapping.
- gknoy 14y agoThey won't need luck, they have the rubber stamps of "National Security" and "We Promise We'll Only Use It For Bad Guys". I imagine that someone somewhere could find a way to apply the interstate commerce clause to let the US gov do what it wants there, too. They've already been effectively wiretapping and storing a lot, if you believe some of the recent whistleblowers, and so far there's been no effective pushback.
- jeremiep 14y agoIs it me or "National Security" really means National Insecurity? Where's freedom in the illusion of safety?
- gknoy 14y agoIt seems to be a balancing act. Too little secrets, and your law enforcement has a very hard time detecting threats before they happen. When people use VOIP instead of telephone lines, it's very hard to wiretap Dangerous People (and non-dangerous people). It's easy to find ways that such things make it easier for people whose job, goals, sworn duties, etc are to Protect us, or our nation. Many people join the armed services and civil service (of any country) for that reason. I rather like the idea of our intelligence agencies finding out ahead of time about genuine threats (whether from foreign states or from terrorists and the like), even while at the same time I am frightened by the potential slippery slope of where this could lead if unchecked. At some point, you really do have to decide whether you prefer safety or liberty. Part of me wants to shout "liberty!", as it's a founding principle of our country, but as a parent and citizen it's very easy to also want safety.
- throwaway125 14y ago
- MichaelGG 14y agoCan someone explain the problems with the ITU creating specifications? I thought I understood it, but all the recent excitement and anti-ITU sentiment tells me I must be missing something. How is what the ITU does different from any standards body? They can propose standards for DPI, censoring, etc., but that won't magically make Level3 or Comcast or any particular ISP start playing with my packets. What am I missing? Where does the stuff the ITU does somehow change the policies and actions of my ISP?
- akozak 14y agoThey're re-negotiating the ITRs, which are the provisions in the ITU's underlying treaty. Some general information (PDF): https://www.cdt.org/files/file/Global%20Internet%20Governance%20and%20the%20ITU.pdf https://www.cdt.org/files/file/Global%20Internet%20Governanc... On the DPI issue: https://www.cdt.org/blogs/cdt/2811adoption-traffic-sniffing-standard-fans-wcit-flames https://www.cdt.org/blogs/cdt/2811adoption-traffic-sniffing-...
- ajb 14y agoThey are negotiating the underlying treaty, but I don't think this is a treaty provision. It's a standards document, adopted by World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), not WCIT, which is renegotiating the treaty. Basically, this is not a law, it's a spec.
- MichaelGG 14y agoI still haven't seen exactly how this would possibly be enforced. Just like products selectively choose features, even if the IETF or ITU says "mandatory", does not somehow create a law. The ITU can't just vote itself to tell an ISP how to handle traffic, even internationally. They could create a standard and then let individual countries tell vendors "hey, you must comply with B.123 in order to sell in our country" -- but they can do that anyways. If a government wants snooping capabilities, you can bet every vendor will add it to get their business. It's still the government that decides if it's mandatory to turn on or not. Again, I'd like to hear the full path from the ITU taking a vote, to my ISP suddenly snooping in on stuff. I can't figure it out.
- beagle3 14y agoI think it is a good time to start incorporating DJB's NaCl into ... everything. And also run HTTP Everywhere in the meantime. And set up opportunistic IPSEC. Sad day. On a related note, I suggest we stop calling the heads of state and bureaucratic organizations like the UN "Leaders" and starting referring to them by their real self appointed role, "Rulers". Language shapes perception, and we've been using the wrong term for too long.
- saraid216 14y ago> Language shapes perception Isn't this an argument to to continue using the term "leaders"? Surely calling them "rulers" would, under your logic, push them further towards "rulership"?
- deleted 14y ago[deleted]
- legutierr 14y agoSeriously, though, who are these people? I mean, how can I get a cushy gig like that? You have to wonder about them as individuals, right? What path has their lives taken that they step into a room make a horrible decision like this and not retch. Is it a perverse sense of superiority over the people who are left out from the decision-making? Is it a complete lack of personality and individual thought? Or is it just an attempt to climb one more rung up the ladder, maybe move into that slightly nicer home in McClean or DuPont Circle?
- eric_bullington 14y agoFrom what I've experienced (as someone who occasionally rubbed elbows with such UN technocrats when I worked in international health), it's your last path that rules their lives. They are almost without exception climbers, both social and professional, much more anxious to climb the next step on the ladder than actually to build or change something for the better. Often, they start out idealistic and slowly change into jaded climbers. It's an outlook on life that would be foreign to many people here. Edit: grammar
- lukejduncan 14y agoI'm unsure if this is "requirements on how to implement deep packet inspection, if you choose to do so" vs "requirements to perform deep packet inspection." Can anyone give context?
- hosay123 14y agoContext is that Google says it impacts profit^W^W^W it's evil, so it must be. Because hey, standardizing what every government is doing already must be evil.
- TazeTSchnitzel 14y agoIPSec to the rescue?
- MichaelGG 14y agoIPSec by itself isn't going to really help. If they are doing DPI, they can MITM your IPSec connections. You still need a key management system, and I am not aware of any large-scale systems that are in-place to just "switch on" IPSec, that is, suddenly provide you with the certificates for every IP you want to connect to.
- andrewcooke 14y agoIf they are doing DPI, they can MITM your IPSec connections. what, how? dpi just means looking at packets inside ip. it doesn't somehow grant you the ability to do man-in-the-middle attacks. deep packet inspection is already possible. that doesn't mean that tls or ipsec or any other protocol is broken. (i agree with the need for key management etc; it's just the quoted statement above that seems wrong).
- MichaelGG 14y agoYou're right, it could be a passive inspection. But... if they are your ISP and have access to your packets, chances are they can rewrite and inject traffic too. Sure, they might need a bit more hardware to do so, but it's not exactly difficult. But you're correct, DPI doesn't necessarily imply MITM capabilities.
- lttlrck 14y agoYou'll be forced into submission. Your link will be throttled by the ISP based on bandwidth alone regardless of content. This is not new.
- deleted 14y ago[deleted]
- bdg 14y agoYou know we're about to have a bad time when the highly tech savy crowd on HackerNews is left asking "what does this mean?" All over the comments in the thread...
- suyash 14y agoWhat is the big deal?
- liquidise 14y agoAppendix I & II are frighting in their casual use of major headings. Looks an awful lot like the fabled "tier-ed internet". Heck, one of the diagrams even categorizes IP traffic in 4 levels: Gold, Silver, Bronze, P2P. I'm not an owner of tinfoil hats, but this has a lot of implications to a distributed web. Appendix Examples: I.2.1 Differentiated services based on service identification I.2.2 Traffic monitoring I.2.4 Traffic statistics and services-based billing I.3.1 DPI used as a bidirectional tool for service control I.5 DPI use case: Traffic control I.5.3 DPI-based policing of peer-to-peer traffic I.9.2 DPI engine use case: Simple fixed string matching for BitTorrent II.4.11 Example “Identify uploading BitTorrent users” II.4.13 Example “Blocking Peer-to-Peer VoIP telephony with proprietary end-to-end application control protocols”
- grecy 14y agoAre they recommending Deep Packet inspection to the governments of the world in the name of "security" or are they recommending it to the ISPs as a means of packet prioritization?
- georgeorwell 14y agoOne way to think of this is as a cat and mouse game. Another way is that some people are developing high-bandwidth, distributed, and anonymous internet software and some other people are writing tests that this software is expected to fail presently but that the developers must pass in order to make it to the next level of hardened security and reliability.
- bstpierre 14y agoThis is not worthy of "the sky is falling" levels of panic. My experience with standardization efforts is that they generally run well behind the technology innovators. DPI has been around for a while. A DPI standard (or series of standards) out of the ITU will simply make public the baseline expectations of vendors and users of DPI systems. On the other hand, CALEA has been on the books for over 15 years, and that is the kind of thing to watch out for -- it does mandate features that provide snooping to the government on demand. (Speaking as someone who has implemented [shallow] inspection/filtering and CALEA-type features on comms equipment for markets both in and outside of the US.)
- throwit1979 14y agoSpeaking as someone who has implemented [shallow] inspection/filtering and CALEA-type features on comms equipment for markets both in and outside of the US.) I'm not trying to flame you here, but I really must ask: How do you live with yourself? I know how trollish that sounds, but I seriously don't understand engineers who voluntarily work against our own ethos. It's not like this is an industry in which implementing CALEA is the only possible way to feed a family. Job opportunities are practically endless.
- bstpierre 14y agoEvery feature I've implemented has been security/stability related. Inspection/filtering/shaping/limiting are absolutely critical on ISP networks. Taps/mirrors are critical to troubleshooting. If ISPs didn't deploy all kinds of filtering, the Internet would be mostly unusable.
- sp332 14y agoI work at an ISP, and this is absolutely true. Sometimes our mail servers get hammered, and we need to modify our blacklist to include servers, netblocks, and/or entire countries(!) at a time. In order to know what to block, we need to be able to know who is emailing whom. Sometimes, it's one of our customers, and we can call them up and tell them their box is owned. This kind of intrusive access is only used for maintenance, and without it we literally couldn't keep the mail servers online.
- Jimega36 14y agoAgainst big governments, nothing is stronger than the little men and women getting together. If this is so bad (which I am not technically capable of understanding...), what shall we DO about it? Signing the petition is probably not enough. Get people to have a minute of 'no internet' across the world? Similar to the Anti-SOPA movement? Suggestions welcome.
- bluedanieru 14y agoReplace the Internet with a wireless meshnet. Problem solved.
- beagle3 14y agoWe need to start establishing a DPI/MITM resistant secret sharing protocol, and a related IP protocol. E.g., a series of simple recaptcha-style tasks that need to be solved within 3 seconds each to be considered secure - in order to avoid active MITM with either machine or manual labor. Once a secret key is established, it can be used from that moment on. Otherwise, opportunistic encryption can be MITMed and becomes useless. Less secure: Require committing the equivalent of 10 seconds of a modern i5 processor to establish the shared secret within 20 seconds. That would be acceptable for two side of a connection, but not for a server or a MITM attacker.
- jessaustin 14y agoHistorically the ITU was a forum through which Ma Bell marketed her switching equipment to national phone companies outside North America. Presumably this is more of the same, except Ma Bell was divested of most equipment manufacturing and it's all IP now so other companies (USA, Japan, Germany, with a few others) are driving. The capacity for spying on and shaping the internet use of customers/subjects is appealing for many decision-makers. Among "first world" nations, we probably shouldn't discount the persuasiveness of the various American TLAs with their various evil projects. Don't you want your national constabulary to buy the same crap the DHS buys? I suspect that if all of this was for reasonable network maintenance then the ITU wouldn't need to be involved. The equipment manufacturers have the researchers; they don't need the ITU to tell them how to shut down open mail relays. What makes me less concerned about these proceedings is that all this is happening anyway, whether we're told or not. Yes Virginia, there are bad people in the world, and some of them run phone companies, while others spy on the citizens who pay their salaries. Eventually they'll all be routed around, and we have encryption anyway. Sure key management is hard, but if your opponent controls national network operators then you'll use something better than TLS.
- noselasd 14y agoI do find that description a bit odd, since all the early ITU specifications were made mostly by Europeean vendors, and were incompatible with the American versions of protocols, etc. Anyway - a lot of these specs are made by the very researchers of the various vendors that you talk about - ITU is just a forum they use to collaborate.
- mtgx 14y agoKeep in mind that this DPI system, besides making it easier to monitor people's communications and even censor them, would also make it very easy for them to identify the type of traffic that goes through the pipes, so they can know exactly how to charge it differently, which brings us to another one of ITU's proposals, which is to kill net neutrality and charge for "premium services" like watching Youtube, or using other type of P2P traffic (Skype, WebRTC, torrents, etc): http://itu4u.wordpress.com/2012/10/25/proposal-for-ict-and-internet-ecosystem-setting-new-rules-on-trade-order/ http://itu4u.wordpress.com/2012/10/25/proposal-for-ict-and-i... They want to do this, they say, to help "grow the Internet" (hasn't the Internet grown fast enough without their help in the past 20 years?), despite the fact that evidence suggests that the sender-pays system would slow down the growth of the Internet, not make it any faster (research paper): http://mercatus.org/publication/do-high-international-telecom-rates-buy-telecom-sector-growth http://mercatus.org/publication/do-high-international-teleco...
- ripperdoc 14y agoNote that a kind of sender-pays is already used in practice as all big content providers pay for CDN on a per GB basis, and the CDN company in turn pays for bandwidth.
- guessWhy 14y agoSure, but this was the case before CDNs as well. Unless you are a Tier 1 network you usually pay a fee to your upstream carrier. However, the ITU would like to charge across many networks and discriminate based on the type of service provided. So if data from your network A reaches the customer through networks B, C and finally D, then D would like to charge you to deliver it and not slow down things artificially.
- ripperdoc 14y agoBut that is what CDNs do. A content provider, such as Apple, will pay both for their upstream carrier access, AND for the CDN access. And the CDN will effectively pay each network on the way to the destination, by renting their lines and hosting servers at their PoPs. CDN is a QoS service, it's just that the access networks feel they aren't getting part of that cake.
- jayfuerstenberg 14y agoSo let me get this straight? Governments who are fighting to keep these negotiations as 'closed' as possible want our communications to be as 'open' as possible? War = Peace Freedom = Slavery ...
- ripperdoc 14y agoThere's a lot of misconceptions on DPI going on here. Without taking position, let me just share a few facts (I work with this...). - DPI is used in most networks in the world, and is mainly used for throttling P2P or for traffic analysis. Legal interception e.g. classical wiretapping is a different thing, although it could use same hardware. - DPI does cost some resources to the operator but the impact on end users is negligible (except for malfunctions or improperly dimensioned DPIs). It only adds a tiny amount to latency, which puts an upper limit on bandwidth. In many cases, the bandwidth is limited somewhere else on the link. - DPI hardware works in several stages, typically: analyze IP flow (shallow inspection), if not enough to decide, to DPI (analyze HTTP headers etc), if not enough to decide, rely on heuristics based on traffic pattern etc. - DPI is not very good at all at dealing with encrypted traffic, and most DPIs will not be able to do anything else than shallow inspection. (some claim to do traffic flow analysis, and some (normally transparent proxies) can break the HTTPS flow in two, but it would generate client errors). - ITUs specifications won't have much impact on what ISPs do at the moment (as they already do it) but I guess could be a part of the wider regulatory discussion.