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> So here are the apples to apples base data for the most recent branch of discussion: These are explicitly not apples to apples comparisons because the 1951 p

> So here are the apples to apples base data for the most recent branch of discussion: These are explicitly not apples to apples comparisons because the 1951 percentage is extremely restrictive about the housing units considered (i.e. most apartments are excluded, as are farms) and there's no reason to believe the ownership percentages are equivalent. I could (equally unfairly) point out that the 9.5 million "free and clear" homes in your paper is less than a quarter of the total recorded nonfarm housing stock which is a lot less than the 34 million (39.4%) owned free and clear today. What is clear though is that no interpretation of the available data is compatible with your original statement that "In 1951 56% of people owned their home, free and clear", or your assertion that something your source claimed had grown massively recently was a "local low". Defending those basic misunderstandings with clumsy misuse of statistics two posts later whilst telling me not to get too vested in arguments is... pretty funny. Also, as I keep pointing out and you keep pretending isn't the case, the 1950s were a time where inflation rates averaged their current level (but with more volatility) not a time of deflation (and for that matter were also a time of the Fannie Mae mortgage backing you blame for everything, rather than the good old days when you had to save up 50% of the cost of your house as a deposit and pay it off within 10 years). So it is completely irrelevant to your argument for deflation. You have not addressed any of the other points in my last two posts. I am sorry, but if genuinely don't understand why nobody would invest for a 0.1% return [under a gold standard] even when the post you are responding to explicitly mentions things like interest rates and risk and the relationship between credit prices and money supply, it is not worth my time trying to educate you on what those very basic concepts entail. Especially given that you have made it extremely clear you have no interest in understanding. There is no point phrasing things like an adult to someone that flat-out refuses to acknowledge very basic adult concepts like interest rates and risk and supply and demand whilst resorting to babyish memes like "money printer go whirrr" and "funny money"

somenameforme 3mo ago
I've already mentioned that the contemporary data are also restrictive. The (of total) maximum possible free and clear owned housing stock is 30% [1] since it's only 45 million units out of a total housing stock of 147. And it'd be even lower because we're only considering owner occupied, and corporations own about 10% of houses in modern times - yet another 'yay' for funny money driven inflation evasion and speculation. So the max would be in the 20s at the absolute most, yet we get 39.4% of homes being owned free and clear. How? By removing a lot of the housing stock from consideration. In any case, much of the stock removed in the 1950s data works against me. For instance farm units had even more favorable ownership rates than general housing stock. There is no 'trick' in the data here. I've also already said I fully agree that the data we're using isn't ideal in terms of inflation. It was right after WW2 and so there was some serious localized inflation, as well as some early funny money stuff. But 1950 is pretty a pretty reasonable inflection point between 'the good ole days' and the inflation squeeze of modern times. If your argument is that inflation/money printing from the 40s was causing the positive outcomes, you end up with a logical contradiction because we engage in orders of magnitude greater inflation/money printing today, yet have worse outcomes by endless metrics. Furthermore, 1950 wasn't some local max. Most data there was significantly worse than the era prior to the wars, spanish flu, and so on. As for investment, expected value [2] is a term you do not seem familiar with. It is a risk adjusted value of expected return on something. In modern times any potential venture needs an expected value greater than inflation to break even. That immediately leads to the scenario where you need infinite exponential growth or this economic system collapses. That infinite exponential growth briefly looked possible. Now the digital explosion is plateauing, there's a fertility collapse (which again is very possibly caused, at least in part, by this system's failures) and more. If LLMs or space don't restart the game of kick the can, this system will die. The only question is whether it will go out with a boom or a whimper. [1] - https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2023.B25081 https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2023.B25081 [2] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expected_value https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expected_value
- somenameforme 3mo ago
  Also, somebody else just submitted this [1]. The Fed just released a paper showing (or at least affirming) that the labor share of income in the US is at its lowest post-war level which is, more or less, equivalent to stating that it's at its lowest level ever. They're likely just using data starting at the 40s for the same reason I am. But the really interesting thing? Go open their graphs and look where the inflection point is. It's, again, the funny money. [1] - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48734234 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48734234
- notahacker 3mo ago
  > I've also already said I fully agree that the data we're using isn't ideal in terms of inflation. It's not a case of it being not ideal. It's the case of it being an example of literally the opposite phenomenon from the one you're arguing for. Arguing that the 1950s are a good example of how deflation helps people is like arguing that Barack Obama is a good example of how Republican candidates make good presidents. > As for investment, expected value [2] is a term you do not seem familiar with. It is a risk adjusted value of expected return on something. hahahahahahaha Again, it's a basic definitional thing that EV isn't adjusted for the investor's risk tolerance (it's a probability weighted average, as your link and many better introductory economics and finance texts you should probably read will tell you.) Not only am I familiar with what expected value actually means and its use as a synonym for risk-neutral return in investment parlance, I'm also apparently the only participant in the discussion aware that 0.1% expected return isn't likely to leave enough of a risk premium[1] and (ii) investors also have to consider opportunity cost, so even in a world filled with insane risk-neutral investors who'd in principle be comfortable betting their house on a fair coin flip, they still wouldn't touch an investment at a nominal 0.1% return in a gold standard world, because the opportunity cost would be giving up much higher returns on lending the money elsewhere. Because unlike you I know that market and base interest rates are a thing and why they're relevant to the argument. And also they're not the same thing as inflation and are in fact generally inversely related[2]. Once we've got past the basic definitional stuff and the "why doesn't this hypothetical gold standard economy where you're considering investing in a productive venture for a 0.1% return have anyone else that wants to borrow your money?", I could question what sort of venture would get a 0.1% nominal return when prices of stuff it might make are going down, and only get a 0.1% nominal return in an inflationary environment where the prices of stuff it might make are going up[3]. It's easier to make more than 0.1% making stuff to sell next year when prices of everything are going to be 2% higher, and harder when prices of everything are going to be 2% lower. Again, if you don't have the basic grasp of the relevant terms you're quoting (some of them more high school than undergrad) never mind sufficient grasp to understand even an argument as simple as "risking money to earn 0.1% is not attractive when money is in short supply" have the decency to the possibility that you might not be in a position to know best about how the economy works. Also, if you don't like billionaire capital owners having too much money, maybe don't pin your hopes on the only policy prescription that hasn't trended towards the CATO institute, von Mises and Ayn Rand's[4] arguments in favour of letting billionaires keep more of their money since the 1950s... [1]in any economy except, ironically, an economy with lots of money printing (seriously, go learn about QE. Hint: it's printing lots of money because printing lots of money is a way to get people interested in investing when interest rates are very low) [2]and also why, and covering the relevant transmission mechanisms might take half a semester of undergrad macro, but even understanding that money isn't cheap to borrow when its in short supply would get you there. [3]I mean, when I say wonder, I actually know that the most likely way of achieving that with actual goods and services is if it's an inferior good with negative income elasticity. I'm just not sure why anybody would want to base economic policy on incentivising the production of inferior goods with negative income elasticities, even if such a policy were feasible. [4]weird how it's all these extremely rabidly pro-billionaire personalities and organizations and none of the pro-worker organizations that want the gold standard back, considering your conviction that it will be good for workers and bad for billionaires.

somenameforme 3mo ago

I've already mentioned that the contemporary data are also restrictive. The (of total) maximum possible free and clear owned housing stock is 30% [1] since it's only 45 million units out of a total housing stock of 147. And it'd be even lower because we're only considering owner occupied, and corporations own about 10% of houses in modern times - yet another 'yay' for funny money driven inflation evasion and speculation. So the max would be in the 20s at the absolute most, yet we get 39.4% of homes being owned free and clear. How? By removing a lot of the housing stock from consideration. In any case, much of the stock removed in the 1950s data works against me. For instance farm units had even more favorable ownership rates than general housing stock. There is no 'trick' in the data here. I've also already said I fully agree that the data we're using isn't ideal in terms of inflation. It was right after WW2 and so there was some serious localized inflation, as well as some early funny money stuff. But 1950 is pretty a pretty reasonable inflection point between 'the good ole days' and the inflation squeeze of modern times. If your argument is that inflation/money printing from the 40s was causing the positive outcomes, you end up with a logical contradiction because we engage in orders of magnitude greater inflation/money printing today, yet have worse outcomes by endless metrics. Furthermore, 1950 wasn't some local max. Most data there was significantly worse than the era prior to the wars, spanish flu, and so on. As for investment, expected value [2] is a term you do not seem familiar with. It is a risk adjusted value of expected return on something. In modern times any potential venture needs an expected value greater than inflation to break even. That immediately leads to the scenario where you need infinite exponential growth or this economic system collapses. That infinite exponential growth briefly looked possible. Now the digital explosion is plateauing, there's a fertility collapse (which again is very possibly caused, at least in part, by this system's failures) and more. If LLMs or space don't restart the game of kick the can, this system will die. The only question is whether it will go out with a boom or a whimper. [1] - https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2023.B25081 https://data.census.gov/table/ACSDT1Y2023.B25081 [2] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expected_value https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expected_value

somenameforme 3mo ago
Also, somebody else just submitted this [1]. The Fed just released a paper showing (or at least affirming) that the labor share of income in the US is at its lowest post-war level which is, more or less, equivalent to stating that it's at its lowest level ever. They're likely just using data starting at the 40s for the same reason I am. But the really interesting thing? Go open their graphs and look where the inflection point is. It's, again, the funny money. [1] - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48734234 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48734234
notahacker 3mo ago
> I've also already said I fully agree that the data we're using isn't ideal in terms of inflation. It's not a case of it being not ideal. It's the case of it being an example of literally the opposite phenomenon from the one you're arguing for. Arguing that the 1950s are a good example of how deflation helps people is like arguing that Barack Obama is a good example of how Republican candidates make good presidents. > As for investment, expected value [2] is a term you do not seem familiar with. It is a risk adjusted value of expected return on something. hahahahahahaha Again, it's a basic definitional thing that EV isn't adjusted for the investor's risk tolerance (it's a probability weighted average, as your link and many better introductory economics and finance texts you should probably read will tell you.) Not only am I familiar with what expected value actually means and its use as a synonym for risk-neutral return in investment parlance, I'm also apparently the only participant in the discussion aware that 0.1% expected return isn't likely to leave enough of a risk premium[1] and (ii) investors also have to consider opportunity cost, so even in a world filled with insane risk-neutral investors who'd in principle be comfortable betting their house on a fair coin flip, they still wouldn't touch an investment at a nominal 0.1% return in a gold standard world, because the opportunity cost would be giving up much higher returns on lending the money elsewhere. Because unlike you I know that market and base interest rates are a thing and why they're relevant to the argument. And also they're not the same thing as inflation and are in fact generally inversely related[2]. Once we've got past the basic definitional stuff and the "why doesn't this hypothetical gold standard economy where you're considering investing in a productive venture for a 0.1% return have anyone else that wants to borrow your money?", I could question what sort of venture would get a 0.1% nominal return when prices of stuff it might make are going down, and only get a 0.1% nominal return in an inflationary environment where the prices of stuff it might make are going up[3]. It's easier to make more than 0.1% making stuff to sell next year when prices of everything are going to be 2% higher, and harder when prices of everything are going to be 2% lower. Again, if you don't have the basic grasp of the relevant terms you're quoting (some of them more high school than undergrad) never mind sufficient grasp to understand even an argument as simple as "risking money to earn 0.1% is not attractive when money is in short supply" have the decency to the possibility that you might not be in a position to know best about how the economy works. Also, if you don't like billionaire capital owners having too much money, maybe don't pin your hopes on the only policy prescription that hasn't trended towards the CATO institute, von Mises and Ayn Rand's[4] arguments in favour of letting billionaires keep more of their money since the 1950s... [1]in any economy except, ironically, an economy with lots of money printing (seriously, go learn about QE. Hint: it's printing lots of money because printing lots of money is a way to get people interested in investing when interest rates are very low) [2]and also why, and covering the relevant transmission mechanisms might take half a semester of undergrad macro, but even understanding that money isn't cheap to borrow when its in short supply would get you there. [3]I mean, when I say wonder, I actually know that the most likely way of achieving that with actual goods and services is if it's an inferior good with negative income elasticity. I'm just not sure why anybody would want to base economic policy on incentivising the production of inferior goods with negative income elasticities, even if such a policy were feasible. [4]weird how it's all these extremely rabidly pro-billionaire personalities and organizations and none of the pro-worker organizations that want the gold standard back, considering your conviction that it will be good for workers and bad for billionaires.