One suggestion for improving the cache's posture: Give each dedicated builder machine a TPM. On each builder, generate a TPM-backed signing key. Only use those

One suggestion for improving the cache's posture: Give each dedicated builder machine a TPM. On each builder, generate a TPM-backed signing key. Only use those TPM-backed keys for signing packages that end up in the cache. That way we'd ensure that signed packages _must_ have been built on the dedicated build machines (due to the TPM) rather than potentially uploaded from a compromised developer machine using a compromised signing key. It seems the current situation is there is a single signing key that has been in use since 2015 which implies that key is not tied to specific hardware and therefore could be leaked/exfiltrated/copied: https://github.com/NixOS/rfcs/pull/149/files#diff-ac4cc42774897d03700afa5e998e676b494ee685860d9ee08dfa2b14d7566273R22 https://github.com/NixOS/rfcs/pull/149/files#diff-ac4cc42774...