4 ms·

No, it only "requires" browser attestation if we taken it as a given that the onus is on tech companies for verifying who they are talking to - ie identity veri

No, it only "requires" browser attestation if we taken it as a given that the onus is on tech companies for verifying who they are talking to - ie identity verification that most of these schemes boil down to regardless of how cute they're dressed up. To effectively keep adult content away from kids, it merely requires secure boot and closed app stores, which are already widespread. And they are only required on the devices actually given to kids, rather than every single computing device. But this proposal has another problem: it's easy for a website to run isUserOver(n) in a loop to derive the exact age. And on a persistent account, it can be queried every day to derive an exact birthday! Which comes back to my main point that the only technical schemes we should be considering are ones where information strictly flows one way - the website/app supplies information to the browser/OS, which then [may] implement parental control policy. anything else fundamentally boils down to a mandate for identity verification.

Wowfunhappy 4mo ago
> To effectively keep adult content away from kids, it merely requires secure boot and closed app stores, which are already widespread. And they are only required on the devices actually given to kids, rather than every single computing device. ...I guess I don't really see the difference. Closed app stores are widespread on some platforms but certainly not others, and I for one would really like them to not spread any further.
- mindslight 4mo ago
  For starters here, the difference is that only devices that parents give to kids need to have secure boot and controlled software sources. The point is that every other device remains completely unaffected. But in general there is a huge difference between the freedom-destroying properties of secure boot with closed app stores, and the next step of remote attestation. Remote attestation lets the server insist that you only run software fully of their choosing rather than your choosing, as a condition of interacting with them. This completely destroys the idea of protocols that mediate between two parties with diverging interests, and computationally disenfranchises users. Imagine the next generation of the Cloudflare nagwall that doesn't let you past unless you buy a new computer, and that new computer must be running MSWin/OSX and MSIE/Chrome. (also note that my use of "secure boot" here includes systems like on Pixels where you can straightforwardly unlock the bootloader (erasing the data on the device), install whatever you want, and then relock. I still find these systems philosophically objectionable, as there is still a privileged key baked in and retained by the manufacturer - similar security properties could be provided without the backdoor. But pragmatically they've been working okay)
  - drdexebtjl 4mo ago
    No, thank you. As a parent, I want to give a device to my child that they can hack, just like I had. Why are we treating kids like adversarial threats? If my kid gets around parental controls, I’ll revoke their phone privileges. No need for invasive security.
    - mindslight 4mo ago
      > No, thank you Yes, as a parent you should be able to say this! You should also be able to say other things like I want my kid to have full access to wikipedia. Or I do not want my kid to have access to Faceboot, including a special Faceboot4Kidz version that their corporate attorneys have declared is completely suitable for minors. My whole point arguing for client side controls is that it allows parents to express these types of fine-grained preferences, without merely putting the onus on tech companies to make these decisions in a top-down fashion serving their own self interest! As for secure boot specifically, my point is that it is already here on basically every phone. One of the most security-forward phone OSs (Graphene) even requires it. I've got philosophical problems with manufacturers baking privileged backdoor keys into hardware, but it's already prevalent. If you think I'm arguing in favor of restrictions, then please go educate yourself on the security properties of remote attestation to see what I'm actually arguing in favor of heading off!
      - drdexebtjl 4mo ago
        If you want to argue for client side controls, I’m on your side. I’ve expressed this opinion elsewhere in this thread. I’m well educastes on what remote attestation means, and I know it’s the status quo. But it is not required by law. And I’d very much like for it to continue being optional indefinitely, and not bundled with a different “save the children” law. More specifically, I don’t want to have to prove to the OEM that I’m an adult to unlock my bootloader or disable SecureBoot. Or, more realistically, I don’t want OEMs deciding it’s cheaper to stop offering that choice because they don’t want to risk unlocking the bootloader on a child’s device.
        4mo ago
drnick1 4mo ago
> To effectively keep adult content away from kids, it merely requires secure boot and closed app stores This is unacceptable. If I own a computer, I expect to be able to build and run any program, either written by myself or others, without asking anyone for permission.
- mindslight 4mo ago
  Maybe I needed to say "it merely requires the existence ...". Because I then do go on to say: > And they are only required on the devices actually given to kids My whole point is that this limits the blast radius, compared to any solution involving "age" (read: identity) verification which has a blast radius of every computing device! Perhaps my other comment will show you where I'm coming from better: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48645646 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48645646

Wowfunhappy 4mo ago

> To effectively keep adult content away from kids, it merely requires secure boot and closed app stores, which are already widespread. And they are only required on the devices actually given to kids, rather than every single computing device. ...I guess I don't really see the difference. Closed app stores are widespread on some platforms but certainly not others, and I for one would really like them to not spread any further.

mindslight 4mo ago
For starters here, the difference is that only devices that parents give to kids need to have secure boot and controlled software sources. The point is that every other device remains completely unaffected. But in general there is a huge difference between the freedom-destroying properties of secure boot with closed app stores, and the next step of remote attestation. Remote attestation lets the server insist that you only run software fully of their choosing rather than your choosing, as a condition of interacting with them. This completely destroys the idea of protocols that mediate between two parties with diverging interests, and computationally disenfranchises users. Imagine the next generation of the Cloudflare nagwall that doesn't let you past unless you buy a new computer, and that new computer must be running MSWin/OSX and MSIE/Chrome. (also note that my use of "secure boot" here includes systems like on Pixels where you can straightforwardly unlock the bootloader (erasing the data on the device), install whatever you want, and then relock. I still find these systems philosophically objectionable, as there is still a privileged key baked in and retained by the manufacturer - similar security properties could be provided without the backdoor. But pragmatically they've been working okay)
- drdexebtjl 4mo ago
  No, thank you. As a parent, I want to give a device to my child that they can hack, just like I had. Why are we treating kids like adversarial threats? If my kid gets around parental controls, I’ll revoke their phone privileges. No need for invasive security.
  - mindslight 4mo ago
    > No, thank you Yes, as a parent you should be able to say this! You should also be able to say other things like I want my kid to have full access to wikipedia. Or I do not want my kid to have access to Faceboot, including a special Faceboot4Kidz version that their corporate attorneys have declared is completely suitable for minors. My whole point arguing for client side controls is that it allows parents to express these types of fine-grained preferences, without merely putting the onus on tech companies to make these decisions in a top-down fashion serving their own self interest! As for secure boot specifically, my point is that it is already here on basically every phone. One of the most security-forward phone OSs (Graphene) even requires it. I've got philosophical problems with manufacturers baking privileged backdoor keys into hardware, but it's already prevalent. If you think I'm arguing in favor of restrictions, then please go educate yourself on the security properties of remote attestation to see what I'm actually arguing in favor of heading off!
    - drdexebtjl 4mo ago
      If you want to argue for client side controls, I’m on your side. I’ve expressed this opinion elsewhere in this thread. I’m well educastes on what remote attestation means, and I know it’s the status quo. But it is not required by law. And I’d very much like for it to continue being optional indefinitely, and not bundled with a different “save the children” law. More specifically, I don’t want to have to prove to the OEM that I’m an adult to unlock my bootloader or disable SecureBoot. Or, more realistically, I don’t want OEMs deciding it’s cheaper to stop offering that choice because they don’t want to risk unlocking the bootloader on a child’s device.
      - 4mo ago

drnick1 4mo ago

> To effectively keep adult content away from kids, it merely requires secure boot and closed app stores This is unacceptable. If I own a computer, I expect to be able to build and run any program, either written by myself or others, without asking anyone for permission.

mindslight 4mo ago
Maybe I needed to say "it merely requires the existence ...". Because I then do go on to say: > And they are only required on the devices actually given to kids My whole point is that this limits the blast radius, compared to any solution involving "age" (read: identity) verification which has a blast radius of every computing device! Perhaps my other comment will show you where I'm coming from better: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48645646 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48645646