5 ms·

them supporting e/OS suggests otherwise

by tcfhgj 4mo ago

Cider9986 4mo ago
It seems to me that /e/ is opposed to privacy and security. https://xcancel.com/GrapheneOS/status/2066908368560656652#m https://xcancel.com/GrapheneOS/status/2066908368560656652#m
- tcfhgj 4mo ago
  It's interesting how you are able to conclude that. e/OS is clearly a step up from default Android
  - Cider9986 4mo ago
    Insinuating that real privacy /security is for pedophiles and criminals is primarily what supports my conclusion. It doesn't matter what your marketing says, what's important is what your devices do, and /e/ is much less secure or private than iOS. Attacking GrapheneOS which makes real progress at privsec. Thinking that badness enumeration is effective for improving privacy while ignoring real solutions like improving the app sandbox and adding more permissions. Adding Google services and giving them extra privileges. GrapheneOS ships with zero Google services by default. https://xcancel.com/GrapheneOS/status/2040887784253141142#m https://xcancel.com/GrapheneOS/status/2040887784253141142#m
    - Cider9986 4mo ago
      This German security researcher maintains a comparison table showing the differences between mobile OSes. https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm
  - strcat 4mo ago
    /e/ has drastically worse privacy and security from the Android Open Source Project or especially and iPhone. It's not a step up from standard AOSP. It lags many months behind on many High/Critical severity patches, years behind on overall patches and rolls back the privacy/security in a bunch of ways. It includes many invasive services. It has many default enabled highly privileged Google services including downloading Google Play executables such as droidguard and running those with similar privileged access as they have on a Google Mobile Services OS anyway.
HybridStatAnim8 4mo ago
No, them supporting e/OS corroborates the claim that their goal is not privacy or security.
- fsflover 4mo ago
  What do they need to support to convince you? Providing all hardware features required by GrapheneOS is not feasible for a small company.
  - strcat 4mo ago
    Fairphone doesn't design or make their smartphones. The devices are designed and made by a large ODM. It's entirely feasible to use a modern SoC with current generation security features and provide proper updates. Their ODM isn't doing it to cut costs. Fairphone quickly stops providing Linux kernel updates and has months of delay for Android userspace backports along with driver/firmware backports. The delay for yearly updates typically starts at a year and gets longer as devices get older and they've always skipped the quarterly updates. Using a modern SoC, properly configuring it, using proper signing keys (Fairphone has repeatedly used publicly available sample private keys) and providing proper updates is most of what's needed to meet the requirements. That's entirely doable by the few OEMs designing their devices in-house such as Motorola Mobility. Samsung and Google along with many of the ODMs making devices for Nothing, Fairphone, etc. https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-privacysecurity-patches-and-protections-arent-private https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-stand...
  - handedness 4mo ago
    > What do they need to support to convince you? I know you're already aware of this because it's been provided to you before, but for the folks reading at home, here are the device requirements: https://grapheneos.org/faq#future-devices https://grapheneos.org/faq#future-devices
    - fsflover 4mo ago
      You completely missed the context here. my comment was not about skipping the security features of GrapheneOS. The original parent comment was > No, them supporting e/OS corroborates the claim that their goal is not privacy or security. and I asked how they could be convinced about Fairphone's intentions given that the company is tiny and can't develop Pixel-level hardware.
strcat 4mo ago
/e/ is the direct opposite of a privacy or security focused OS. It doesn't provide bare minimum standard privacy and security patches while setting an inaccurate Android security patch level. It lags many months behind on patches even on devices where they're the least behind. It's typically years behind on kernel, driver, firmware and major OS updates. It doesn't keep the standard privacy and security protections intact and lagging behind on OS updates means not having the current ones. It sends user data to OpenAI and other third parties without consent. https://community.e.foundation/t/voice-to-text-feature-using-open-ai/70509 https://community.e.foundation/t/voice-to-text-feature-using... https://codeberg.org/divested-mobile/divestos-website/raw/commit/c7447de50bc8fadd20a30d4cbf1dcd8cf14805a0/static/misc/e.txt https://codeberg.org/divested-mobile/divestos-website/raw/co... https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-privacysecurity-patches-and-protections-arent-private https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-stand... /e/ and Murena have repeatedly claimed providing strong privacy and security mainly benefits criminals and claim devices doing it are mainly used by criminals. Here's one example of many: https://grapheneos.social/deck/@GrapheneOS/116353973732143171 https://grapheneos.social/deck/@GrapheneOS/11635397373214317... An iPhone is a hardened device with drastically better privacy and security than an /e/ device. It would fall under the claims from /e/ and Murena about hardened devices.

them supporting e/OS suggests otherwise

by tcfhgj 4mo ago

them supporting e/OS suggests otherwise

It seems to me that /e/ is opposed to privacy and security. https://xcancel.com/GrapheneOS/status/2066908368560656652#m https://xcancel.com/GrapheneOS/status/2066908368560656652#m

tcfhgj 4mo ago
It's interesting how you are able to conclude that. e/OS is clearly a step up from default Android
- Cider9986 4mo ago
  Insinuating that real privacy /security is for pedophiles and criminals is primarily what supports my conclusion. It doesn't matter what your marketing says, what's important is what your devices do, and /e/ is much less secure or private than iOS. Attacking GrapheneOS which makes real progress at privsec. Thinking that badness enumeration is effective for improving privacy while ignoring real solutions like improving the app sandbox and adding more permissions. Adding Google services and giving them extra privileges. GrapheneOS ships with zero Google services by default. https://xcancel.com/GrapheneOS/status/2040887784253141142#m https://xcancel.com/GrapheneOS/status/2040887784253141142#m
  - Cider9986 4mo ago
    This German security researcher maintains a comparison table showing the differences between mobile OSes. https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm
- strcat 4mo ago
  /e/ has drastically worse privacy and security from the Android Open Source Project or especially and iPhone. It's not a step up from standard AOSP. It lags many months behind on many High/Critical severity patches, years behind on overall patches and rolls back the privacy/security in a bunch of ways. It includes many invasive services. It has many default enabled highly privileged Google services including downloading Google Play executables such as droidguard and running those with similar privileged access as they have on a Google Mobile Services OS anyway.

HybridStatAnim8 4mo ago

No, them supporting e/OS corroborates the claim that their goal is not privacy or security.

fsflover 4mo ago
What do they need to support to convince you? Providing all hardware features required by GrapheneOS is not feasible for a small company.
- strcat 4mo ago
  Fairphone doesn't design or make their smartphones. The devices are designed and made by a large ODM. It's entirely feasible to use a modern SoC with current generation security features and provide proper updates. Their ODM isn't doing it to cut costs. Fairphone quickly stops providing Linux kernel updates and has months of delay for Android userspace backports along with driver/firmware backports. The delay for yearly updates typically starts at a year and gets longer as devices get older and they've always skipped the quarterly updates. Using a modern SoC, properly configuring it, using proper signing keys (Fairphone has repeatedly used publicly available sample private keys) and providing proper updates is most of what's needed to meet the requirements. That's entirely doable by the few OEMs designing their devices in-house such as Motorola Mobility. Samsung and Google along with many of the ODMs making devices for Nothing, Fairphone, etc. https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-privacysecurity-patches-and-protections-arent-private https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-stand...
- handedness 4mo ago
  > What do they need to support to convince you? I know you're already aware of this because it's been provided to you before, but for the folks reading at home, here are the device requirements: https://grapheneos.org/faq#future-devices https://grapheneos.org/faq#future-devices
  - fsflover 4mo ago
    You completely missed the context here. my comment was not about skipping the security features of GrapheneOS. The original parent comment was > No, them supporting e/OS corroborates the claim that their goal is not privacy or security. and I asked how they could be convinced about Fairphone's intentions given that the company is tiny and can't develop Pixel-level hardware.

strcat 4mo ago

/e/ is the direct opposite of a privacy or security focused OS. It doesn't provide bare minimum standard privacy and security patches while setting an inaccurate Android security patch level. It lags many months behind on patches even on devices where they're the least behind. It's typically years behind on kernel, driver, firmware and major OS updates. It doesn't keep the standard privacy and security protections intact and lagging behind on OS updates means not having the current ones. It sends user data to OpenAI and other third parties without consent. https://community.e.foundation/t/voice-to-text-feature-using-open-ai/70509 https://community.e.foundation/t/voice-to-text-feature-using... https://codeberg.org/divested-mobile/divestos-website/raw/commit/c7447de50bc8fadd20a30d4cbf1dcd8cf14805a0/static/misc/e.txt https://codeberg.org/divested-mobile/divestos-website/raw/co... https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-privacysecurity-patches-and-protections-arent-private https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-stand... /e/ and Murena have repeatedly claimed providing strong privacy and security mainly benefits criminals and claim devices doing it are mainly used by criminals. Here's one example of many: https://grapheneos.social/deck/@GrapheneOS/116353973732143171 https://grapheneos.social/deck/@GrapheneOS/11635397373214317... An iPhone is a hardened device with drastically better privacy and security than an /e/ device. It would fall under the claims from /e/ and Murena about hardened devices.