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#1 is the biggest problem with Google Authenticator today (as well as inconsistent use of Authenticator across various Google properties, but that wouldn't matt
by rdl 14y ago
#1 is the biggest problem with Google Authenticator today (as well as inconsistent use of Authenticator across various Google properties, but that wouldn't matter to a third party site).
AWS supports the same system in a less brain-dead way, treating the authentication as a separate feature per account profile, and letting you re-enroll a new token and delete the old one. I'm pretty sure this is a Google Account problem, not a Google Authenticator problem. (AWS IAM is actually a pretty awesome product, but not very well documented, and from what I've seen of AWS users, not being correctly used to even 5% of its potential by most users.)
It's obviously more secure to make changes to the authentication system harder than just "any single valid login from any device lets me reset authentication requirements for future logins", though. The real problem is being able to get a one-time authenticated login, use that session to add a new "always let me log in" credential, and leave everything else as-is. The legitimate owner then has no reason to be suspicious, and you can continue to subversively use the account. It's almost better when the legit owner is forced out of his account on a change like that, as he can then contact Google's excellent customer support (...) to resolve the issue.
Of course, Google exposes themselves to THAT with application specific passwords, which are neither application-specific nor otherwise limited, and can be created easily once you log in.
- harshreality 14y agoI'd rather deal with resetting OATH 2-factor tokens, than rely on proprietary apps like duo or authy, or rely on the security of mobile networks (for SMS). That complication is an unavoidable consequence of not relying on trusted third parties (like authy or duo), right? Apps like those also encourage fracturing of the 2-factor ecosystem, rather than relying on a single standard. I realize that corporations with lots of employees to support see things differently, and centralized 2-factor proxy in that environment makes more sense. The only problem I have with google authenticator is that it's barely maintained. Even obvious features like rearranging order of accounts, haven't been implemented. http://code.google.com/p/google-authenticator/issues/list?can=2&q=&sort=-stars http://code.google.com/p/google-authenticator/issues/list?ca... Although they could add some export functionality, that would be a problem, now that I think about it, because anyone with even brief access to your phone could export all the OATH seeds to their phone.
- stock_toaster 14y ago> The only problem I have with google authenticator is that it's barely maintained. Even obvious features like rearranging order of accounts, haven't been implemented. http://code.google.com/p/google-authenticator/issues/list?ca.. http://code.google.com/p/google-authenticator/issues/list?ca.... There is also a weird bug in google authenticator (on ios) where the edit button in the lower left doesn't work until you hit legal information button, then go back. Very weird.
- rdl 14y agoActually Google seems to have fixed the one issue I really cared about; it's possible to create a new device (and then manually use the new code to put the app on both iPhone and iPad) without turning off 2-factor-auth entirely. But they don't actually check that you have the 2 factor device when you do this, so all you need to do is get logged in once and you're clear to lock the original user out, change auth credentials, etc. It's totally fine for the "protect a personal gmail account" threat model, but as far as I can tell, no one does 2fa in a way as-secure as I'd want it for an enterprise/IT deployment.
- stock_toaster 14y ago> Actually Google seems to have fixed the one issue I really cared about; it's possible to create a new device (and then manually use the new code to put the app on both iPhone and iPad) without turning off 2-factor-auth entirely. Interesting. I have been using 2fa for a while now, and hadn't noticed this yet (guess I don't view that page often). It seems they rely on someone needing to know the password and the generated pin to get to that point (or the pre-generated backup codes -- which are also not invalidated with the new 2fa replacement). > But they don't actually check that you have the 2 factor device when you do this, so all you need to do is get logged in once and you're clear to lock the original user out, change auth credentials, etc. I don't see how this is different than it was before. If someone gets your password and a valid 2fa pin or pre-generated code (eg. they can log in), they could just change your password, turn off 2fa, etc. Your aren't getting in then either.