You mean IRV does not satisfy the Condorcet criterion. IRV is not the only preferential voting system. There are others, e.g. ranked pairs[1] which do. Under

You mean IRV does not satisfy the Condorcet criterion. IRV is not the only preferential voting system. There are others, e.g. ranked pairs[1] which do. Under ranked pairs, each pair of candidates is considered individually, largest majorities first. In bradbeattie's example we have: C > B: 115 votes C > A: 85 votes B > A: 85 votes So the group preference is C > B > A and C wins. Ranked pairs fails the participation criterion[2], but it is still possible to vote tactically in a way that guarantees you will not harm your first-choice candidate by participating (since if your first choice is A you can rank A first and all the others joint second. Similarly if your goal is to prevent C from winning, you can rank C second and all others joint first.) [1]:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranked_pairs http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranked_pairs [2]:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Participation_criterion http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Participation_criterion