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Let's say there are two head-line candidates: A and B. I hate A, am neutral towards B, and love the less popular of the three candidate C. So do I vote 0/0/1 o

Let's say there are two head-line candidates: A and B. I hate A, am neutral towards B, and love the less popular of the three candidate C. So do I vote 0/0/1 or 0/1/1? Well, that depends on how popular the three are and is very much an example of strategic voting. When proposing an alternative, one should probably be up-front with its flaws.

jivatmanx 14y ago
That's not strategic voting according to the definition. In both cases you're still voting for C, the candidate you like the most. "In voting systems, tactical voting (or strategic voting or sophisticated voting or insincere voting) occurs, in elections with more than two candidates, when a voter supports a candidate other than his or her sincere preference in order to prevent an undesirable outcome.[1]" If you mean it in the larger sense of using strategy when voting, Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem shows that no voting system is strategy free unless it's either dictatorial or nondeterministic.
- bradbeattie 14y ago
  My decision to vote either 0/0/1 or 0/1/1 is explicitly to prevent my desire for B over A from causing B to win when C might have a chance. Whenever you have to consider the ballots of other voters, you're dealing with tactical voting.
  - lmkg 14y ago
    Approval voting is immune to a particular definition of tactical voting, which is somewhat weaker than the traditional one. Which isn't perfect, but it's better than most other methods can offer. Most traditional voting methods are preference systems: You take your N candidates and rank them from 1 to N. Every voter is assumed to have a "ground truth" preference of ranking. Tactical voting means that a rational voter may sometimes be encouraged to vote with a ranking other than their true preference. The weaker criteria that approval voting satisfies is this: A rational voter can always make a rational vote by writing down their true preference ranking in order, drawing a line, and approving everyone above that line. In other words, there is no situation where a rational voter would want to vote A > B when their true preference is B > A. This is a significant bound on the effects of tactical voting. As you correctly point out, the rationally optimal place to draw that line can be tactical. Nonetheless, there is a strong argument that this is "less tactical" than many other systems allow.
pc86 14y ago
Would it be better to have something like 0/1/2 which is essentially IRV, or some other method of point distribution among candidates?
- autarch 14y ago
  No, IRV actually makes the strategic voting problem even worse than our current system. Approval voting seems to have the best mix of desirable traits.
  - r00fus 14y ago
    [cite needed] The current system (assuming you're not from Australia) - plurality (or first-past-the-post) voting - is literally the least representative voting mechanism. Tell me where you see IRV as having a worse-case than plurality/FPTP. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting

jivatmanx 14y ago

That's not strategic voting according to the definition. In both cases you're still voting for C, the candidate you like the most. "In voting systems, tactical voting (or strategic voting or sophisticated voting or insincere voting) occurs, in elections with more than two candidates, when a voter supports a candidate other than his or her sincere preference in order to prevent an undesirable outcome.[1]" If you mean it in the larger sense of using strategy when voting, Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem shows that no voting system is strategy free unless it's either dictatorial or nondeterministic.

bradbeattie 14y ago
My decision to vote either 0/0/1 or 0/1/1 is explicitly to prevent my desire for B over A from causing B to win when C might have a chance. Whenever you have to consider the ballots of other voters, you're dealing with tactical voting.
- lmkg 14y ago
  Approval voting is immune to a particular definition of tactical voting, which is somewhat weaker than the traditional one. Which isn't perfect, but it's better than most other methods can offer. Most traditional voting methods are preference systems: You take your N candidates and rank them from 1 to N. Every voter is assumed to have a "ground truth" preference of ranking. Tactical voting means that a rational voter may sometimes be encouraged to vote with a ranking other than their true preference. The weaker criteria that approval voting satisfies is this: A rational voter can always make a rational vote by writing down their true preference ranking in order, drawing a line, and approving everyone above that line. In other words, there is no situation where a rational voter would want to vote A > B when their true preference is B > A. This is a significant bound on the effects of tactical voting. As you correctly point out, the rationally optimal place to draw that line can be tactical. Nonetheless, there is a strong argument that this is "less tactical" than many other systems allow.

pc86 14y ago

Would it be better to have something like 0/1/2 which is essentially IRV, or some other method of point distribution among candidates?

autarch 14y ago
No, IRV actually makes the strategic voting problem even worse than our current system. Approval voting seems to have the best mix of desirable traits.
- r00fus 14y ago
  [cite needed] The current system (assuming you're not from Australia) - plurality (or first-past-the-post) voting - is literally the least representative voting mechanism. Tell me where you see IRV as having a worse-case than plurality/FPTP. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting