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Right but you're talking about owning the DID, which one may or may not need to do in order to compromise your connection. For example, if I pwn the Asterisk bo
by josh2600 14y ago
Right but you're talking about owning the DID, which one may or may not need to do in order to compromise your connection. For example, if I pwn the Asterisk box your call routing runs through, I can mirror the audio or redirect the audio pretty trivially.
Going a step further, given how few people aren't buying through a reseller, it's possible to pwn an upstream provider and impact boxes through a man in the middle attack. Even over TDM you're not safe because of physical taps which are difficult to detect (albeit easier than IP).
No, Phone numbers are not secure and should never be used as a form of authentication. You don't even need to port a number, you just need to be somewhere in the stream.
- MichaelGG 14y agoI think there's a significant scope difference in performing a MiTM attack (via hacking a provider or installing a tap) and forcing a port through. After all, it's implicit in telephone banking when you authenticate via voice that you trust the connection. The argument you're making is that telephony is insecure, which is arguably true, but sorta irrelevant within the scope of telephone banking.
- josh2600 14y agoHow is it irrelevant? Is it not the crux of the issue here? Many upstream providers are just Asterisk boxes forwarding traffic. Those boxes can be overloaded with a malformed SIP header; hell, most application switches get wrecked by malformed headers. What I'm trying to say is that money is one of those things where security is actually important. Trusting telephony, even as a signal and not source, is foolish. There are many better methods of deriving identity. My point, and arguably the point of the article, is that telephony is insecure, and I think it's pretty far from irrelevant... Please correct me if I misunderstood, I'm not trying to offend I just don't understand.