6 ms·

Illusions of understanding in the sciences

115 points by sebg 5mo ago

skyberrys 5mo ago
What is a model anyways? There are so many answers to say you that. The models are almost the same models, but at a different abstraction away from the original experienced in reality.
- satisfice 5mo ago
  A model is an idea, activity, or object that represents some other idea, activity, or object. A good model is one that helps you understand or manipulate the thing that it represents.
- TheOtherHobbes 5mo ago
  Science uses maps of metaphors to cover observable space. Math is one of them. The math in science isn't provable, objective, or self-consistent, and mathematicians who look at physics regularly have "Wait a minute..." moments. But scientific math is a useful toolbox of techniques that create useful metaphors where the maps and the experiences coincide, to a useful extent. Science is really a process of inventing and trying out metaphor maps and keeping the ones that match experience. Reality itself is likely unknowable, because our experience of it is too limited to provide enough information to get down to the bedrock mechanisms. So we have these intermediate models that get some way there, but clearly have gaps and edges where the parts don't fit together. Everything starts at human-scale and works outwards.
pazimzadeh 5mo ago
this is extremely long and repetitive. "the sciences" is very broad. in biology there are established methods for establishing causality (i.e. Koch's postulates, etc), and even then conclusions are generally qualified. not sure about the other fields, but I wish they had more concrete and recent examples of what they are talking about. this was painful to even skim. also for some reason i cant click on anyting on the site or select text?
- in_a_hole 5mo ago
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- refactor_master 5mo ago
  Some of the figures are downright atrocious quality and are found in better quality on Wikipedia. It’s almost an insult to paying subscribers and contributors of Springer.
jdw64 5mo ago
Looking at the paper, the core message is 'that even scientists harbor the illusion of understanding more than they actually do'. In reality, science operates much like a mental model. The paper argues that just because a model predicts future values more accurately, it doesn't mean the model explains the actual causal structure. Yet, the fact that outcomes fall within the predicted range reinforces the illusion that one has truly 'understood' it. This reminds me of the statistician's aphorism: 'All models are wrong, but some are useful.' Science itself, in a way, is a mental model—a simplification created for humans because the world is a complex system that is cognitively impossible to fully comprehend. Within that framework, certain facts reinforce the mental model, while others weaken it. While mental models vary from person to person, in a broad sense, we are commonly taught to view the macroscopic world through the Newtonian model and the microscopic world through the quantum mechanics model. Reading this makes me reconsider what 'understanding' truly means. I believe the starting point of genuine understanding is acknowledging that perfect prediction is ultimately impossible, and that when viewing the world through our mental models, what matters is defining what we consider to be acceptable 'lossy information' (or information we can afford to lose)
- jdw64 5mo ago
  [dead]
- ian_j_butler 5mo ago
  > This reminds me of the statistician's aphorism: 'All models are wrong, but some are useful.' It reminded the authors of this too, since they quote and source it
  - warumdarum 5mo ago
    "Some are eclipsed in usefullness by others"
- vi_sextus_vi 5mo ago
  Exactly. The lede buried here is, as you say, accurate prediction is not better understanding Which has a statistician counterintuition Less "accurate" model can lead to better prediction Therefore (in my understanding) A better understanding encodes more info about how much more it can be improved, when compared to a less good understanding Maybe understanding should be related to wisdom rather than intelligence? Like Socrates. AGW? Explained by this wonderful series
usernametaken29 5mo ago
This is a classic case of overthinking. Induction should not yield new knowledge because nothing new is discovered, but it does. Deduction likewise also cannot establish new knowledge, yet it does. Empirical science is flawed on extremely many levels but it works because on average, over time, many converging observations can build refined and accurate causal theories. It’s a matter of practicality that things cannot be proven fully. Judging from the state of modern medicine, engineering and the sciences, the system works ok regardless
- ltbarcly3 5mo ago
  You are just making the mistake of using two incompatible definitions of the word 'knowledge' here and then acting like it's a contradiction.
  - usernametaken29 5mo ago
    I don’t think so. The point is that really nothing can be understood. This has been known since ancient times. But in practical terms it doesn’t matter. It doesn’t matter that you truly understand e.g explosions if your goal is to blow stuff up. You can drive this argument in circles like a child saying “but why” and you will discover that science is built on axioms, just things we kind of believe. They work well enough. Is it true knowledge? Probably not in the idealistic sense. But then again that just has no practical value. In the end science is a tool and not a means in itself, if you ask me.
ian_j_butler 5mo ago
This is kind of interesting, but I predict that it pleases almost nobody. Philosophy of science types will be kind of annoyed at the preoccupation with statistics, ML people will be annoyed at too much philosophy of science, etc. I totally support a goal to get those groups talking more but something tighter is probably better. And why isn't it tighter? Without big original contributions, the goal does seem to be a survey
- jdw64 5mo ago
  However, for a freelance programmer like me who has to model the world the client wants, this might actually be a useful problem. LOL
01010101011 5mo ago
Popper writes the philosophy of science in a Platonic micro-descriptor fetch, which is 20:20 recursion.
- vixen99 5mo ago
  I'm very familiar with most of Popper's books (I got to meet him as a student once) and I have no idea what you mean. Please elucidate.
dbacar 5mo ago
Is it a probability that the authors understood the notion of Understanding all wrong? ;).
- rramadass 5mo ago
  You jest but are right. There is nothing new in the article and has already been covered well by some of the greatest Scientists/Mathematicians. We must be careful that articles/papers like these are not used by the anti-scientific crowd to promote their talking points and agendas. Notably, Henri Poincare (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henri_Poincar%C3%A9 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henri_Poincar%C3%A9 and https://henripoincarepapers.univ-nantes.fr/en/ https://henripoincarepapers.univ-nantes.fr/en/) wrote three philosophy of science books; viz. 1) Science and Hypothesis 2) The Value of Science and 3) Science and Method. These were published together under the apt title, The Foundations of Science which is available here - https://www.gutenberg.org/files/39713/39713-h/39713-h.htm https://www.gutenberg.org/files/39713/39713-h/39713-h.htm and here (ebook versions) - https://archive.org/details/foundationsscie01poingoog https://archive.org/details/foundationsscie01poingoog Details of the works; 1) Science and Hypothesis (1902) - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science_and_Hypothesis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science_and_Hypothesis 2) The Value of Science (1904) - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Value_of_Science https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Value_of_Science 3) Science and Method (1908) - pdf at https://henripoincarepapers.univ-nantes.fr/chp/hp-pdf/hp1914sm.pdf https://henripoincarepapers.univ-nantes.fr/chp/hp-pdf/hp1914... At the minimum read this completely. See also; a) History of Scientific Method - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_scientific_method https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_scientific_method b) Scientific Method - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method
  - ordu 5mo ago
    > We must be careful that articles/papers like these are not used by the anti-scientific crowd to promote their talking points and agendas. It is a slippery slope. At the moment you started to avoid talking about some things because your political opponents could use your ideas to promote their agenda, you stopped being a scientist and became a politician. You thinking is no more scientific, it is political. You are not a scientist anymore, you are a politician. I dramatize a bit, it doesn't happen all suddenly, but before you started to devise a strategy of censoring discussion due to political reasons, you should find a way to do it without inhibiting thought and free flow of ideas. From the other hand, I don't understand the discourse at all. If you don't like what anti-scientific crowd says, just don't read them. They will find talking points with you or without you. I believe, people are mistaken that you can curb somehow anti-science movement. Lets take for example that story with "vaccines cause autism". If the paper claiming that was not published, there would be no antivaxxers, oder? I believe it doesn't matter. They would find something else, the whole point of their ideology "science is a conspiracy which hides things". So not published paper comes into the category of hidden things. They always find something. It is dynamic system with a chaotic behavior, you can try as hard as you like to remove triggers created by science, but conspiracy theories would be spawn by something "smaller".
osullivj 5mo ago
So, to summarise, consistency is the virtue of a narrow mind?
dr_dshiv 5mo ago
Like thinking LLMs aren’t magic* because you utter “it’s just predicting the next token!” I’d argue, only slightly tongue in cheek, that thinking of LLMs as magical leads to more effective use than the predicting-next-token explanation. See also Frank Keil’s “illusion of explanatory depth.” * magic not as “unreal,” but in the classical conception of a living magic world where mental intentions can manifest physical realities
- king_geedorah 5mo ago
  To go a bit further, perhaps behaviors are less about the mechanism than they are about the belief. If one believed such a thing, then finding repeatable mechanisms could be perceived as an effort in fortifying belief in the mind as much or more than establishing physical conditions necessary for the behavior to occur again.
Ozzie-D 5mo ago
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deleted 5mo ago
[deleted]
Xmd5a 5mo ago
> It is the writer's experience that new degrees of comprehension are always and only consequent to ever-renewed review of the spontaneously rearranged inventory of significant factors. This awareness of the processes leading to new degrees of comprehension spontaneously motivates the writer to describe over and over again what—to the careless listener or reader—might seem to be tiresome repetition, but to the successful explorer is known to be essential mustering of operational strategies from which alone new thrusts of comprehension can be successfully accomplished. R. Buckminster Fuller – Synergetics: Explorations in the Geometry of Thinking > Delusional interpretation is a false deduction drawn from an accurate perception. The subject perceives correctly, but reasons wrongly; in him, judgment is impaired by affective disturbance, while the senses remain normal. > Delusion progresses by accumulation, radiation, and extension; its richness is inexhaustible. The plan of the edifice does not change, but its proportions keep increasing. > Every new fact, however insignificant, is immediately incorporated into the delusional system, where it becomes a fresh piece of evidence. The patient lives in a state of perpetual suspicion, searching everywhere for guiding threads, clues, correlations. > Interpreters are not hallucinated subjects; they are logicians gone astray. Their point of departure is an intuition or a false belief, but the consequences they draw from it follow one another with an apparent rigor that often deceives the superficial observer. It is order within madness, logic in the service of the absurd. > The need to write, graphomania, is in many interpreters a major symptom. They accumulate immense files, endless memoirs, interminable correspondences, in which every detail of their existence is dissected, analyzed, turned over and over, in order to bring to light what they believe to be the truth. Sérieux & Capgras — Reasoning Madness: The Delusion of Interpretation > The madman is, rather, the free man: the one who does not allow himself to be chained by the false appearances of common reality. Delusion is not an insult to logic; it is logic driven to exasperation. The paranoiac is a tireless translator, a man who spends his life deciphering the signs of the world in order to find in them the key to his own destiny. Far from being chaos, psychosis is an attempt at rigor, a complete theory that the subject constructs in order to account for his own genesis and his place before the Other. The risk of madness is measured by the very attraction of the identifications through which man alienates his freedom. > following Fontenelle, I surrendered myself to that fantasy of holding my hand full of truths, the better to close it over them. I confess the ridiculousness of it, because it marks the limits of a being at the very moment when he is about to bear witness. Must one denounce here some failure in what the movement of the world demands of us, if speech was offered to me once again, at the very moment when it became clear even to the least perceptive that, once again, the infatuation of power had only served the cunning of Reason? I leave it to you to judge how my inquiry may suffer from it. Lacan — Remarks on Psychic Causality
felooboolooomba 5mo ago
It's funny when you think you know something pretty much thoroughly. Then you learn a bit more and realize that your understanding was a bit simplified, had gaps or there was a whole other level to it. The feeling is a strange mixture of disappointment, awe, annoyance and excitement.
- warumdarum 5mo ago
  It also leads to a carefullness and lawyerization of language, that the laymen mistake for a lack of confidence. "All evidence points towards x under the constraints y, z and q." vs "Its like this: x"
- brnaftr361 5mo ago
  Y'know it's funny how, at least in my experience, education worked. We're handed a bunch of simplified models then build on them. The consequence being that the landscape is very narrowly revealed. This itself is a consequence of the architecture, at least in the US we don't really specialize until college/university. Nobody really comprehends the depth of things until then, and troublingly enough we don't understand that until we're 2-3 years in. For instance we have DNA, right? It gets replicated in cells via mitosis and in specialized cells called gametes via meiosis, the latter form is used for sexual reproduction. That's the gist you get in High School, you might talk about the polymer, nucleotides, nucleotide construction (which are superficial) That isn't even close to the end, just off the top of my head there are elements in the DNA that code for several processes like methylation, allow interfacing with proteins which have myriad effects like up or downregulating transcription, they can also change the local topology forming loops that facilitate the process. There's a bunch of crazy shit that happens at the histone level. And any one of those Substituent parts is probably worth discussing for a week in lecture at least but they're glossed over for more advances classes. For instance those regulatory molecules, in sufficient concentrations, can overpower histones that keep genes turned off, and that has downstream consequences in general regulation and cell differentiation. I think that in the long run it compromises mental rigor. It also allows people to carry with them a sense of complete understanding when it's superficial and shallow. Having never experience the depth that the real world goes to kind of limits the horizons of people that aren't naturally curious and never shows them the potential for how deep shit can really get and when it does it is still superficial by the dint of the expectation placed on students being so narrow.
chermi 5mo ago
More predictive power is always a good goal, full stop. This is orthogonal to whether the model producing prediction helps with "understanding" directly. Predictability encodes understanding in a strict information theoretic sense, regardless of our ability as humans to access that understanding.
- ordu 5mo ago
  > More predictive power is always a good goal But in some cases it is not good enough. If you look for a better explanation and chose gradient descent as your strategy, then you'll come to a local maximum eventually, but not for another explanation. Arguably, it is hard to look for better explanation if the current one doesn't have a backtrack of failed predictions. One of the possible ways out of this situation is to search for the predictions that fail. But what I want to say is explanations are not just for prediction. They are needed to build a mental model that then can drive the research. And new model can be built (theoretically) from the first principles. I can't find clean examples for it though. If we look at Einstein for example, he started with a failure to predict. But what he came up at first was Special Relativity which failed utterly with the gravity. Einstein spent like 10 years rewriting gravity to make it work with SR? Failed predictions of his new shiny theory didn't stop him, and it is considered to be good. > Predictability encodes understanding in a strict information theoretic sense, regardless of our ability as humans to access that understanding. But it doesn't necessary implies the possibility to move forward. I'm not sure if an analogy with compressed data is a good one, but you don't work with compressed data, you unpack it, and maybe unpack some more and convert to a very inefficient format with regard to the disk space used. Compressed theory is good to apply it as is, but to refine it you should probably prefer something else.
- zigzag312 5mo ago
  It's not arguing that predictive power is bad. Just that people often mistakenly believe some phenomenon is understood more deeply than it really is, because a model can fit data and generate accurate predictions.
galsapir 5mo ago
got me at "Most often scientists believe they understand more than they do, making their belief an illusion." but why is it still bothering me? 1. feels unfalsifiable in spirit 2. somewhat restates "all models are wrong, but some are useful" less cleanly 3. doesn't really offer like, what can we do as science people? tomorrow morning perspective
musicale 5mo ago
> Many people know of Simpson’s through simple examples. One was UC Berkeley admissions showing that individual departments admitted more women than men but the university as a whole had admitted more men than women (Bickel et al., 1975). This only seems possible if students can be admitted to more than one department.
raincom 5mo ago
The authors of this paper have not studied what historians and philosophers of science have written. They just use 'induction', 'validity', etc. They reinvent the wheel. They write "Of course the validity of that induction depends on a host of other assumptions.". Duhem-Quine thesis is better than this way of formulation, as the latter doesn't use 'validity'. If authors ever come to this forum, please read Duhem-Quine thesis, over/under determination, inference to the best explanation, Goodman's paradox, also how various theories in philosophy of sciences: from Popper to Kuhn, Lakatos, Laudan, etc.
smarm52 5mo ago
Who is this for? This section, which is fairly close to a central thesis, contains no citations: > Illusions of understanding can take several (overlapping) forms. Some that are commonly encountered are: (1) Illusions of explanatory depth (we think we personally understand things in more detail than we do). (2) Illusions of explanatory completeness (even if we don’t think we fully understand it ourselves, we think the best experts do). (3) Illusions resulting from understanding something other than the goal (e.g. we believe we understand the formation of memories because we understand the anatomy of the brain site, the hippocampus, that is needed for such learning). (4) Illusions due to simple statements giving a feeling of insight (such as when tautological statements seem insightful because they are framed in a reductionist manner). (5) Illusions (as described earlier) that one understands the cause of phenomena because there exists a model or procedure that predicts well. (6) Illusions of causal strength (attending to an observed relation makes one believe the causal connection is stronger than it is). (7) illusions that one can describe causes simply. (8) Illusions by the explainer that the recipient understands what the communicator intends. (9) Illusions by the recipient of an explanation that the communicator understands well and that the explanation is correct and complete. Are we to infer that these observations are unsupported by evidence? Are we to assume that the research work is so poorly constructed that they did not do research to find evidence of the existence of the classifications in existing research?
OmindStash 5mo ago
This is fascinating. It's so funny how everything flows back to philosophy... What is understanding? What is knowledge? Can we know what the truth is, and does it exist?
- armchairhacker 5mo ago
  Relations formed by pattern recognition. Knowledge is recalling A from B, e.g. the definition of a word, the answer to a question. Understanding is more general knowledge: recalling A from related (e.g. “that’s a quadratic equation”) and recalling related from A (e.g. “quadratic equations are solved by the quadratic formula”)
- bigbadfeline 5mo ago
  > everything flows back to philosophy... Same as flowing forward off the edge of a cliff. > Can we know what the truth is, and does it exist? If you tried the forward motion at the aforementioned place you'd quickly find out the answer to that question. The fact that not many are trying it clearly shows that truth exists, the only question is which way to get there - by science or by fooling around and finding out.

115 points by sebg 5mo ago

What is a model anyways? There are so many answers to say you that. The models are almost the same models, but at a different abstraction away from the original experienced in reality.

satisfice 5mo ago
A model is an idea, activity, or object that represents some other idea, activity, or object. A good model is one that helps you understand or manipulate the thing that it represents.
TheOtherHobbes 5mo ago
Science uses maps of metaphors to cover observable space. Math is one of them. The math in science isn't provable, objective, or self-consistent, and mathematicians who look at physics regularly have "Wait a minute..." moments. But scientific math is a useful toolbox of techniques that create useful metaphors where the maps and the experiences coincide, to a useful extent. Science is really a process of inventing and trying out metaphor maps and keeping the ones that match experience. Reality itself is likely unknowable, because our experience of it is too limited to provide enough information to get down to the bedrock mechanisms. So we have these intermediate models that get some way there, but clearly have gaps and edges where the parts don't fit together. Everything starts at human-scale and works outwards.

pazimzadeh 5mo ago

this is extremely long and repetitive. "the sciences" is very broad. in biology there are established methods for establishing causality (i.e. Koch's postulates, etc), and even then conclusions are generally qualified. not sure about the other fields, but I wish they had more concrete and recent examples of what they are talking about. this was painful to even skim. also for some reason i cant click on anyting on the site or select text?

in_a_hole 5mo ago
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refactor_master 5mo ago
Some of the figures are downright atrocious quality and are found in better quality on Wikipedia. It’s almost an insult to paying subscribers and contributors of Springer.

jdw64 5mo ago

Looking at the paper, the core message is 'that even scientists harbor the illusion of understanding more than they actually do'. In reality, science operates much like a mental model. The paper argues that just because a model predicts future values more accurately, it doesn't mean the model explains the actual causal structure. Yet, the fact that outcomes fall within the predicted range reinforces the illusion that one has truly 'understood' it. This reminds me of the statistician's aphorism: 'All models are wrong, but some are useful.' Science itself, in a way, is a mental model—a simplification created for humans because the world is a complex system that is cognitively impossible to fully comprehend. Within that framework, certain facts reinforce the mental model, while others weaken it. While mental models vary from person to person, in a broad sense, we are commonly taught to view the macroscopic world through the Newtonian model and the microscopic world through the quantum mechanics model. Reading this makes me reconsider what 'understanding' truly means. I believe the starting point of genuine understanding is acknowledging that perfect prediction is ultimately impossible, and that when viewing the world through our mental models, what matters is defining what we consider to be acceptable 'lossy information' (or information we can afford to lose)

jdw64 5mo ago
[dead]
ian_j_butler 5mo ago
> This reminds me of the statistician's aphorism: 'All models are wrong, but some are useful.' It reminded the authors of this too, since they quote and source it
- warumdarum 5mo ago
  "Some are eclipsed in usefullness by others"
vi_sextus_vi 5mo ago
Exactly. The lede buried here is, as you say, accurate prediction is not better understanding Which has a statistician counterintuition Less "accurate" model can lead to better prediction Therefore (in my understanding) A better understanding encodes more info about how much more it can be improved, when compared to a less good understanding Maybe understanding should be related to wisdom rather than intelligence? Like Socrates. AGW? Explained by this wonderful series

usernametaken29 5mo ago

This is a classic case of overthinking. Induction should not yield new knowledge because nothing new is discovered, but it does. Deduction likewise also cannot establish new knowledge, yet it does. Empirical science is flawed on extremely many levels but it works because on average, over time, many converging observations can build refined and accurate causal theories. It’s a matter of practicality that things cannot be proven fully. Judging from the state of modern medicine, engineering and the sciences, the system works ok regardless

ltbarcly3 5mo ago
You are just making the mistake of using two incompatible definitions of the word 'knowledge' here and then acting like it's a contradiction.
- usernametaken29 5mo ago
  I don’t think so. The point is that really nothing can be understood. This has been known since ancient times. But in practical terms it doesn’t matter. It doesn’t matter that you truly understand e.g explosions if your goal is to blow stuff up. You can drive this argument in circles like a child saying “but why” and you will discover that science is built on axioms, just things we kind of believe. They work well enough. Is it true knowledge? Probably not in the idealistic sense. But then again that just has no practical value. In the end science is a tool and not a means in itself, if you ask me.

ian_j_butler 5mo ago

This is kind of interesting, but I predict that it pleases almost nobody. Philosophy of science types will be kind of annoyed at the preoccupation with statistics, ML people will be annoyed at too much philosophy of science, etc. I totally support a goal to get those groups talking more but something tighter is probably better. And why isn't it tighter? Without big original contributions, the goal does seem to be a survey

jdw64 5mo ago
However, for a freelance programmer like me who has to model the world the client wants, this might actually be a useful problem. LOL

01010101011 5mo ago

Popper writes the philosophy of science in a Platonic micro-descriptor fetch, which is 20:20 recursion.

vixen99 5mo ago
I'm very familiar with most of Popper's books (I got to meet him as a student once) and I have no idea what you mean. Please elucidate.

dbacar 5mo ago

Is it a probability that the authors understood the notion of Understanding all wrong? ;).

rramadass 5mo ago
You jest but are right. There is nothing new in the article and has already been covered well by some of the greatest Scientists/Mathematicians. We must be careful that articles/papers like these are not used by the anti-scientific crowd to promote their talking points and agendas. Notably, Henri Poincare (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henri_Poincar%C3%A9 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henri_Poincar%C3%A9 and https://henripoincarepapers.univ-nantes.fr/en/ https://henripoincarepapers.univ-nantes.fr/en/) wrote three philosophy of science books; viz. 1) Science and Hypothesis 2) The Value of Science and 3) Science and Method. These were published together under the apt title, The Foundations of Science which is available here - https://www.gutenberg.org/files/39713/39713-h/39713-h.htm https://www.gutenberg.org/files/39713/39713-h/39713-h.htm and here (ebook versions) - https://archive.org/details/foundationsscie01poingoog https://archive.org/details/foundationsscie01poingoog Details of the works; 1) Science and Hypothesis (1902) - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science_and_Hypothesis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science_and_Hypothesis 2) The Value of Science (1904) - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Value_of_Science https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Value_of_Science 3) Science and Method (1908) - pdf at https://henripoincarepapers.univ-nantes.fr/chp/hp-pdf/hp1914sm.pdf https://henripoincarepapers.univ-nantes.fr/chp/hp-pdf/hp1914... At the minimum read this completely. See also; a) History of Scientific Method - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_scientific_method https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_scientific_method b) Scientific Method - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method
- ordu 5mo ago
  > We must be careful that articles/papers like these are not used by the anti-scientific crowd to promote their talking points and agendas. It is a slippery slope. At the moment you started to avoid talking about some things because your political opponents could use your ideas to promote their agenda, you stopped being a scientist and became a politician. You thinking is no more scientific, it is political. You are not a scientist anymore, you are a politician. I dramatize a bit, it doesn't happen all suddenly, but before you started to devise a strategy of censoring discussion due to political reasons, you should find a way to do it without inhibiting thought and free flow of ideas. From the other hand, I don't understand the discourse at all. If you don't like what anti-scientific crowd says, just don't read them. They will find talking points with you or without you. I believe, people are mistaken that you can curb somehow anti-science movement. Lets take for example that story with "vaccines cause autism". If the paper claiming that was not published, there would be no antivaxxers, oder? I believe it doesn't matter. They would find something else, the whole point of their ideology "science is a conspiracy which hides things". So not published paper comes into the category of hidden things. They always find something. It is dynamic system with a chaotic behavior, you can try as hard as you like to remove triggers created by science, but conspiracy theories would be spawn by something "smaller".

osullivj 5mo ago

So, to summarise, consistency is the virtue of a narrow mind?

dr_dshiv 5mo ago

Like thinking LLMs aren’t magic* because you utter “it’s just predicting the next token!” I’d argue, only slightly tongue in cheek, that thinking of LLMs as magical leads to more effective use than the predicting-next-token explanation. See also Frank Keil’s “illusion of explanatory depth.” * magic not as “unreal,” but in the classical conception of a living magic world where mental intentions can manifest physical realities

king_geedorah 5mo ago
To go a bit further, perhaps behaviors are less about the mechanism than they are about the belief. If one believed such a thing, then finding repeatable mechanisms could be perceived as an effort in fortifying belief in the mind as much or more than establishing physical conditions necessary for the behavior to occur again.

Ozzie-D 5mo ago

[flagged]

deleted 5mo ago

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Xmd5a 5mo ago

> It is the writer's experience that new degrees of comprehension are always and only consequent to ever-renewed review of the spontaneously rearranged inventory of significant factors. This awareness of the processes leading to new degrees of comprehension spontaneously motivates the writer to describe over and over again what—to the careless listener or reader—might seem to be tiresome repetition, but to the successful explorer is known to be essential mustering of operational strategies from which alone new thrusts of comprehension can be successfully accomplished. R. Buckminster Fuller – Synergetics: Explorations in the Geometry of Thinking > Delusional interpretation is a false deduction drawn from an accurate perception. The subject perceives correctly, but reasons wrongly; in him, judgment is impaired by affective disturbance, while the senses remain normal. > Delusion progresses by accumulation, radiation, and extension; its richness is inexhaustible. The plan of the edifice does not change, but its proportions keep increasing. > Every new fact, however insignificant, is immediately incorporated into the delusional system, where it becomes a fresh piece of evidence. The patient lives in a state of perpetual suspicion, searching everywhere for guiding threads, clues, correlations. > Interpreters are not hallucinated subjects; they are logicians gone astray. Their point of departure is an intuition or a false belief, but the consequences they draw from it follow one another with an apparent rigor that often deceives the superficial observer. It is order within madness, logic in the service of the absurd. > The need to write, graphomania, is in many interpreters a major symptom. They accumulate immense files, endless memoirs, interminable correspondences, in which every detail of their existence is dissected, analyzed, turned over and over, in order to bring to light what they believe to be the truth. Sérieux & Capgras — Reasoning Madness: The Delusion of Interpretation > The madman is, rather, the free man: the one who does not allow himself to be chained by the false appearances of common reality. Delusion is not an insult to logic; it is logic driven to exasperation. The paranoiac is a tireless translator, a man who spends his life deciphering the signs of the world in order to find in them the key to his own destiny. Far from being chaos, psychosis is an attempt at rigor, a complete theory that the subject constructs in order to account for his own genesis and his place before the Other. The risk of madness is measured by the very attraction of the identifications through which man alienates his freedom. > following Fontenelle, I surrendered myself to that fantasy of holding my hand full of truths, the better to close it over them. I confess the ridiculousness of it, because it marks the limits of a being at the very moment when he is about to bear witness. Must one denounce here some failure in what the movement of the world demands of us, if speech was offered to me once again, at the very moment when it became clear even to the least perceptive that, once again, the infatuation of power had only served the cunning of Reason? I leave it to you to judge how my inquiry may suffer from it. Lacan — Remarks on Psychic Causality

felooboolooomba 5mo ago

It's funny when you think you know something pretty much thoroughly. Then you learn a bit more and realize that your understanding was a bit simplified, had gaps or there was a whole other level to it. The feeling is a strange mixture of disappointment, awe, annoyance and excitement.

warumdarum 5mo ago
It also leads to a carefullness and lawyerization of language, that the laymen mistake for a lack of confidence. "All evidence points towards x under the constraints y, z and q." vs "Its like this: x"
brnaftr361 5mo ago
Y'know it's funny how, at least in my experience, education worked. We're handed a bunch of simplified models then build on them. The consequence being that the landscape is very narrowly revealed. This itself is a consequence of the architecture, at least in the US we don't really specialize until college/university. Nobody really comprehends the depth of things until then, and troublingly enough we don't understand that until we're 2-3 years in. For instance we have DNA, right? It gets replicated in cells via mitosis and in specialized cells called gametes via meiosis, the latter form is used for sexual reproduction. That's the gist you get in High School, you might talk about the polymer, nucleotides, nucleotide construction (which are superficial) That isn't even close to the end, just off the top of my head there are elements in the DNA that code for several processes like methylation, allow interfacing with proteins which have myriad effects like up or downregulating transcription, they can also change the local topology forming loops that facilitate the process. There's a bunch of crazy shit that happens at the histone level. And any one of those Substituent parts is probably worth discussing for a week in lecture at least but they're glossed over for more advances classes. For instance those regulatory molecules, in sufficient concentrations, can overpower histones that keep genes turned off, and that has downstream consequences in general regulation and cell differentiation. I think that in the long run it compromises mental rigor. It also allows people to carry with them a sense of complete understanding when it's superficial and shallow. Having never experience the depth that the real world goes to kind of limits the horizons of people that aren't naturally curious and never shows them the potential for how deep shit can really get and when it does it is still superficial by the dint of the expectation placed on students being so narrow.

chermi 5mo ago

More predictive power is always a good goal, full stop. This is orthogonal to whether the model producing prediction helps with "understanding" directly. Predictability encodes understanding in a strict information theoretic sense, regardless of our ability as humans to access that understanding.

ordu 5mo ago
> More predictive power is always a good goal But in some cases it is not good enough. If you look for a better explanation and chose gradient descent as your strategy, then you'll come to a local maximum eventually, but not for another explanation. Arguably, it is hard to look for better explanation if the current one doesn't have a backtrack of failed predictions. One of the possible ways out of this situation is to search for the predictions that fail. But what I want to say is explanations are not just for prediction. They are needed to build a mental model that then can drive the research. And new model can be built (theoretically) from the first principles. I can't find clean examples for it though. If we look at Einstein for example, he started with a failure to predict. But what he came up at first was Special Relativity which failed utterly with the gravity. Einstein spent like 10 years rewriting gravity to make it work with SR? Failed predictions of his new shiny theory didn't stop him, and it is considered to be good. > Predictability encodes understanding in a strict information theoretic sense, regardless of our ability as humans to access that understanding. But it doesn't necessary implies the possibility to move forward. I'm not sure if an analogy with compressed data is a good one, but you don't work with compressed data, you unpack it, and maybe unpack some more and convert to a very inefficient format with regard to the disk space used. Compressed theory is good to apply it as is, but to refine it you should probably prefer something else.
zigzag312 5mo ago
It's not arguing that predictive power is bad. Just that people often mistakenly believe some phenomenon is understood more deeply than it really is, because a model can fit data and generate accurate predictions.

galsapir 5mo ago

got me at "Most often scientists believe they understand more than they do, making their belief an illusion." but why is it still bothering me? 1. feels unfalsifiable in spirit 2. somewhat restates "all models are wrong, but some are useful" less cleanly 3. doesn't really offer like, what can we do as science people? tomorrow morning perspective

musicale 5mo ago

> Many people know of Simpson’s through simple examples. One was UC Berkeley admissions showing that individual departments admitted more women than men but the university as a whole had admitted more men than women (Bickel et al., 1975). This only seems possible if students can be admitted to more than one department.

raincom 5mo ago

The authors of this paper have not studied what historians and philosophers of science have written. They just use 'induction', 'validity', etc. They reinvent the wheel. They write "Of course the validity of that induction depends on a host of other assumptions.". Duhem-Quine thesis is better than this way of formulation, as the latter doesn't use 'validity'. If authors ever come to this forum, please read Duhem-Quine thesis, over/under determination, inference to the best explanation, Goodman's paradox, also how various theories in philosophy of sciences: from Popper to Kuhn, Lakatos, Laudan, etc.

smarm52 5mo ago

Who is this for? This section, which is fairly close to a central thesis, contains no citations: > Illusions of understanding can take several (overlapping) forms. Some that are commonly encountered are: (1) Illusions of explanatory depth (we think we personally understand things in more detail than we do). (2) Illusions of explanatory completeness (even if we don’t think we fully understand it ourselves, we think the best experts do). (3) Illusions resulting from understanding something other than the goal (e.g. we believe we understand the formation of memories because we understand the anatomy of the brain site, the hippocampus, that is needed for such learning). (4) Illusions due to simple statements giving a feeling of insight (such as when tautological statements seem insightful because they are framed in a reductionist manner). (5) Illusions (as described earlier) that one understands the cause of phenomena because there exists a model or procedure that predicts well. (6) Illusions of causal strength (attending to an observed relation makes one believe the causal connection is stronger than it is). (7) illusions that one can describe causes simply. (8) Illusions by the explainer that the recipient understands what the communicator intends. (9) Illusions by the recipient of an explanation that the communicator understands well and that the explanation is correct and complete. Are we to infer that these observations are unsupported by evidence? Are we to assume that the research work is so poorly constructed that they did not do research to find evidence of the existence of the classifications in existing research?

OmindStash 5mo ago

This is fascinating. It's so funny how everything flows back to philosophy... What is understanding? What is knowledge? Can we know what the truth is, and does it exist?

armchairhacker 5mo ago
Relations formed by pattern recognition. Knowledge is recalling A from B, e.g. the definition of a word, the answer to a question. Understanding is more general knowledge: recalling A from related (e.g. “that’s a quadratic equation”) and recalling related from A (e.g. “quadratic equations are solved by the quadratic formula”)
bigbadfeline 5mo ago
> everything flows back to philosophy... Same as flowing forward off the edge of a cliff. > Can we know what the truth is, and does it exist? If you tried the forward motion at the aforementioned place you'd quickly find out the answer to that question. The fact that not many are trying it clearly shows that truth exists, the only question is which way to get there - by science or by fooling around and finding out.