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> The victim is prompted to enable the "Installed community plugins" synchronization feature. Obsidian has the proper protections in place to prevent this type
by slowmover 5mo ago
> The victim is prompted to enable the "Installed community plugins" synchronization feature.
Obsidian has the proper protections in place to prevent this type of attack, and the victims are being convinced to ignore them. This is just a successful social engineering event. I hate to see Obsidian dragged down by this headline, since this attack is not exploiting a vulnerability in it or its plugin system.
- cmbailey 5mo agoRight, I'm a heavy Obsidian user myself, and love it. I think the value of this disclosure is more in spreading awareness about plugins, and demonstrating the vector. Where less sophisticated users may think, "Oh, this is just a collection of markdown files. I don't need to be too worried about malicious code."
- Groxx 5mo agoEhm. No? https://obsidian.md/help/plugin-security#Plugin+capabilities https://obsidian.md/help/plugin-security#Plugin+capabilities >Due to technical limitations, Obsidian cannot reliably restrict plugins to specific permissions or access levels. This means that plugins will inherit Obsidian's access levels. As a result, consider the following examples of what community plugins can do: Community plugins can access files on your computer. Community plugins can connect to internet. Community plugins can install additional programs. Obsidian has no protection at all. Installing a plugin gives it full access to your computer. This was only a matter of time, and honestly I think it's inexcusably negligent that they shipped a plugin system like this at all since about 2010 (or arguably much earlier).
- pointlessone 5mo agoIt does give full access but Obsidian does tell you that. Community plugins are not enabled by default, you have to enable them manually. Same happens with a shared vault: once you get it you still have to manually enable plugins. So far no one managed to sneak in a plugin completely unnoticed.
- Groxx 5mo ago"Hey users: don't do insecure things. Here's a button to do cool insecure things!" is not a plugin security model.
- Ferret7446 5mo agoMeanwhile that is exactly what a lot of people here want for Android with side loaded apps
- eightys3v3n 5mo agoI'm not sure I agree or understand where you're coming from. Side-loaded Android apps are still bound by all the same permission restrictions as any app installed by the Play Store. The only difference is Google didn't review it (for what little good that does) and that I didn't get the app from Google. If I side-load a camera app, it still has to ask for camera privileges the same way any Play store app does. Is there something in your message I missed about how it relates to this article or is this just being uninformed about side-loading?
- Groxx 5mo agoSideloading bypasses nothing at all except Google's thumbs-up, Android's permission system doesn't work that way.
- kid64 5mo agoThat's horse hockey. Obsidian is not a usable system without community plugins. Folks will reply "but I use it every day without plugins". That position disregards software usability as a formal discipline, along with decades of UX research and standards.
- ImPostingOnHN 5mo agoThe attack here requires not just enabling community plugins, but also syncing the attacker's vault to your computer, and also separately enabling the synchronization of the attacker's plugins with yours.
- moron4hire 5mo agoA program one runs on one's computer can and should be able to do computer things. The alternative road you're advocating for ends in hardware attestation https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48086190 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48086190
- no-name-here 5mo agoThere are in-between models, such as: * Android's permissions model where the user must approve specific potentially undesirable classes of actions (separate from the 24H delay, etc controversy) * Optional sandboxing
- Paul-E 5mo agoObsidian seems like a perfect candidate for a WASM/WASI based plugin system that would properly sandbox plugin code.
- Groxx 5mo agoFor at least the vast majority, yes definitely. I'm fine with full bypasses existing (say a webgl thing, or web previews, custom VCS integration, there are tons of legitimate reasons to escape a sandbox), but they should be an abnormality with heavy warnings and proportionate community attention to watch for issues, not the only option. I don't think they meant it this way, but I honestly consider unsafe official plugin systems to be negligent to the point of being actively malicious. By releasing one, if you ever become successful you have explicitly chosen to screw over an unknown number of your users to save yourself a relatively small amount of work in the short term. It might be single digit users, or it might be septuple digit users - is it really worth it? (Unsafe unofficial plugins, like most games? Mildly unfortunate but I think that's fine. Though a healthy modding community around your stuff should be a VERY STRONG sign that you should introduce a safe version to protect your users, if it won't cause you to implode (it definitely can)).
- PurpleRamen 5mo agoHas WASM/WASI DOM-access? When I last read about the architecture, there was a strict separation between WASM, Javascript and the app, but also a movement to allow UI-customization from WASM-space. Many Obsidian-plugins are adding heavy UI-changes, so without that, it would be kinda pointless.
- Groxx 5mo agoNot generally / as many would hope, but that's partly because both WASM and WASI are not targeting being a full javascript-in-browser replacement - they're lower level, larger APIs are built on top, not defined by them. It's fairly easy to build an unsafe and unstable DOM access layer (a little bit of eval or string key accessers), but the web changes rapidly and isn't a stable target - exposing that in a stricter environment is tricky, and no one approach is likely to solve all needs.
- hirvi74 5mo agoSeems like the same risks of downloading plugins/packages for various text editors.
- e28eta 5mo agoI remember reading that page sometime pre-COVID, and being surprised at just how ridiculous it was. It started strong with “The Obsidian team takes security seriously”, but then almost everything else on the page led me to believe they didn’t actually take security very seriously. I agree with the claim of negligence. I think they were more than happy to reap the benefits of a thriving community plugin ecosystem, and were hoping this page would provide enough CYA when security breaches inevitably occurred. > TIP: If you're working with sensitive data and wish to install a community plugin, we recommend that you perform an independent security audit on the plugin before using it. I wonder just how many plugins received a security audit.
- nkrisc 5mo agoI use only one plugin because I am aware of the security model (or lack thereof). I only use one because I read the source and am convinced it’s safe. It would be foolish to blindly install many plugins.
- Groxx 5mo agoAgreed, but also they prominently feature that they support plugins. Currently it's the second paragraph on the home page: https://obsidian.md/ https://obsidian.md/ They're trying to get all the benefits while pushing the extremely-obvious-to-them downsides into subpages. Not hidden, but not shown along-side the feature. It's intentionally misleading for non-technical users.
- poulpy123 5mo ago> Community plugins can access files on your computer. Community plugins can connect to internet. Community plugins can install additional programs. That's what make obsidian plugins useful. It it's just for having themes , there is no need for them