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> …Google could trivially make it work with GrapheneOS (which is more secure than any other Android OS on the market) but they won't. But if Google did support

> …Google could trivially make it work with GrapheneOS (which is more secure than any other Android OS on the market) but they won't. But if Google did support third-party attestation, would the GrapheneOS Foundation be happy? Most of the thread seems to be a call for attestation to die, which feels impractical and unachievable. But "Google could use it to permit GrapheneOS for Play Integrity if that was actually about security" seems to be the real ask, and that seems reasonable and achievable. If that's true, I think it would’ve been more effective to lead with that and focus on it.

microtonal 6mo ago
Why should Google decide which devices are safe enough to pass remote attestation? Seems to me that if we want this at all, it should be an independent body that approves signing keys of vetted vendors (e.g. vendors roll out security updates timely, etc.). As long as this is in Google's hands, they can abuse it to control the market. That said, Play Integrity accepting GrapheneOS would be a step forward, but they will never do it, because then other vendors might also want to pass attestation without preloading Google apps.
- Hoodedcrow 6mo ago
  > Seems to me that if we want this at all, it should be an independent body that approves signing keys of vetted vendors (e.g. vendors roll out security updates timely, etc.). This is also a horrible idea. If an OS can be vetoed for untimely security updates, it can also be vetoed for not having something like clientside scanning.
- foltik 6mo ago
  Then you’re just replacing one DRM cartel with another. What would even be the criteria for approval? Pinky promise to not let the end user have full control of their own device? That’s all “integrity” really means in practice. Don’t be fooled by appeals to security.
thomastjeffery 6mo ago
No. That would be a relatively better circumstance, but we would still have the root problem. > Most of the thread seems to be a call for attestation to die, which feels impractical and unachievable. I disagree, and I expect GrapheneOS devs do, too. Hardware attestation is a new thing, that isn't even really here yet. It absolutely can and should meet its demise.

microtonal 6mo ago

Why should Google decide which devices are safe enough to pass remote attestation? Seems to me that if we want this at all, it should be an independent body that approves signing keys of vetted vendors (e.g. vendors roll out security updates timely, etc.). As long as this is in Google's hands, they can abuse it to control the market. That said, Play Integrity accepting GrapheneOS would be a step forward, but they will never do it, because then other vendors might also want to pass attestation without preloading Google apps.

Hoodedcrow 6mo ago
> Seems to me that if we want this at all, it should be an independent body that approves signing keys of vetted vendors (e.g. vendors roll out security updates timely, etc.). This is also a horrible idea. If an OS can be vetoed for untimely security updates, it can also be vetoed for not having something like clientside scanning.
foltik 6mo ago
Then you’re just replacing one DRM cartel with another. What would even be the criteria for approval? Pinky promise to not let the end user have full control of their own device? That’s all “integrity” really means in practice. Don’t be fooled by appeals to security.

thomastjeffery 6mo ago

No. That would be a relatively better circumstance, but we would still have the root problem. > Most of the thread seems to be a call for attestation to die, which feels impractical and unachievable. I disagree, and I expect GrapheneOS devs do, too. Hardware attestation is a new thing, that isn't even really here yet. It absolutely can and should meet its demise.