3 ms·

Ran as a fresh new default user in a ubuntu:latest container git clone https://github.com/V4bel/dirtyfrag.git && cd dirtyfrag && gcc -O0 -Wall -o exp exp.c -

by hughw 5mo ago

Ran as a fresh new default user in a ubuntu:latest container git clone https://github.com/V4bel/dirtyfrag.git && cd dirtyfrag && gcc -O0 -Wall -o exp exp.c -lutil && ./exp Result: dirtyfrag: failed (rc=3) Good news!

Havoc 5mo ago
Wouldn't count on container being a reliable testing platform for this. Loads of stuff - legitimate or otherwise - fails in containers
stsewd 5mo ago
I got the same running it inside a container, but got a shell when running it directly in the host. This only shows that the exploit doesn't work inside a container. So, containers aren't vulnerable, or the script needs some adjustments to make it work in containers. Since copy fail can be used to escape containers (https://github.com/Percivalll/Copy-Fail-CVE-2026-31431-Kubernetes-PoC https://github.com/Percivalll/Copy-Fail-CVE-2026-31431-Kuber...), I'm guessing the exploit needs some changes only.
- cyphar 5mo ago
  The repo you linked works by replacing files that are being used by other privileged containers on the same system. That works for the Kubernetes case (I'm a little surprised they don't use static binaries for their own privileged containers, seems a little dangerous to share any kind of data with untrusted tenants even if it's read-only) but not standalone containers. However, there is a much an easier way of doing a breakout -- you can corrupt the host runc binary in a way analogous to CVE-2019-5736. The next time a container is spawned, the host runc binary will get run as as root and that's that. Ironically, the first version of the protection against this attack I wrote also protected against page cache poisoning (by making a temporary copy of the runc binary during container setup in a sealed memfd and re-execing that) but the runtime cost of copying a 10MB binary at container startup was seen as too expensive by some users[1] so we ended up with a setup that shares the same page cache. I also distinctly remember arguing at the time that something like Dirty Cow could always happen in the future, and the memfd approach was better for that reason -- maybe I should've stuck to my guns more... :/ In practice the solution for containers is to update your seccomp policy to block the vulnerable syscall. [1]: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/issues/1980 https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/issues/1980
  - jguarnelli 5mo ago
    [dead]
- percivalll 5mo ago
  [dead]

by hughw 5mo ago

Havoc 5mo ago

Wouldn't count on container being a reliable testing platform for this. Loads of stuff - legitimate or otherwise - fails in containers

stsewd 5mo ago

I got the same running it inside a container, but got a shell when running it directly in the host. This only shows that the exploit doesn't work inside a container. So, containers aren't vulnerable, or the script needs some adjustments to make it work in containers. Since copy fail can be used to escape containers (https://github.com/Percivalll/Copy-Fail-CVE-2026-31431-Kubernetes-PoC https://github.com/Percivalll/Copy-Fail-CVE-2026-31431-Kuber...), I'm guessing the exploit needs some changes only.

cyphar 5mo ago
The repo you linked works by replacing files that are being used by other privileged containers on the same system. That works for the Kubernetes case (I'm a little surprised they don't use static binaries for their own privileged containers, seems a little dangerous to share any kind of data with untrusted tenants even if it's read-only) but not standalone containers. However, there is a much an easier way of doing a breakout -- you can corrupt the host runc binary in a way analogous to CVE-2019-5736. The next time a container is spawned, the host runc binary will get run as as root and that's that. Ironically, the first version of the protection against this attack I wrote also protected against page cache poisoning (by making a temporary copy of the runc binary during container setup in a sealed memfd and re-execing that) but the runtime cost of copying a 10MB binary at container startup was seen as too expensive by some users[1] so we ended up with a setup that shares the same page cache. I also distinctly remember arguing at the time that something like Dirty Cow could always happen in the future, and the memfd approach was better for that reason -- maybe I should've stuck to my guns more... :/ In practice the solution for containers is to update your seccomp policy to block the vulnerable syscall. [1]: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/issues/1980 https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/issues/1980
- jguarnelli 5mo ago
  [dead]
percivalll 5mo ago
[dead]