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For anyone that thinks this is an Edge-specific dunk, Chrome does not hash your passwords and they are cleartext in memory while Chrome is running (which for mo

For anyone that thinks this is an Edge-specific dunk, Chrome does not hash your passwords and they are cleartext in memory while Chrome is running (which for most users is always).

bobbiechen 6mo ago
This is generally true of every application that handles sensitive data. Unless you explicitly clear that memory, it's likely to hang around forever. For example, here is a 2019 writeup from KeePassXC with similar notes: https://keepassxc.org/blog/2019-02-21-memory-security/ https://keepassxc.org/blog/2019-02-21-memory-security/ - even though they explicitly clear sensitive data, there is still a window of opportunity. During my time working on confidential computing, we had a variety of demos showing similar attacks against lots of different datastores, scripts, etc. That's just how computers work and your options are very limited if this is part of your threat model (imo just confidential computing and, if you can handle the performance hit, fully-homomorphic encryption).
- dist-epoch 6mo ago
  Windows already has a secure kernel credential store, they could move the Edge password store there with a bit of effort, minimize the splash damage when you retrieve a single password to send over HTTP from the regular user space. > Credential Guard prevents credential theft attacks by protecting NTLM password hashes, Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs), and credentials stored by applications as domain credentials. > Credential Guard uses Virtualization-based security (VBS) to isolate secrets so that only privileged system software can access them. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/ https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-...
  - jborean93 6mo ago
    This only works if credential guard has implemented a way to build a subsequent token/value from that secret. For things like basic auth the secret would need to eventually hit the userland process that needs it in some shape or form to then embed it in the HTTP payload which is plaintext.
Someone1234 6mo ago
Password hashes are one-directional lossy storage. If a password manager "hashed your password" it would be essentially deleting your password and replacing it with something else which cannot be used to log into anything. The password MUST be recoverable to plain-text to replay it to a website. But you're correct that Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Lastpass, BitWarden, even Keepass have the same issue. It is an Operating System limitation, not a password manager problem.
- Sohcahtoa82 6mo ago
  I think the catch is whether the passwords are unencrypted in memory constantly, or only during a short period when the password is being used?
- busterarm 6mo ago
  I never said that they should be hashed, just that they aren't. Just subtly pointing out what the tradeoffs are if you choose to use a password manager whose storage/access is basically always available. At least with Keepass it's locked in an encrypted store and only available exactly when I need it to be. I can take other precautions if I want when I want to access it. With your browser's password manager you're stuck with the slop you were given.
  - traderj0e 6mo ago
    So are you typing your password every single time you want to unlock that store? If not, where's the master password stored? I know Keychain does something advanced with the enclave.
    - busterarm 6mo ago
      My master password is ~20 characters of strong randomness and completely in my head and has worked that way a good 10 years or so now.
asmosoinio 6mo ago
Not since 2024 according to this article? As they use DPAPI. Or am I reading this wrong? https://security.googleblog.com/2024/07/improving-security-of-chrome-cookies-on.html https://security.googleblog.com/2024/07/improving-security-o... > In Chrome 127 we are introducing a new protection on Windows that improves on the DPAPI by providing Application-Bound (App-Bound) Encryption primitives. Rather than allowing any app running as the logged in user to access this data, Chrome can now encrypt data tied to app identity, similar to how the Keychain operates on macOS.

For anyone that thinks this is an Edge-specific dunk, Chrome does not hash your passwords and they are cleartext in memory while Chrome is running (which for most users is always).

bobbiechen 6mo ago

This is generally true of every application that handles sensitive data. Unless you explicitly clear that memory, it's likely to hang around forever. For example, here is a 2019 writeup from KeePassXC with similar notes: https://keepassxc.org/blog/2019-02-21-memory-security/ https://keepassxc.org/blog/2019-02-21-memory-security/ - even though they explicitly clear sensitive data, there is still a window of opportunity. During my time working on confidential computing, we had a variety of demos showing similar attacks against lots of different datastores, scripts, etc. That's just how computers work and your options are very limited if this is part of your threat model (imo just confidential computing and, if you can handle the performance hit, fully-homomorphic encryption).

dist-epoch 6mo ago
Windows already has a secure kernel credential store, they could move the Edge password store there with a bit of effort, minimize the splash damage when you retrieve a single password to send over HTTP from the regular user space. > Credential Guard prevents credential theft attacks by protecting NTLM password hashes, Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs), and credentials stored by applications as domain credentials. > Credential Guard uses Virtualization-based security (VBS) to isolate secrets so that only privileged system software can access them. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/ https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-...
- jborean93 6mo ago
  This only works if credential guard has implemented a way to build a subsequent token/value from that secret. For things like basic auth the secret would need to eventually hit the userland process that needs it in some shape or form to then embed it in the HTTP payload which is plaintext.

Someone1234 6mo ago

Password hashes are one-directional lossy storage. If a password manager "hashed your password" it would be essentially deleting your password and replacing it with something else which cannot be used to log into anything. The password MUST be recoverable to plain-text to replay it to a website. But you're correct that Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Lastpass, BitWarden, even Keepass have the same issue. It is an Operating System limitation, not a password manager problem.

Sohcahtoa82 6mo ago
I think the catch is whether the passwords are unencrypted in memory constantly, or only during a short period when the password is being used?
busterarm 6mo ago
I never said that they should be hashed, just that they aren't. Just subtly pointing out what the tradeoffs are if you choose to use a password manager whose storage/access is basically always available. At least with Keepass it's locked in an encrypted store and only available exactly when I need it to be. I can take other precautions if I want when I want to access it. With your browser's password manager you're stuck with the slop you were given.
- traderj0e 6mo ago
  So are you typing your password every single time you want to unlock that store? If not, where's the master password stored? I know Keychain does something advanced with the enclave.
  - busterarm 6mo ago
    My master password is ~20 characters of strong randomness and completely in my head and has worked that way a good 10 years or so now.

asmosoinio 6mo ago

Not since 2024 according to this article? As they use DPAPI. Or am I reading this wrong? https://security.googleblog.com/2024/07/improving-security-of-chrome-cookies-on.html https://security.googleblog.com/2024/07/improving-security-o... > In Chrome 127 we are introducing a new protection on Windows that improves on the DPAPI by providing Application-Bound (App-Bound) Encryption primitives. Rather than allowing any app running as the logged in user to access this data, Chrome can now encrypt data tied to app identity, similar to how the Keychain operates on macOS.