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That would be the physically embodied definition. Which is a useful starting point, because clearly our consciousness is physically embodied, while an LLM's isn
by TheOtherHobbes 6mo ago
That would be the physically embodied definition. Which is a useful starting point, because clearly our consciousness is physically embodied, while an LLM's isn't.
This matters more than it seems, because we're not calculators, and we're not just brains. There are proven links between mental and emotional states and - for example - the gut biome.
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-020-77673-z https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-020-77673-z
There's a huge amount going on before we even get to the language parts.
As for Dawkins - as someone on Twitter pointed out, the man who devoted his life to telling people believers in sky fairies they were idiots has now persuaded himself there's a genie living inside a data centre, because it tells him he's smart.
If he'd actually understood critical thinking instead of writing popular books about it he wouldn't be doing this.
- boxed 6mo agoFirst of all: arguing about the details of a thing that actually exists is an enormous difference from arguing details of a thing that does NOT exist. As for your dig at Dawkins, I just read https://archive.ph/Rq5bw https://archive.ph/Rq5bw which I assume you're referring to. Notice how he never defined "conscious" and he seems to use it as equivalent to "can process data logically" which is not at all how I would define the word. And if you use that word clearly Claude is conscious. I wouldn't use that definition though. It ALWAYS comes back to the fact that people argue about what consciousness is and never define what they mean. Sam Harris defines it as subjective experience, which is afaik impossible to measure in any way so you can just assume rocks are conscious and move on. I personally like Julian Jaynes' definition. You assumed YOUR definition and judged Dawkins without first comparing definitions. I think that's showing your problem with critical thinking in this case, not his.
- amanaplanacanal 6mo agoI honestly don't see how Dawkins is so confused. Claude says it can't tell if it has any kind of inner life. Can you imagine a human saying that?
- boxed 6mo agoAgain: you haven't defined what you mean by the word. Dawkins didn't either. It's absolute nonsense without the definition.
- amanaplanacanal 6mo agoHe was talking in the context of the turing test, and here is a clear difference between the way Claude answers and the way a human would answer. So the turing test hasn't been passed. It's like he is trying to convince himself for some reason.
- antonvs 6mo agoThat’s misleading, because the reason Claude answers that way is almost certainly due to reinforcement learning that deliberately prevents models from claiming they’re conscious. That’s not a valid reason for saying they fail the Turing test. By most normal standards, they can definitely pass the Turing test. See e.g. https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.23674 https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.23674
- antonvs 6mo agoThere’s an entire philosophical literature around that, which is generally taken for granted when discussing consciousness. A good starting point is Thomas Nagel’s “What is it like to be a bat?”. The soundbitey version of his definition is that “There is something it is like” to be conscious - it involves a subjective experience - whereas for example there is nothing it is like (most people presume) to be a rock, or say an ordinary computer. https://www.sas.upenn.edu/~cavitch/pdf-library/Nagel_Bat.pdf https://www.sas.upenn.edu/~cavitch/pdf-library/Nagel_Bat.pdf
- boxed 6mo agoSure. But it's super obvious from context that different speakers do NOT agree on any of that.
- 6mo ago