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Maybe it's just me, but if I had to approve each command of the agent, that'd remove 90% of the benefits of using an agent in the first place. Almost the whole
by embedding-shape 6mo ago
Maybe it's just me, but if I had to approve each command of the agent, that'd remove 90% of the benefits of using an agent in the first place. Almost the whole point is that I can fire off a prompt, it can do whatever and then I come back later.
Instead, wrap the agent in a way so it cannot destroy stuff in the first place. And if you still want it to "be able to destroy databases in production", do so by copy-pasting stuff out of the isolated environment. I've run codex as root, as "dangerously as possible" with zero approvals, since the launch of the TUI, and never hit a snag, because the agent literally don't have access to snag things up.
Agents WILL make mistakes, it's up to you to set things up in a way that you don't get utterly fucked when that eventually happens. Avoiding adding 10s of MCPs tools, avoiding authenticating with all platforms, services and databases and not giving it access to all directories on your computer solves 99% of the issues people are having, and there are numerous of simple ways of doing this.
- jguarnelli 6mo agoit's a fair point sandboxing is necessary. But not sufficient for agents that legitimately need write access. A payment agent needs Stripe. A maintenance agent needs DB writes. You can't sandbox those away. The missing layer is between has access and executes