3 ms·

It seems Qubes OS and Qubes-Whonix are not affected.

• ranger_danger 6mo ago
  Source?
  • fsflover 6mo ago
    Different VMs result in different identifiers.
    • handedness 6mo ago
      Creating a new identity in the browser in a disposable VM does not start a new disposable VM.
      • fsflover 6mo ago
        I never said that. I only assumed that a user followed the docs when using Qubes-Whonix.
        • handedness 6mo ago
          A dangerous assumption for someone who styles himself as the introducer of Qubes OS to new audiences. The saying about assumptions is as true as ever, unfortunately for both of us.
          • fsflover 6mo ago
            People who use tools incorrectly bear responsibility for corresponding dangers themselves. They can always ask for an additional advice or more details. I don't understand why you are attacking me for that. See also my answer elsewhwere (and please stop repeating the same thing in every comment thread): https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47878794 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47878794.
• hrimfaxi 6mo ago
  How so? If you kept a disposable VM open and just created new identities in tor browser, how does Qubes mitigate the threat here?
  • fsflover 6mo ago
    On Qubes, you do not create a new identity in the same VM. This would go against the Qubes approach to security/privacy. Using separate VMs for independent tasks is the whole point of using Qubes.
    • handedness 6mo ago
      > On Qubes, you do not create a new identity in the same VM. This would go against the Qubes approach to security/privacy. Using separate VMs for independent tasks is the whole point of using Qubes. This is technically incorrect information and could get people in trouble if followed literally. On Qubes OS, if a user creates a new identity inside a Whonix workstation disposable VM via the browser's new identity functionality, the new identity spawns within the same disposable VM. I just tested this on Qubes OS 4.3. That, I assume would expose one to OP's vulnerability, as its still running in the same VM. I would be glad to learn that I'm incorrect in my unverified assumption. Even Qubes OS users still need to be mindful to launch new disposable VM when keeping identities separate to sidestep this attack.
      • fsflover 6mo ago
        You are right, and I am saying exactly the same thing. You seem to misunderstand that Qubes saves you whenever you use it as designed by its security approach. To benefit from Qubes security, you have to use virtualization to compartmentalize your tasks. Only virtualization is a guarantee of security. Everything running in the same domain is assumed to be not isolated, and a compromise would affect everything in it. Even root access has no password by default in VMs. So what you're saying is obvious to any Qubes user. This is why I didn't mention it. (But I should have indeed.) By you reasoning, Qubes doesn't provide more protection than the underlying operating systems. I've seen this myth on HN multiple times.
• 2ndorderthought 6mo ago
  In the last ten years has qubes moved on to support more hardware? Every 4 years I would try to use it only to find it didn't support any of my hardware.
  • Aachen 6mo ago
    We buy off the shelf laptops, not sure anyone ever checked that it can run Qubes specifically before trying to install it (I'm sure of at least one person: myself). Doesn't just about any x64 machine with hardware where drivers are available in standard kernels also work with Qubes? What have you bought that's not supported?
    • fsflover 6mo ago
      Actually, it should work indeed, unless it lacks some Linux drivers or VT-d.
    • 2ndorderthought 6mo ago
      .y attempts were 4 yrs ago and prior to that about 4 yrs prior. Home built PC's, random laptops, etc.
  • fsflover 6mo ago
    Tested hardware can be found here https://qubes-os.org/hcl https://qubes-os.org/hcl. New hardware is being constantly added. If you plan to switch to Qubes, consider buying something from that list or, better, certified, or community-recommended hardware linked there.
  • orbital-decay 6mo ago
    Most hardware (especially GPUs) is hard to virtualize in a secure manner, which is the entire point of Qubes. People who use it typically buy compatible hardware.
    • fsflover 6mo ago
      I would expect that most Qubes users (including myself) do not virtualize GPUs and use the CPU to render graphics outside of dom0.
• handedness 6mo ago
  > It seems Qubes OS and Qubes-Whonix are not affected. This is dangerously incomplete and bad advice. Qubes OS does not work the way you seem to think it does. Creating a new identity in the Tor Browser inside a disposable VM does not automatically stop that VM and start a new disposable VM. That initial disposable VM launches the new identity from the existing process and therefore remains vulnerable, the same as any bare metal computer running Tor Browser would. Virtualization is not magic. A Qubes OS user needs to spin up a new disposable Whonix VM to sidestep this attack. Creating a new identity alone is ineffective in this threat model. If you care about these projects as much as you say you do, please stop giving harmful advice. You do it in various places on the Internet and in every thread which gives you half a chance to do so, and these projects would be better off if you either took any of the extensive well-reasoned correction many people offer you, or opted to stop making such claims. The former would be ideal, the latter still vastly preferable to the existing state of affairs.