3 ms·
finding vulns in a large codebase is a search problem with a huge negative space and what aisle measured is classification accuracy on ground-truth positives, t
by mrifaki 6mo ago
finding vulns in a large codebase is a search problem with a huge
negative space and what aisle measured is classification accuracy on
ground-truth positives, those are different tasks so a model that
correctly labels a pre-isolated vulnerable function tells me almost
nothing about that model's ability to surface the same function out of
a million lines of unrelated code under a realistic triage budget
the experiment i'd want to see is running each of the small models as an
unsupervised scanner across full freebsd then return the top-k suspicious
functions per model and compute precision at recall levels that
correspond to real analyst triage budgets, if mythos s findings show up
in the small models top 100, i'd call that meaningful but if they only
surface under 10k false positives then the cost advantage
collapses because analyst triage time is more expensive than frontier
model compute to begin with
second thing i keep coming back to is the $20k mythos number is a search
budget not a model cost, small models at one hundredth the per-token
price don't give us one hundredth the total budget when the search
process is the same shape, i still run thousands of iterations and the
issue for autonomous vuln research is how fast the reward signal
converges and the aisle post doesn't touch any of this