3 ms·
I do. I care. And there are dozens of us. Lots of infected programs provide value. It has nothing to do with being or not being infected. If a project was vib
by mathfailure 6mo ago
I do. I care. And there are dozens of us.
Lots of infected programs provide value. It has nothing to do with being or not being infected.
If a project was vibecoded in a weekend - there are less chances that it will still be maintained in a, say, year or two.
- mvdwoord 6mo agoBut if it is open source you could maintain it? It could be "done" for a given state of affairs (protocol/API versions etc)?
- imcritic 6mo agoSuch action has non-zero cost/effort. Do I really want to pay it? I am not sure.
- Leomuck 6mo agoOf course you could, but if it was indeed vibe-coded in a weekend, why wouldn't you want to start from scratch to make sure everything is up to your standards (especially security)? I'm definitely not going to jump in on a vibe-coded project. I'd much rather start from scratch if I found the use-case to be relevant. Not to say vibe-coded projects can't be alright. If the engineer behind it knows their stuff, it's fine to me. But we don't know that. So to get a general idea, I think it's fair to ask how this was done.
- synotna 6mo agoDon't give programs unnecessary access - problem solved
- imcritic 6mo agoThat's a good advice in general to treat any software as untrusted black box as much as possible. But it raises (slightly, but still does) the cost/effort for the user: the user now has to make extra steps and take extra caution. These concerns were great valid even before vibecoding becoming a thing, but now the estimated probabilities of malicious code's presence have changed, simply because nowadays the cost/effort of writing software plummeted.
- d0liver 6mo agoUnnecessary access isn't a solveable problem. In order to restrict permissions to exactly what a program needs, in general, you'd have to define exactly what a program does. In other words, you'd need to rewrite the program with self-enforcing access restrictions. So, permissions are always going to be more general than what a program actually needs and, therefore, exploitable. Producing incorrect information is an insidious example of this. We can't simply restrict the program's permissions so that it only yields correct outputs -- we'd need to understand the outputs themselves to make that work. But, then, we're in a situation where we're basing our choices on potentially incorrect and unverified outputs from the program.