6 ms·

Putting on my user hat... "OK. Signal has forward secrecy. So messages are gone after I receive them. Great!" Oh, you didn't turn on disappearing messages? Oh

Putting on my user hat... "OK. Signal has forward secrecy. So messages are gone after I receive them. Great!" Oh, you didn't turn on disappearing messages? Oh, right, then forensic tools like Cellebrite can get them. You have to turn on disappearing messages. The default is off. Oh, you did turn on disappearing messages? We send the messages in notifications. So the OS can keep them. Turns out Apple was doing that. There is an option you can turn on to prevent that. It is off by default. "I'll just delete the entire app!" No, sorry, the OS still has your messages... At what point does the usability get so bad that we can blame the messaging system? This same app had a usability issue that turned into a security issue just last year: End to End Encrypted Messaging in the News: An Editorial Usability Case Study (my article) https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?id=em:sg https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?id=em:sg

DevX101 6mo ago
The median user isn't going to change default settings, so your app is as secure as whatever the default it.
- stvltvs 6mo ago
  Even if I change the setting, my messages aren't truly secure against this unless all recipients do the same on all of their devices.
jacquesm 6mo ago
People keep pushing signal because it is supposedly secure. But it runs on platforms that are so complex with so much eco system garbage that there is no way know even within a low percentage of confidence if you've done everything required to ensure you are communicating just with the person you think you are. There could be listeners at just about every layer and that is still without looking at the meta-data angle which is just as important (who communicated with who and when, and possibly from where).
- OutOfHere 6mo ago
  There is nothing secure about sending encrypted content to notifications. If it were secure, it would only notify that there is a message, with no details included.
  - anon84873628 6mo ago
    Once again there is a trade off between security and user convenience. If security is the main differentiator then app should start in the most secure mode possible. Then allow users to turn on features while alerting them to the risks. Or at least ask users at startup whether they want "high sec mode" or "convenient mode". As the app becomes more popular as a general messaging replacement, there will be a push towards greater convenience and broad based appeal, undermining the original security marketing as observed here.
    - jacquesm 6mo ago
      Exactly, but, sooner or later the cost of support overcomes the need for security, that's what is driving this. Popularity is the main reason signal is now less secure than it was in the past.
  - david_shaw 6mo ago
    > If it were secure, it would only notify that there is a message, with no details included. You're right. This is configurable via settings, but is not the default state. That said: if I can get friends and family to use Signal instead of iMessage, that gives me the opportunity to disable those notifications and experience more security benefits. But I agree with your point: most people think that Signal is bulletproof out of the box, and it's clearly not.
    - jacquesm 6mo ago
      You only control one side of any conversation.
- dingaling 6mo ago
dist-epoch 6mo ago
Use SimpleX if you really want a secure messenger. Endorsed by Whonix, which in endorsed by Snowden. https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Chat#Recommendation https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Chat#Recommendation
- bladeacidic 6mo ago
  SimpleX has the same problem with notifications. You still have to properly configure it. Opsec is hard.
- wqaatwt 6mo ago
  > endorsed by Snowden. Who is endorsed by the Russian government
microtonal 6mo ago
I think one of the main issues is that end-to-end message encryption is a sham as long as backups are not encrypted. I could have good device security, but if the person I'm talking to does not use ADP, iMessage and WhatsApp messages get backed up with only at-rest encryption (I think Signal opts out of standard iOS backups) and possibly the same for backups of the iPhone notification database (which the article suggests as a possibility). Similarly on Android, WhatsApp suggests unencrypted backups to Google Drive by default. Putting on my tinfoil hat, I am pretty sure that Google/Apple/Meta have some deal (successor to PRISM) where end-to-end encrypted messaging is tolerated as long as they have defaults that make it possible to access chats anyway. Apple not enabling ADP by default and WhatsApp doing Google Drive backups that are not end-to-end encrypted is the implementation. Since most people just use the defaults, it undermines security of people who care. It's a 'win-win', the tech companies can wash their hands in innocence, the agencies get access to data, and phone users believe that they are chatting in a secure/private manner.
- AJ007 6mo ago
  "end-to-end message encryption is a sham as long as" -- I agree with that but would add even more caveats. If someone can't list those caveats off the top of their head they shouldn't be pretending they aren't able to communicate securely. Just look at Salt Typhoon, every single person should be way more paranoid than they are, including government & agency officials. The attach surface and potential damage - financial and reputation - will only get worse with AI automation and impersonation, and that's for people who are doing nothing interesting and are law abiding citizens.
  - microtonal 6mo ago
    I mean the Hungarian minister of Foreign Affairs briefed Lavrov on internal EU matters and there are recordings of one or more calls. It seems that opsec is bad at pretty much every level.
    - alfiedotwtf 6mo ago
      We’re already forgetting when the Secretary of War invited a journalist to the secret SIGNAL group chat
GeekyBear 6mo ago
> Oh, you did turn on disappearing messages? We send the messages in notifications. So the OS can keep them. Worse than that, they did not take advantage of the ability to send that message data as an encrypted payload inside the notification. https://blog.davidlibeau.fr/push-notifications-are-a-privacy-nightmare/ https://blog.davidlibeau.fr/push-notifications-are-a-privacy... Either do not include sensitive user data inside a notification by default, or encrypt that data before you send it to the notification server.
- janfoeh 6mo ago
  According to Michael Tsai, they did use encrypted notification payloads. The OS just then stores the decrypted payloads in its notification database. [0] [0] https://mjtsai.com/blog/2026/04/10/notifications-privacy/ https://mjtsai.com/blog/2026/04/10/notifications-privacy/
- greysonp 6mo ago
  Signal developer here. Our FCM and APN notifications are empty and just tell the app to wake up, fetch encrypted messages, decrypt them, and then generate the notification ourselves locally.
  - GeekyBear 6mo ago
    That's certainly a better state of affairs. So you just need to fix the default setting and not display the message text in notifications to prevent this issue in the future?
ransom1538 6mo ago
0) send a public key. 1) encrypt the file with your private key 2) send file. WTF. This is super simple stuff.
- amethyst 6mo ago
  3) recipient stores decrypted content in plain text and backs that up in well-known cloud storage systems
commandersaki 6mo ago
We send the messages in notifications. So the OS can keep them. Turns out Apple was doing that. There is an option you can turn on to prevent that. It is off by default. At least on my iPhone the default is to preview messages only when unlocked [0]. This user went out of their way to show previews in a locked state which meant it was vulnerable by digital acquisition without unlock code. [0] https://files.catbox.moe/3gwjoy.png https://files.catbox.moe/3gwjoy.png
- eggnet 6mo ago
  That doesn’t solve the problem. You have to configure Signal to not send the information in the notification.
  - commandersaki 6mo ago
    “We learned that specifically on iPhones, if one’s settings in the Signal app allow for message notifications and previews to show up on the lock screen, [then] the iPhone will internally store those notifications/message previews in the internal memory of the device,” a supporter of the defendants who was taking notes during the trial told 404 Media Doesn't indicate this is an issue when you have it set to preview when unlocked.
bombcar 6mo ago
If the encryption security isn’t a freaking pain in every ass in the Tri county area, it’s not secure. That’s been my go-to and I’ve yet to see it not work.

DevX101 6mo ago

The median user isn't going to change default settings, so your app is as secure as whatever the default it.

stvltvs 6mo ago
Even if I change the setting, my messages aren't truly secure against this unless all recipients do the same on all of their devices.

jacquesm 6mo ago

People keep pushing signal because it is supposedly secure. But it runs on platforms that are so complex with so much eco system garbage that there is no way know even within a low percentage of confidence if you've done everything required to ensure you are communicating just with the person you think you are. There could be listeners at just about every layer and that is still without looking at the meta-data angle which is just as important (who communicated with who and when, and possibly from where).

OutOfHere 6mo ago
There is nothing secure about sending encrypted content to notifications. If it were secure, it would only notify that there is a message, with no details included.
- anon84873628 6mo ago
  Once again there is a trade off between security and user convenience. If security is the main differentiator then app should start in the most secure mode possible. Then allow users to turn on features while alerting them to the risks. Or at least ask users at startup whether they want "high sec mode" or "convenient mode". As the app becomes more popular as a general messaging replacement, there will be a push towards greater convenience and broad based appeal, undermining the original security marketing as observed here.
  - jacquesm 6mo ago
    Exactly, but, sooner or later the cost of support overcomes the need for security, that's what is driving this. Popularity is the main reason signal is now less secure than it was in the past.
- david_shaw 6mo ago
  > If it were secure, it would only notify that there is a message, with no details included. You're right. This is configurable via settings, but is not the default state. That said: if I can get friends and family to use Signal instead of iMessage, that gives me the opportunity to disable those notifications and experience more security benefits. But I agree with your point: most people think that Signal is bulletproof out of the box, and it's clearly not.
  - jacquesm 6mo ago
    You only control one side of any conversation.
dingaling 6mo ago

dist-epoch 6mo ago

Use SimpleX if you really want a secure messenger. Endorsed by Whonix, which in endorsed by Snowden. https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Chat#Recommendation https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Chat#Recommendation

bladeacidic 6mo ago
SimpleX has the same problem with notifications. You still have to properly configure it. Opsec is hard.
wqaatwt 6mo ago
> endorsed by Snowden. Who is endorsed by the Russian government

microtonal 6mo ago

I think one of the main issues is that end-to-end message encryption is a sham as long as backups are not encrypted. I could have good device security, but if the person I'm talking to does not use ADP, iMessage and WhatsApp messages get backed up with only at-rest encryption (I think Signal opts out of standard iOS backups) and possibly the same for backups of the iPhone notification database (which the article suggests as a possibility). Similarly on Android, WhatsApp suggests unencrypted backups to Google Drive by default. Putting on my tinfoil hat, I am pretty sure that Google/Apple/Meta have some deal (successor to PRISM) where end-to-end encrypted messaging is tolerated as long as they have defaults that make it possible to access chats anyway. Apple not enabling ADP by default and WhatsApp doing Google Drive backups that are not end-to-end encrypted is the implementation. Since most people just use the defaults, it undermines security of people who care. It's a 'win-win', the tech companies can wash their hands in innocence, the agencies get access to data, and phone users believe that they are chatting in a secure/private manner.

AJ007 6mo ago
"end-to-end message encryption is a sham as long as" -- I agree with that but would add even more caveats. If someone can't list those caveats off the top of their head they shouldn't be pretending they aren't able to communicate securely. Just look at Salt Typhoon, every single person should be way more paranoid than they are, including government & agency officials. The attach surface and potential damage - financial and reputation - will only get worse with AI automation and impersonation, and that's for people who are doing nothing interesting and are law abiding citizens.
- microtonal 6mo ago
  I mean the Hungarian minister of Foreign Affairs briefed Lavrov on internal EU matters and there are recordings of one or more calls. It seems that opsec is bad at pretty much every level.
  - alfiedotwtf 6mo ago
    We’re already forgetting when the Secretary of War invited a journalist to the secret SIGNAL group chat

GeekyBear 6mo ago

> Oh, you did turn on disappearing messages? We send the messages in notifications. So the OS can keep them. Worse than that, they did not take advantage of the ability to send that message data as an encrypted payload inside the notification. https://blog.davidlibeau.fr/push-notifications-are-a-privacy-nightmare/ https://blog.davidlibeau.fr/push-notifications-are-a-privacy... Either do not include sensitive user data inside a notification by default, or encrypt that data before you send it to the notification server.

janfoeh 6mo ago
According to Michael Tsai, they did use encrypted notification payloads. The OS just then stores the decrypted payloads in its notification database. [0] [0] https://mjtsai.com/blog/2026/04/10/notifications-privacy/ https://mjtsai.com/blog/2026/04/10/notifications-privacy/
greysonp 6mo ago
Signal developer here. Our FCM and APN notifications are empty and just tell the app to wake up, fetch encrypted messages, decrypt them, and then generate the notification ourselves locally.
- GeekyBear 6mo ago
  That's certainly a better state of affairs. So you just need to fix the default setting and not display the message text in notifications to prevent this issue in the future?

ransom1538 6mo ago

0) send a public key. 1) encrypt the file with your private key 2) send file. WTF. This is super simple stuff.

amethyst 6mo ago
3) recipient stores decrypted content in plain text and backs that up in well-known cloud storage systems

commandersaki 6mo ago

We send the messages in notifications. So the OS can keep them. Turns out Apple was doing that. There is an option you can turn on to prevent that. It is off by default. At least on my iPhone the default is to preview messages only when unlocked [0]. This user went out of their way to show previews in a locked state which meant it was vulnerable by digital acquisition without unlock code. [0] https://files.catbox.moe/3gwjoy.png https://files.catbox.moe/3gwjoy.png

eggnet 6mo ago
That doesn’t solve the problem. You have to configure Signal to not send the information in the notification.
- commandersaki 6mo ago
  “We learned that specifically on iPhones, if one’s settings in the Signal app allow for message notifications and previews to show up on the lock screen, [then] the iPhone will internally store those notifications/message previews in the internal memory of the device,” a supporter of the defendants who was taking notes during the trial told 404 Media Doesn't indicate this is an issue when you have it set to preview when unlocked.

bombcar 6mo ago

If the encryption security isn’t a freaking pain in every ass in the Tri county area, it’s not secure. That’s been my go-to and I’ve yet to see it not work.