4 ms·
You’re right, but I think the commenter you’re replying to is also right. The OP is using unreadable hex strings in a way that obscures what’s actually going o
by amluto 7mo ago
You’re right, but I think the commenter you’re replying to is also right.
The OP is using unreadable hex strings in a way that obscures what’s actually going on. If you turn those strings into functionally equivalent text, then the signatures are computed over:
(serialized object, “This is a TreeRoot”)
and the verifier calls the API:
func Verify(key Key, sig []byte, obj VerifiableObjecter) error
(I assume they meant Object not Objector.)
This API is wrong, full stop. Do not use this design. Sure, it might catch one specific screwup, but it will not catch subtler errors like confusing a TreeRoot that the signer trusts with a TreeRoot that means something else entirely. And it requires canonical encodings, which serves no purpose here. And it forces the verifier to deserialize unverified data, which is a big mistake.
The right solution is to have the sender sign a message, where:
(a) At the time of verification, the message is just bytes, and
(b) The message is structured such that it contains all the information needed to interpret it correctly.
So the message might be a serialization of a union where one element is “I trust this TreeRoot” and another is “I revoke this key”, etc. and the verification API verifies bytes.
If you want to get fancy and make domain separation and forward-and-backward-compatibility easier, then build a mini deserializer into the verifier that deserializes tuples of bytes, or at most UUIDs or similar. So you could sign (UUID indicating protocol v1 message type Foo, serialization of a Foo). And you make that explicit to the caller. And the verifier (a) takes bytes as input and (b) does not even try to parse them into a tuple until after verifying the signature.
P.S. Any protocol that uses the OP’s design must be quite tortured. How exactly is there a sensible protocol where you receive a message, read enough of it to figure out what type (in the protobuf sense) it contains such that there is more than one possible choice, then verify the data of that type? Are they expecting that you have a message containing a oneof and you sign only the oneof instead of the entire message? Why?
- maxtaco 7mo agoI think in practice it doesn't work to deserialize only verified data. Snowpack has a mechanism for this but I found it impractical to require all use cases fit this form. I'm not sure exactly what system you're describing, but I hope it doesn't involve hand-marshaling and unmarshaling of data structures. Your requirement (b) seems at odds with forward-compatibility. Lack of forward-compatibility complicates upgrades, especially in federated systems when you cannot expect all nodes to upgrade at once. I might be biased, but it's been possible to write a sufficiently complex system (https://github.com/foks-proj/go-foks https://github.com/foks-proj/go-foks) without feeling "tortured." It's actually quite the opposite, the cleanest system I've programmed in for these use cases, and I've tried many over the last 25 years. Never am I guessing how to verify an object, I'm not sure how that follows. I also think it's worth noting that the same mechanism works for MAC'ing, Encryption and prefixed hashing. Just today I came across this IDL code: struct ChunkNoncePayload @0xadba174b7e8dcc08 { id @0 : lib.FileID; offset @1 : lib.Offset; final @2 : Bool; } And the following Go code for making a nonce for encrypting a chunk of a large file: pld := lcl.ChunkNoncePayload{ Id: fid, Offset: offset, Final: isFinal, } hsh, err := core.PrefixedHash(&pld) if err != nil { return nil, err } var ret [24]byte copy(ret[:], (\*hsh)[0:24]) return &ret, nil As in signing, it's nice to know this nonce won't conflict with some other nonce for a different data type, and the domain separation in the IDL guarantees that.