If you throw out strong-form rationality, why would you believe someone has (a) a perfect model; (b) knows when the 'perfect' is missing; and (c) can fix it bac

If you throw out strong-form rationality, why would you believe someone has (a) a perfect model; (b) knows when the 'perfect' is missing; and (c) can fix it back to perfect? Empirical evidence of 'imperfection' should not lead you to conclude 'this is stupid, i am smart'. In this regard, and others, there are pretty big differences in worldview between the Nobel prize winners of 2008 and 2009. [1] And what happened in-between? The financial crisis. Is that a co-incidence? Probably not. The main point of this thread -- about the price of X being one thing or another -- does not (appear to) need a critique of rationality to explain, however. In that regards, it is superflous. Whether this price is 'belief' or 'manipulation' (ie, strategy), the market would be needing to evidence preferences <accurately> for the prefernces to be revealed. Manipulation in this sense is a variation of strategic preferencing.[2] Again, this is a notion more consistent with <hyper rationality> than its opposite. Whether or not Market A and Market B have the same price is also simply explained by lack of common market participants. A textbook 'inefficiency' may result, but again this is not anywhere near a critique of rationality, proper. Lastly, thinking orthogonally to the orthodoxy is not 'conservative' its actually 'liberal' but this requires omission of capital letters [3] and some sense of history to understand. Which is the larger point about rhetoric. And closer to my personal worldview. _________ [1] ie, Krugman vs http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/13/business/economy/13nobel.html http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/13/business/economy/13nobel.h... [2] preferences are </meta> to orthdox economics, as its practised by keynesian-style interventionists and neo-liberals (er, Conservatives) alike. [3] Liberal is now a modern brand, not a reference point of clear thinking.